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PUBLIC REQUITALS: CORRECTIVE, 
RETRIBUTIVE, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
BAILEY KUKLIN*
ABSTRACT
The currently predominant view of public requitals for criminal behavior draws on 
the deontic guidance provided rather sketchily by Kant’s writings. He offers a broad, 
formal framework for the mandate to respect others and punish those who criminally 
violate the mandate. As ethical beings, people have the duty to avoid invading the 
“autonomy space” of others that is delineated by maxims designed to reasonably and 
fairly balance everyone’s equal liberty and security interests. Once society settles on 
a complete and coherent set of maxims that determines the reach of one’s autonomy 
space, it must then turn to maxims that address the requital repercussions for invasions 
of this space. In the private realm, our legal regime looks to corrective justice for 
guidance. In the public, criminal realm we turn to . . . . Well, here is where a deep 
debate resides. Might we think of punishment as corrective justice writ large? This 
does not seem promising since our intuitions and traditions emphasize the 
blameworthiness of the criminal autonomy invader, which corrective justice 
downplays. Instead, should we turn to conceptions of retribution, as Kant asserts? If 
so, what are the parameters of retribution? While this is more promising, I believe the 
prominent role of blameworthiness in our judgments of apt punishment are best 
situated by conceptions of distributive justice. Defending and developing this position 
is the primary burden of this Article. After explicating the key elements of autonomy 
space and requitals for its invasion, including “dignity,” “respect,” “responsibility,” 
“consent,” “harm,” “wrongful harm,” and especially “blameworthiness,” I turn to the 
process by which these elements may be integrated and implemented in a just penal 
regime centered on distributive justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of autonomy is at the heart of the modern discussion of rights and 
duties. While consequentialist utilitarians, such as J.S. Mill, offer a basis for honoring 
autonomy claims, individualistic deontology dominates the current debate among 
commentators about the reach of the protections issuing from the obligation to respect 
a person’s autonomy. This debate involves two important questions. First, what is the 
justification for a person’s autonomy claims? Second, when there has been a violation 
of recognized claims, what is a proper requital? In prior articles, I addressed the first 
question,1 as well as the second question regarding requitals for invasions of private 
rights, such as torts.2 In this Article, I address requitals in the public, criminal context.
To arrive at the question of requitals for autonomy invasions, I will first summarize 
the reasoning in my prior work that led me to identify the reach of autonomy claims. 
This starts, of course, with Kant, the seminal deontologist.3 Kant places the right and 
duty to respect a person’s dignity at the center of practical reasoning. According to 
Kant, a person, by virtue of her capacity for rationality, is an ethical being whose 
autonomy is entitled to respect and who, likewise, is obligated to respect the autonomy 
of other ethical beings.4 Every moral agent is entitled to the maximum amount of 
freedom consistent with an equal freedom for others.5 Because a person’s exercise of 
her interest in freedom often is incompatible with the freedom interests of others, there 
must be a means of resolving these conflicts.6 Consequently, inconsistent exercises of 
liberty interests (positive freedom) and security interests (negative freedom) must be 
balanced by the adoption of norms or maxims of conduct.7
Under Kant, the balancing process that produces adopted maxims must meet the 
constraints of the categorical imperative. The most important forms of the categorical 
imperative for our purposes are, first, that maxims are to be universalized, meaning 
that they must apply equally to all within the class of persons covered by the maxims.8
                                                          
1 Bailey Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 375 (2015) [hereinafter 
Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy].
2 Bailey Kuklin, Private Requitals, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 965 (2016) [hereinafter Kuklin,
Private Requitals].
3 Id.
4 Id. at 967–68.
5 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785),
reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 37, 41 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1996) [hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS].
6 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 381.
7 Id. at 390–91.
8 “[A]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law.” KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra
note 5, at 73 (emphasis omitted). This mandate “can be called the Formula of Universal Law . . 
. .” PAUL GUYER, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW, AND HAPPINESS 142 (2000).
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Second, moral agents are to be treated as ends in themselves and not as a means only 
to another’s ends.9 As an aspect of exercising her autonomous freedom, each agent is 
to adopt maxims that govern her own conduct while respecting the equal autonomy 
interests of others.10 Since the constraints of the categorical imperative usually are seen 
as formal only,11 within these limitations, in principle, an agent may adopt any one of 
an infinite number of complete and coherent sets of deontic maxims. What, then, is to 
be done when the proper maxims adopted by one agent are inconsistent with the proper 
maxims adopted by another? From a private, entirely individualized perspective, this 
problem is intractable.12 Kant resolved this problem by finding a nonconsensual social 
contract that obligates everyone.13 One might argue that ignoring the consent of the 
governed is not very Kantian, at least in light of Kant’s deep concern for personal 
autonomy.14 Others have resolved this problem by basing political obligation on a 
social contract grounded on such propositions as hypothetical or tacit consent, or 
notions of fairness.15 From a personal autonomy perspective, I see much hand waving 
in these solutions, but I am relegated to hand waving myself. The foundational 
disagreements between Kantian liberals and Kantian libertarians, and others, are 
understandable.16 Therefore, I rely on a deus ex machina of sorts that grants a just 
government the power to adopt a complete and coherent set of legal maxims, as long
as each maxim satisfies the categorical imperative. Likewise, a community may 
establish a set of non-legal, moral norms.
                                                          
9 “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 5, at 80 (emphasis omitted). This form or formulation is 
referred to as “the Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself . . . .” GUYER, supra note 8, at 142.
10 Robert Johnson & Adam Cureton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Feb. 23, 2004), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/.
11 See, e.g., GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 89–90
(T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 40 (1970). But see, e.g., Andrews Reath, Agency and Universal Law, in
AGENCY AND AUTONOMY IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY 196, 196 (2006); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE 
AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 383 app. (2009) [hereinafter 
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM].
12 See generally Jens Timmermann, Kant’s Puzzling Ethics of Maxims, 8 HARV. REV. PHIL.
39, 43 (2000).
13 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797), reprinted in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 5, at 353, 451, 457–59 [hereinafter KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS]; JOHN RAWLS, Justice as Fairness, in COLLECTED PAPERS 47, 71 n.22 (Samuel 
Freeman ed., 1999); RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 11, at 198–204.
14 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 385–86.
15 See generally DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); BRIAN SKYRMS,
EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996); Fred D’Agostino et al., Contemporary 
Approaches to the Social Contract, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 3, 1996), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/.
16 See generally Jason Kuznicki, Kantianism, in ARGUMENTS FOR LIBERTY 87, 87–122 
(Aaron Ross Powell & Grant Babcock eds., 2016).
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With this shaky foundation in place, we are now ready for the business of adopting 
maxims. Maxims establish the extent of a person’s autonomy claims.17 I refer to this 
ambit, as have others, by using a spatial metaphor—autonomy space. The adoption of 
deontic maxims delineates a person’s autonomy space.18 For instance, “do not assault 
another person” protects a person from certain kinds of harms. Once these types of 
substantive, first-order maxims are adopted, the boundaries they establish may 
generally be adjusted by the consent of the protected party.19 In case there is a 
nonconsensual violation of these maxims, we must turn our attention to apt responses 
to the autonomy space invasion. This requires the adoption of requital, second-order 
maxims.20 In the private realm, the standard for Kantians is to look to Aristotle’s 
concept of corrective justice for guidance.21 In the public, criminal realm, we usually 
look to the concept of retribution, as did Kant.22
The Kantian process of identifying autonomy space, and then protecting against 
invasions of it, is not simple and straightforward. A person’s material autonomy space, 
her freedom in practice, is demarcated not only by substantive maxims, but also by 
the maxims that are embraced to requite invasions.23 Hence, if for no other reason, 
these requital maxims must also satisfy the categorical imperative.24 Corrective justice 
and retribution are up to this task in principle, but like the categorical imperative itself, 
they both have a formal quality.25 In other words, each of these two concepts have
many deontically justifiable conceptions.26 For example, an invasion of the autonomy 
space delineated by an assault maxim may trigger an associated legal or moral requital 
maxim that, perhaps depending on the particularities of the assault, may call for
general damages for harms, damages for only particular kinds or extents of harms, or 
simply for a sincere apology that acknowledges the invader’s disregard of the 
invadee’s protected dignity interest. An assaulter effectively has greater freedom 
under a requital maxim that requires an apology than one that exacts general 
                                                          
17 Timmermann, supra note 12, at 39.
18 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 380.
19 Some boundary markers are, most commentators would argue, immutable or inalienable, 
such as the disallowance of slavery contracts. Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 
394. Allowable consent does not simply serve as an excuse for autonomy invasions; instead, it 
readjusts the autonomy space boundary such that the consensual actions impacting on the 
consenter’s baseline, pre-consensual autonomy space, do not constitute invasions at all. Under 
the Consent Principle I favor, the greater the negative effect of the consensual conduct on the 
consenter’s baseline autonomy space, the deeper, more understanding, must be the consent. For 
further development of this principle, see infra text accompanying notes 489–93.
20 Kuklin, Public Requitals, supra note 2, at 972.
21 Id. at 979.
22 Frederick Rauscher, Kant’s Social and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(July 24, 2007), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/.
23 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 381.
24 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 990.
25 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 388.
26 Id.
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damages.27 The assaulter’s personal resources and future options are less at risk from 
her invasive conduct.28 Vice versa for the person assaulted.29
In considering plausible maxims for adoption, we must attend to the harms, the 
setbacks to interest,30 that go onto the scales balancing liberty and security interests. 
As Kantians, the central harm is to one’s dignitary interest, the right to be respected 
and treated as a moral equal.31 Associated with dignitary harm are the standard types 
of harms recognized in legal and moral practice: physical, economic, and psychic.32
These four types of harms may be direct, immediate harms or indirect, reactive
harms.33 A direct or immediate harm is the usual, quotidian sort, as where a battery 
causes physical injury, medical expenses, and pain and suffering.34 An indirect or 
reactive harm is a product of an awareness of an autonomy space invasion, as where 
the public responds to the knowledge of a crime spree by fright, expenditures for 
protective measures, and even physical illness from the psychic distress.35 Reactive 
harms may be convoluted. A targeted invadee may suffer them when, for example, 
she becomes aware that she is the object of an intended invasion before the invader 
even begins to carry out her planned incursion. As another instance, a person may 
silently suffer invasive abuse from her partner that begins to negatively affect her 
work. When she perceives that her coworkers have begun to question her abilities or 
work ethic, she may suffer reactive harms of all four types, which may increase her 
coworkers’ unfavorable perceptions, etc. The kin, kith, and supporters of an invadee 
and, for that matter, an invader, may suffer reactive harms from their perceptions of 
the interaction between the invader and direct invadee.36 Reactive harms are, I argue, 
a crucial, perhaps underappreciated element in a deontic realm, especially in the 
retributive context of criminal law.
A harm principle, such as those advanced by J.S. Mill or Joel Feinberg,37
establishes limits to the acceptable constraints on liberty, and reciprocally, the 
protection of security.38 For instance, some types of harms, deemed self-regarding 
                                                          
27 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 974.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 For “harm” as a setback to interest, see JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31–64 (1984) 
[hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS].
31 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 390, 427.
32 Id. at 427.
33 See id. at 433.
34 Id. at 430–32.
35 Id. at 433.
36 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 1010.
37 See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 30, at 10–14, 26–27; JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 134–67 (4th ed. London 1869) (“Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the 
Individual”).
38 David Brink, Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 
9, 2007), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political/.
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harms (e.g., reading sexually explicit literature, according to some observers), do not 
present legitimate concerns for others.39 Even other-regarding harms, such as those 
from business competition, may or may not call for restrictions.40 Like the categorical 
imperative, corrective justice, and retributive justice, specific maxims must flesh out 
a harm principle. With this in mind, when establishing a complete and coherent set of 
substantive and requital maxims within deontic constraints, the notion of culpability 
or blameworthiness traditionally and intuitively is seen as an important factor.41 As 
individualistic deontologists, we are concerned with the just deserts of the invader, 
and perhaps the invadee as well, especially when delineating conceptions of 
retribution. Therefore, acceptable meanings of desert must be identified. While we 
may find some room for truly strict liability, it makes most deontologists 
uncomfortable, particularly in the criminal law realm, for its failure to weigh in the 
actor’s blameworthiness.42
The genus of blameworthiness has two species. First, “responsibility 
blameworthiness” harkens back to Aristotle’s position that fully responsible choices 
and actions must be free of unavoidable ignorance and coercion.43 At some point, 
depending on the situation, a person’s choice is too impaired to fairly hold her 
responsible for it, or at least, fully responsible. She has not adequately chosen, or 
“consented to” in some sense, her own conduct. Second, “disrespect blameworthiness” 
accounts for Kant’s insistence that one has the duty to respect the equal dignity of 
other rational, ethical beings.44 Disrespect blameworthiness must be distinguished 
from dignitary harm. Dignitary harm is judged from the invadee’s perspective, while 
disrespect blameworthiness is gauged from the invader’s perspective.45 An agent who 
beneficently paternalizes another person produces a dignitary harm by denying that 
person the liberty to choose for herself, even when such action produces no other harm 
and is prompted by love for the person. An agent who consensually assists another 
person to successfully diet is disrespect blameworthy when the motive for the aid, 
unbeknownst to the dieter, is to see her suffer during the process.
Both responsibility blameworthiness and disrespect blameworthiness may be 
adopted as factors in substantive maxims and associated requital maxims. For 
example, here are plausible high-level substantive and associated requital maxims 
(that need much unpacking): “[d]o not unreasonably harm another person through 
(responsibility) blameworthy conduct”; “[i]f one unreasonably harms another person 
through (responsibility) blameworthy conduct, then one is to compensate that person 
                                                          
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 446.
42 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 969. 
43 See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, ch. 1 (c. 384 B.C.E.), reprinted in THE 
BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 964–67 (Richard McKeon ed., Random House 1941).
44 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 446.
45 Id. at 453.
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to the extent of the harm and one’s (disrespect) blameworthiness.”46 In the course of 
working out a complete set of substantive maxims to establish autonomy space 
boundaries, some types of situational features are salient: intentional harm; truth-
telling and promise-keeping; reliance and expectations; exploitation (advantage-
taking); risk imposition; and the existence of established norms, such as statutes, 
customs, and mores.47 This Article mainly focuses on the plausible retributive requital 
maxims for violation of substantive maxims related to the aforementioned situations
and others, all of which require balancing the liberty and security interests of moral 
agents.
As should be evident already, I have projected a rocky road to map. Commentators 
have not identified a way to apply the theory of retributive punishment to an actual 
measure of levels of punishment.48 The application of corrective justice has not 
generated as much complaint, but this lack of dissatisfaction is apparently because the 
concept largely has been narrowed to the single conception of returning an invadee to 
the position she occupied prior to the invasion.49 The invader’s blameworthiness plays 
a minor role in gauging the private requital.50 One may strongly argue against this 
position, however, for minimal negligence may ground enormous damage recoveries, 
or vice versa. The public realm of punishment is quite to the contrary when it comes 
to accounting for blameworthiness. Our legacies and feelings about punishment 
invoke the concept of just deserts, which puts blameworthiness on center stage.51 Once 
we put responsibility and disrespect blameworthiness into the limelight, and the means 
to accommodate these factors in measures of requital, all hope of clearly implied, 
mechanical applications in the private and public realms vanish. Thus, the rocky road 
will not reach a definitive final destination. Traveling that road will, I hope, show 
some of the potholes, gullies, and chasms that must be avoided or leaped.
                                                          
46 Bailey Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 173, 198–99 (2017) 
[hereinafter Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness].
47 See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 1020–25 (“Norms”).
48 See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 
818–20 (2007) [hereinafter Cahill, Retributive Justice]. Furthermore, “a cursory historical 
survey [of philosophical discussions] makes it clear that although retributivism has been, and 
still is, a live philosophical option, its theoretical base has not been clearly articulated.” GEORGE 
SHER, DESERT 69 (1987) [hereinafter SHER, DESERT]. Duff believes that strict retributive 
accounts cannot explain “the role of hard treatment in punishment.” R.A. Duff, Penal 
Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1 (1996) 
[hereinafter Duff, Penal Communications].
49 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 416.
50 Id. at 439.
51 “Under a distributive principle of ‘deontological desert’ . . . , the sole criterion for 
punishment is the actor’s moral blameworthiness, a matter of moral philosophy. . . . The degree 
of an offender’s blameworthiness depends upon both the seriousness of the violation and the 
extent of the person’s moral accountability for it.” PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 11 (2008) [hereinafter ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES]. “Culpability, 
it should be noted, affects both questions of liability (‘Should the person be punished at all?’) 
and questions of allocation (‘How severely should he be punished?’).” ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE 80 n.* (1976) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE].
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II. CORRECTIVE, RETRIBUTIVE, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
In a deontic regime, autonomy space is specified by adopted maxims.52 Invasions 
of autonomy space are requited by conceptions and applications of deontic justice. In 
the private sphere of tort, contract, and unjust enrichment, conceptions of corrective 
justice are invoked as requital standards.53 In the public sphere of criminal law, 
conceptions of retribution are commonly invoked.54 As Aristotle declares, conceptions 
of distributive justice also play a role in the public sphere.55 The interrelationship 
among these three forms of justice is not settled.56 Some commentators contend that 
retributive justice is simply corrective justice writ large.57 Corrective justice is said to 
account for wrongful harms to specific protected individuals, while retributive justice 
accounts for wrongful harms to the general public, though both forms of justice are 
gauged in a similar manner.58 While this view has attractive features, the usual, more 
                                                          
52 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 392.
53 Id. at 381.
54 Id.
55 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 43, bk. V, chs. 1–3, at 1002–07. For a useful summary, see 
IZHAK ENGLARD, CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: FROM ARISTOTLE TO MODERN TIMES
1–10 (2009).
56 In working out the relationship among the three forms of justice, “a number of conflicting 
solutions have been advanced . . . : (1) retribution makes part of distributive justice; (2) it is part 
of corrective justice; (3) it is a third form of justice; (4) it is a distinct idea that can be applied 
to the basic two forms of particular justice.” ENGLARD, supra note 55, at 9–10. As for the 
difference between distributive justice and corrective justice, Sadurski finds “the distinction is 
not as clear in actual social life as it is in theory . . . .” WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS 
DUE 25 (1985) [hereinafter SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE]; see id. at 25–36. “Because 
corrective and distributive justice are mutually irreducible structures of justificatory coherence, 
a single legal relationship cannot coherently partake of both.” Ernest J. Weinrib, The 
Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 583, 589 (1993). For 
elaboration, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 84–93 (2003).
57 See, e.g., David Wood, Retributive and Corrective Justice, Criminal and Private Law,
48 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 542, 542 (2005).
58 “[I]t is desired that a theory of punishment concern itself with corrective justice, as that 
is its principal aim. . . . [This] is meant to caution against a theory of punishment’s placing 
considerations other than those of corrective justice (e.g., distributive justice) at the forefront of 
concern in punishment.” J. ANGELO CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT 22 (rev. 2d ed. 
2004) [hereinafter CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT]. “[A]ccording to Aquinas 
retribution is embedded in corrective justice: rectification of wrongful conduct must take into 
account the fact that injury has been caused not only to a private person, but also to the state or 
to the public at large through violation of their interest in individual security.” Ronen Perry, The 
Third Form of Justice, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 233, 239 (2010) [hereinafter Perry, The Third 
Form of Justice] (citing ENGLARD, supra note 55, at 19–20 (citing Aquinas)). Perry states, “[i]n 
my view, applying the notion of retributive justice cannot be deemed as vindicating an 
independent state interest but as an attempt to vindicate the aggregate interest of law abiding 
citizens.” Id. at 241 n.67. Perry finds substantial differences between retribution and corrective 
justice. See id. at 239–42. “[T]here is now no danger of confusion or collision between the 
principle of Reparative and that of Retributive Justice, as the one is manifestly concerned with 
the claims of the injured party, and the other with the deserts of the wrongdoer . . . .” Henry 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss2/5
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appealing, conceptions of corrective justice fail to satisfactorily incorporate the 
centrality of just deserts in conceptions of retributive justice.59 Moral luck, for 
instance, may crucially affect whether, and the extent to which, an invader’s 
obligations under corrective justice correlate to her degree of blameworthiness.60 As
two examples, under (non)responsibility for moral luck, an invader’s outrageously evil 
motivation may produce little harm, as where a delivery accident destroyed the large 
shipment of drugs she poisoned.61 Alternatively, her minimal wrongfulness may cause 
enormous harm, as where she inadvertently rammed a school bus over a cliff.62 For 
the conceptions of retribution that I embrace, blameworthiness must always be kept 
under the magnifying glass.63 Corrective justice, in general terms, obligates an invader 
to restore the invadee to her position prior to the invader’s conduct.64 Retribution is to 
                                                          
Sidgwick, Justice as Desert, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?: A READER ON JUSTICE AND DESERT
47, 52 (Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod eds., 1999). “[T]he problem is to explain the notion 
of a public wrong in a way which does not denigrate the wrong done to the individual victim . . 
. .” Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 48, at 79. “The wrong suffered by the mugging 
victim is ‘her’ wrong: but insofar as we identify ourselves with her, as we should, as a fellow 
member of the community, it becomes ‘our’ wrong too.” Id. I would say, we are also harmed.
While some argue that corrective justice subsumes retribution, a welfarist may turn this around. 
In discussing the notion of fairness, 
concerned with making the injurer pay for the harm he has occasioned. . . . [Kaplow 
and Shavell] find it convenient to refer to such a notion of fairness as one involving 
punishment, whether the motivation for the notion pertains to retribution, the desire to 
rectify the outcome created by the injurer’s action . . . or some other reason.
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 87 (2002) (footnote omitted).
59 “Although in my own view, corrective justice is not this focused on wrongdoing to the 
exclusion of culpability, it remains true that wrongdoing, and not culpability, is the main trigger 
for corrective justice duties.” Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 319, 331 (1996) [hereinafter Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability].
60 For various types of luck, see RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 73 (2000) (“option” 
and “brute” luck); Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin Is More Wicked than the Unsuccessful 
One, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 791, 798 (2000) (“character,” “opportunity,” “circumstantial,” and 
“outcome” luck). “Why treat these different kinds of luck so asymmetrically? There seems to 
be no principled difference between them.” Id.
61 Perry, The Third Form of Justice, supra note 58, at 240.
62 “[E]ven where wrongful conduct results in harm, the extent of damages under corrective 
justice is determined by the fortuitous amount of the victim’s loss, which is usually a poor 
measure of the gravity of the wrong.” Id. at 240, 240 n.64. For more on moral luck, see infra
text accompanying notes 333–34.
63 “Nowadays, the dominant tendency in criminal law theory is to derive the conditions of 
penal liability and of exculpation from a moral theory of inward blameworthiness for 
wrongdoing.” ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF PENAL 
JUSTICE 17 (2009) (citing exceptions).
64 “[T]ort law does not purport to provide remedies proportional to the injurer’s wrong: 
normally, compensation is the remedy, whatever the nature of the tort or wrong. . . . [T]he tort 
remedy usually does not vary with the culpability of the injurer.” Kenneth W. Simons, The 
Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 721 
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punish an invader in proportion to her just deserts irrespective of the fortuitous impact 
of her conduct on the invadees and her obligations to them under corrective justice.65
Some commentators argue that an interrelationship exists between corrective and 
distributive justice,66 or among corrective justice, distributive justice, and retribution.67
Some see an unbridgeable gap between corrective and retributive justice.68 I subscribe 
                                                          
(2008) [hereinafter Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction] (citing John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1142–43 (2007) 
[hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck]).
65 There are other views. “In contrast with culpability-based retributivism, which premises 
just deserts upon the agent’s blameworthiness in bringing about a harm, harm-based
retributivism premises just deserts (at least in part) simply upon the agent’s bringing about a 
harm.” Kenneth W. Simons, Book Review: Social Meaning, Retributivism, and Homicide, 19 
LAW & PHIL. 407, 413 (2000) [hereinafter Simons, Book Review] (reviewing SAMUEL H.
PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL (1998)).
66 “The normative force of corrective justice is, [Coleman] argues, conditional upon 
whether there are other institutions in society the purpose of which is to make good victims’ 
losses. . . . [As in New Zealand and no-fault insurance, such schemes are] generally best 
understood in terms of distributive justice . . . .” Stephen R. Perry, The Distributive Turn: 
Mischief, Misfortune and Tort Law, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 315, 317–18 (1996) [hereinafter 
Perry, The Distributive Turn] (citing JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 401–04 (1992) 
[hereinafter COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS]). Ripstein sees a chasm between corrective and 
distributive justice. Corrective justice “is not a distributive theory, not even a small-scale 
version of distributive justice between plaintiff and defendant. It is not a theory of desert or 
proportionality, not an attempt to approximate a normative order in which suffering is 
proportionate to wickedness.” Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and 
Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163, 199 (2011) [hereinafter Ripstein, Civil Recourse].
67 “Since all justice is allocative, and ‘distributive’ and ‘allocative’ are synonyms, it is hard 
to resist the thought that all justice is distributive.” John Gardner, Corrective Justice, Corrected,
12 DIRITTO & QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE 9, 13–14 (2012) [hereinafter Gardner, Corrective Justice]. 
“It is notoriously hard to pin down what is interestingly distinctive about [corrective and 
distributive justice].” Id. at 14. “Retributive justice combines features of both corrective and 
distributive justice.” George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 51, 58, 57–59 (1999) [hereinafter Fletcher, Place of Victims]. For a 
discussion of commentators who have taken this position, with criticism, see Perry, The Third 
Form of Justice, supra note 58, at 242–45. As telegraphed by the title of his article, Perry takes 
the position that retribution does not fall within corrective or distributive justice. “The idea that 
retributive justice constitutes an independent form [of justice] has gained support in modern 
legal scholarship. It is assumed without explanation by many authors.” Id. at 246.
68 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 
B.U. L. REV. 201, 207 (1996); Jules Coleman & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of Tort Law, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 22, 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/tort-
theories/. “Although there are theories of retributive justice which in many respects resemble 
theories of corrective justice, the most plausible versions of retributive justice separate the duty 
to accept punishment from any duty to annul a victim’s losses.” Heidi M. Hurd, Correcting 
Injustice to Corrective Justice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 72 (1991) (citing HERBERT MORRIS,
ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 31–58 (1976)).
In standing back to survey the arguments, one commentator sees three kinds of distinctions 
between corrective and retributive justice, that is, private and criminal law, based on the 
prohibitions involved, the remedies available, and the means of enforcement. See Aya Gruber, 
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to the view that retributive justice fits most comfortably within conceptions of 
distributive justice that place just deserts on center stage.69 This view requires 
specification of the idea of just deserts.70
                                                          
Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical Criticisms of the Nonspecific Victim 
Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 483–84 (2004). For Gruber’s observations on the 
differences, see id. at 484–96. Gruber places the differences between private law and public law 
in this third distinction (means of enforcement). Id. Ripstein provides an example. “Criminal 
law differs from tort in three distinctive ways. First, in order to qualify as a crime, the risk of 
wrongful injury must be chosen, not merely taken. Second, criminals are punished. Third, the 
state is charged with punishment and appears as a party to a criminal proceeding.” ARTHUR 
RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 245 (1999) [hereinafter RIPSTEIN,
EQUALITY].
Some question the nature or extent of the gap in existing law. Here are some examples: “If
painted without an eye to detail, the line that divides most of tort law from most of criminal law 
is the line between consequential wrongs and deontological wrongs.” Heidi M. Hurd, The 
Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 271 (1996). “If this is true, . . . it challenges 
those who are corrective justice theorists about torts and retributive justice theorists about 
crimes to ask why consequential wrongs uniquely demand corrective justice while 
deontological wrongs uniquely demand retributive justice.” Id. at 272. Simons takes issue with 
Hurd. Simons says, “I present evidence that deontological principles can explain much of tort 
doctrine. In particular, I suggest that negligence doctrine can have a nonconsequentialist 
justification, notwithstanding the cost-benefit and balancing form of analysis that courts 
increasingly employ in negligence cases.” Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, 
and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 273–74 (1996) [hereinafter Simons, Deontology]. For 
Simons’s evidence, see id. at 276–85, and for his rejection of Hurd’s thesis, see id. at 285–95. 
See generally Robert W. Drane & David J. Neal, On Moral Justifications for the Tort/Crime 
Distinction, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 398 (1980); Richard A. Epstein, Symposium, The Tort/Crime 
Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1996); Simons, Book Review, supra note 
65.
69 “Some [retributivists] regard the punishment of wrongdoers as derivative from a 
fundamental axiom of justice that wrongdoers deserve to suffer. Other retributivists try to 
connect punishment with broader issues of distributive justice, or justice in the distribution of 
the benefits and burdens of social life.” C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 5 (1987). 
“The literature rarely rationalizes punishment in terms of distributive justice.” Alon Harel, 
Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of 
Comparative Fault, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1181, 1201 (1994) (footnote omitted). “With few 
exceptions . . . there has been no deliberate effort to propose a principle or set of principles 
which apply uniformly to the retributive and distributive aspects of ‘doing justice’. There has 
been no congruence between these two realms in modern literature, nor (I suspect) in most 
popular thinking.” Wojciech Sadurski, Social Justice and the Problem of Punishment, 25 ISR.
L. REV. 302, 304 (1991) [hereinafter Sadurski, Social Justice] (citing ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON 
AND MORALITY (1978)). For a discussion of whether retribution is properly considered an aspect 
of distributive justice, see Perry, The Third Form of Justice, supra note 58, at 242–45, who finds 
more differences than alignments. Perry discusses whether retribution is an amalgam of 
corrective and distributive justice. Id. at 245–46. But, ultimately, he subscribes to the view that 
retribution is a third form of justice. Id. at 246–47. Sadurski, “suggest[s] that there is no reason 
to avoid the application of a principle of distributive justice (that is, justice in the distribution 
of good things) to retributive justice.” Wojciech Sadurski, Distributive Justice and the Theory 
of Punishment, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 47 (1985) (noting Rawls’s disagreement as well).
70 “Among the great ethical theorists of the past, Aristotle, Butler, Price, Kant and Hegel 
all made considerable use of the notion of desert, yet none of them, with the possible exception 
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The literature identifies two broad categories of desert, one that is based on 
equality values and the other on liberty values.71 Examples of equality-grounded 
                                                          
of Price, made any real endeavor to analyse [sic] the concept.” JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND 
DESERT 50 (1973) [hereinafter KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT]. “By ‘punishment according 
to desert’ I mean punishment according to the offender’s personal blameworthiness for the past 
offense, which takes account not only of the seriousness of the offense but also the full range of 
culpability, capacity, and situational factors that we understand to affect an offender’s 
blameworthiness.” Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Principle of ‘Limiting 
Retributivism’: Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other than Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 3, 5, 5 n.5 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson, Limiting Retributivism] (noting that “all 
thoughtful desert advocates that I know essentially support the description I have offered here”). 
Robinson finds “at least three distinct conceptions of desert to be found in the current debates, 
typically without distinction being made between them. The three include what might be called 
vengeful desert, deontological desert, and empirical desert.” Paul H. Robinson, Competing 
Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
145, 146 (2008) [hereinafter Robinson, Competing Conceptions]. “[T]he primary focus of 
vengeful desert remains the extent of the harm of the offence.” Id. at 147 (first citing NICOLA 
LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 17 (1994); then 
citing TEN, supra note 69, at 152). “The deontological conception of desert focuses not on the 
harm of the offense but on the blameworthiness of the offender, as drawn from the arguments 
and analyses of moral philosophy.” Id. at 148 (footnote omitted). “Empirical desert, like 
deontological desert, focuses on the blameworthiness of the offender. But in determining the 
principles by which punishment is to be assessed, it looks not to philosophical analyses but 
rather to the community’s intuitions of justice.” Id. at 149. While there are difficulties with all 
three conceptions, “it seems clear that the usefulness of the ongoing debate over desert as a 
distributive principle can only be enhanced by distinguishing these three conceptions of it.” Id.
at 175. Scheid identifies three “contrasting notions of punitive desert as statements of desert 
principles,” none of which specifically focuses on the blameworthiness of the invader. Don E. 
Scheid, Davis, Unfair Advantage Theory, and Criminal Desert, 14 LAW & PHIL. 375, 399 n.52 
(1995) [hereinafter Scheid, Davis] (noting that the traditional retributivist looks to the harm 
caused, compensation theories turn on the damages caused, and the unfair-advantage theory 
center on the illicitly gained advantage). “An adequate account of desert may grow rather 
complex.” SHELLY KAGAN, THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 5 (2012). For some of the complexities, 
see id. at 5–12. Kagan grounds desert on a person’s virtue. Id. at 251.
71 See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING:
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 55 (1970) [hereinafter FEINBERG, Justice and 
Personal Desert]; JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 107–17 (1973); CH. PERELMAN, THE 
IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 6–29 (John Petrie trans., 1963); NICHOLAS 
RESCHER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 73–83 (1966); SHER, DESERT, supra note 48, at 6–8; Owen 
McLeod, Introduction to Contemporary Interpretations of Desert, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?,
supra note 58, at 61, 61–69 [hereinafter McLeod, Introduction]; Diana T. Meyers, Introduction,
in ECONOMIC JUSTICE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES 1, 1–2 (Kenneth Kipnis 
& Diana T. Meyers eds., 1985); John Kleinig, The Concept of Desert, in WHAT DO WE
DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 84, 88–89 [hereinafter Kleinig, The Concept of Desert]; Serena 
Olsaretti, Introduction: Debating Desert and Justice, in DESERT AND JUSTICE 1 (Serena Olsaretti 
ed., 2003); see generally SHER, DESERT, supra note 48; WHAT DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 58. 
“In spite of its ubiquity, or perhaps because of it, the notion of desert is not especially well 
understood. This isn’t surprising, since there are many difficult questions surrounding desert.” 
Owen McLeod, Desert, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 14, 2002), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/desert/. “Even when one strives to be 
charitable, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that desert theory takes a widely held but 
imprecise intuition that wrongdoers should be punished and attempts, without much success, to 
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conceptions of desert include the view that each individual is to receive according to 
her needs, rank, legal entitlement (society’s rules, e.g., statutory welfare), or “same 
thing” (as equals).72 This equality notion of desert relates to a person’s state of being.73
Under Kant, it is by virtue of having the capacity to be a rational, ethical being that 
one’s state of being entitles one to respect.74 Indeed, apparently because the 
requirements for meeting this notion of desert are so minimal, rather than saying one 
“deserves” the benefits of society’s rules, for example, saying that one is “entitled” to 
them is more common.75 Examples of liberty-grounded conceptions of desert, on the 
other hand, argue that each is to receive according to her merit, ability, achievement, 
virtue, effort, sacrifice, works, contribution, or agreements with others.76 This liberty 
notion of desert relates to a person’s conduct.77 A person who does praiseworthy or 
blameworthy conduct is to be requited accordingly.78
This Article argues that the conduct, liberty-driven conceptions of distributive 
justice are the conceptions that best fit into a retributive calculus.79 While the basic 
                                                          
impose onto this intuition philosophical vigor.” Alice G. Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a 
Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 739 (2009). “We often claim that . . . punishment merely gives 
offenders what they deserve, but we have no coherent theory of deserts which justifies the 
claim.” TEN, supra note 69, at 164.
72 Peter Celello, Desert, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/desert/ 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
73 Id.
74 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 383–84.
75 See McLeod, Introduction, supra note 71, at 67–68; Owen McLeod, Desert and 
Institutions, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 186, 186; Kleinig, The Concept of 
Desert, supra note 71, at 88–89. Rawls, for example, writes that “what we can say is that, in the 
traditional phrase, a just scheme gives each person his due: that is, it allots to each what he is 
entitled to as defined by the scheme itself.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 275–76 (rev. 
ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE]. David Miller, holding that desert relates 
to conduct, objects to considering need or entitlement as a basis for desert. David Miller, 
Deserts, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 93.
76 Celello, supra note 72.
77 See, e.g., SHER, DESERT, supra note 48, at 37–52.
78 Rawls has famously, and influentially, challenged the view that one’s desert should be 
based on conduct, because a person does not deserve her natural endowments or superior 
character that facilitate the cultivation of her abilities. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 
75, at 87. Hence, “most contemporary political philosophy, especially liberal political 
philosophy, the dominant contemporary form, has renounced or greatly undermined the notion 
of desert.” Louis P. Pojman, Introduction to Historical Interpretations of Desert, in WHAT DO
WE DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 1, 6 (footnote omitted). “The leading political philosophers of 
our time . . . reject or undermine the idea of justice as rewarding desert or merit as inegalitarian 
and/or based on false consciousness.” Louis P. Pojman, Does Equality Trump Desert?, in WHAT 
DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 283 (footnote omitted) (identifying thirteen philosophers 
“to name a few”). This aspect of the debate about justice will not be addressed here. Instead, I 
target the question of what desert-based justice, if embraced, should consider.
79 Thus, I reject the position that retributive punishment is to be gauged by the invader’s 
character. Character, as a state of being, would be relevant to an equality-based notion of desert. 
All persons with the same character deserve the same positive or negative requital. Instead, I 
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duty to respect others is grounded on an equality conception of desert, the reach of any 
breach of that duty is gauged by a liberty conception.80 More specifically, 
(de)meritorious conduct has overtones of Kant’s focus on the freedom interests of an 
ethical being.81 Adopted maxims that apply universally balance her liberty and security 
interests. When conduct that has been declared criminal by a properly adopted maxim
disrupts this balance, the blameworthiness of that wrongful conduct provides the 
gauge for a just retributive requital. A wrongful criminal invasion of another’s 
established autonomy space is disrespectful of the invadee’s equal dignity.82 The 
blameworthiness of the dignitary wrong is, in its turn, gauged by the reaction of the 
knowing public as perceived by an objective observer representing the deontic views 
of society.83
In light of this orientation of the three forms of justice, insofar as a person’s 
conduct wrongfully harms another person, corrective justice requires that she 
                                                          
favor the position that retributive punishment is to be gauged by the invader’s conduct. This is 
grounded on a liberty-based notion of desert. I subscribe to Brudner’s view: “Not only is the 
character theory at odds with well-settled and defensible features of the criminal law; it is also 
intrinsically deficient as a theory of criminal desert.” BRUDNER, supra note 63, at 69; see infra
note 346.
80 Dillon points out that our commonsense notion of personal worth has two aspects. “On 
the one hand, there is the intrinsic worth, which Kant called ‘dignity,’ that each of us has simply 
by virtue of being a person rather than a rock or a tree.” Robin S. Dillon, Toward a Feminist 
Conception of Self-Respect, in DIGNITY, CHARACTER, AND SELF-RESPECT 290, 292 (Robin S. 
Dillon ed., 1995). “On the other hand, there is a kind of worth or merit we may earn through 
what we do and become, which individuals can have in varying degrees, and which some may 
lack altogether.” Id. Darwall refers to the first of these as “recognition respect” and the second 
as “appraisal respect.” Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, in DIGNITY, CHARACTER, AND 
SELF-RESPECT, supra, at 181, 183–84.
81 Johnson & Cureton, supra note 10.
82 “[A]n adequately justificatory account of a system of criminal law, trials and 
punishments must be founded on the Kantian principle of respect for individual autonomy . . . 
.” R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 11 (1986) [hereinafter DUFF, TRIALS AND 
PUNISHMENTS]. “On the question of just what it is that translates an action into one of ‘offense’ 
and the actor as ‘offender,’ it has been argued that crimes generically are acts of disrespect and 
therefore that punishment functions as a rectification.” DANIEL N. ROBINSON, PRAISE AND 
BLAME: MORAL REALISM AND ITS APPLICATIONS 181 (2002) [hereinafter ROBINSON, PRAISE AND 
BLAME].
83 Cf. Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1784, 1820 (2009) (citing Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 1187, 1195–96 (2001) (“[T]he jury is described as the conscience of the community in 
negligence cases.”); see generally DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 82, at 39–73
(“Criticism, Blame and Moral Punishment”). Relatedly, Robinson argues that the problems of 
gauging blameworthiness can be addressed by looking not at the philosophical analysis of 
deontological desert, but rather to empirical desert. Empirical desert looks “to the community’s 
intuitions of justice. The primary source of empirical desert principles . . . is not moral 
philosophy but empirical research into the factors that drive people’s intuitions of 
blameworthiness.” ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, at 139 (footnote 
omitted). In gauging empirical desert, Robinson would exclude bias from “political or social 
context or . . . other factors, such as race or class . . . .” Id.
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compensate the invadee by, typically, restoring her to her prior, protected position.84
Insofar as a person’s conduct is criminally blameworthy, irrespective of whether 
restoration is implicated, her just deserts under distributive justice call for retributive 
punishment.85 Praiseworthy behavior, often forgotten in these discussions, may call 
for rewards granted by some organ of the government.
Respect the equal dignity of all ethical, autonomous beings. Do not sacrifice 
autonomous agents merely for the sake of social welfare. With these underpinnings in 
place, collectives, such as corporations and governmental entities, do not have 
independent claims.86 They are not ethical beings.87 While we may grant the state 
standing to bring claims against individuals as a representative of the general public,88
                                                          
84 “Should we understand torts as moral wrongs or as legal wrongs? For sound doctrinal 
reasons, tort theorists have been disinclined to cast torts as moral wrongs. For a different set of 
jurisprudential reasons, they have instead treated torts as legal wrongs.” John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 930 (2010). Despite the authors’ 
examples of strict-liability type torts, among other reasons, as suggested in the later discussion 
of social norms as a source of moral duties, I doubt that moral and legal wrongs can be neatly 
separated. Goldberg and Zipursky also see an intricate intertwining. See id. at 947–53.
85 Alexander and Ferzan “argue[] that negative desert, the measure of just punishment, is 
solely a function of the culpability of the offender.” Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes: Retribution or Prevention?, in SEEKING SECURITY: PRE-
EMPTING THE COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL HARMS 103, 103 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 
2012) [hereinafter Alexander & Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes] (citing LARRY ALEXANDER 
& KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY (2009) [hereinafter ALEXANDER &
FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY]). Culpability, in its turn, has two factors. First, “the risks to 
others’ legally protected interests that the actor believes his action is ‘unleashing’ beyond his 
ability to alter.” Id. Second, “the reasons the actor perceives in favour of and against imposing 
the risks.” Id. at 104. “In essence, we reduce[] all culpability assessments to that of 
recklessness.” Id.
86 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 375.
87 Id.
88 Rather than referring to crime as harm to the state, Murphy prefers “to think of crime as 
an invasion by an individual into an area of decision making and action that is properly reserved
to the state as part of its necessary job that we, as its ‘clients,’ might think of ourselves as ‘hiring’ 
it to do.” JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Why Have Criminal Law at All?, in RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED
1, 10 (1992) [hereinafter MURPHY, Why Have Criminal Law at All?]. “[I]n the case of retributive 
justice the State acts as an enforcer of the duties which precede it, and which obtain irrespective 
of the State’s existence.” Sadurski, Social Justice, supra note 69, at 321. “According to some, 
a so-called legal relation between an individual and a collectivity, like the state or a corporation, 
may be reduced to multiple legal relations between that individual and all other individuals 
composing the collectivity.” Ronen Perry, Correlativity, 28 LAW & PHIL. 537, 545 (2009) (citing 
Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 165 (1919)). “Richard 
Swinburne, in his recommendation of retributive punishment, indicated that the state only has 
authority to impose punishment for criminal harm where it serves as a proxy for the individual 
harmed.” Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 19, 25 (2003) (citing ROBINSON, PRAISE AND BLAME, supra note 82, at 183). 
Moreover, another problem with group rights is that they “consign individuals to dependence 
sustained by their conformity.” GEORGE KATEB, HUMAN DIGNITY 12 (2011).
“Just because the offender might deserve punishment, it does not follow—without an 
appropriate theory of state power—that the state should assess the degree of deserved 
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as, arguably, for public nuisance,89 even a unanimously consented-to social contract 
cannot make the state into an ethical being with independent autonomy interests of a 
relevant type.90 The state may have independent claims against other collective 
entities, particularly other states, but any use of the idea of autonomy in this context 
is based on a different understanding of the term “autonomy”—one that is not based 
on moral agency in a germane, deontic sense.
From this viewpoint that the state has no independent autonomy claims of a 
relevant sort, the question again arises as to whether there is in principle a difference 
between corrective justice and retribution.91 The difference, arguably, relates to the 
                                                          
punishment and use its power to impose it on the offender.” GEORGE P. FLETCHER, 1 THE 
GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 153 (2007) [hereinafter FLETCHER, GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW]
(referring to the assumption that the state is entitled to punish criminals as “one of the 
unfortunate banalities of criminal law in our time”).
89 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 643 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 
1984) (“No better definition of a public nuisance has been suggested than that of an act or 
omission ‘which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of 
rights common to all Her Majesty’s subjects.’” (quoting R v. Price, [1884] 12 Q.B.D. 247 
(Stephen, J.)).
Duff writes of crimes that “count as ‘public’ . . . simply because they wrong or harm the public 
collectively or the polity as a whole,” such as treason and tax evasion, as well as a crime that is 
a “kind of ‘public nuisance’: ‘which is so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its 
effect that it . . . should be taken on the responsibility of the community at large.’” R.A. DUFF,
ANSWERING FOR CRIME 140 (2007) [hereinafter DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME] (quoting A-G v. 
P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd., [1957] 1 All E.R. 894, 908 (Can.) (Denning, L.J.)). I see all crimes based 
on deontic principles as offenses to the general public, not to the state in an independent 
capacity. In other words, the principles behind public nuisance apply to all so-called crimes 
against the state. But the relevant, key principles of public nuisance are driven by convenience, 
not deontic demands. There is nothing in deontic principle that would disallow every person 
harmed by a public nuisance from standing to bring an action against the tortfeasor. We choose 
otherwise if for no other reason than the relative administrative costs. Thus, arguably, the state 
is delegated authority to sue on behalf of individual harmed parties, as in a class action. “A 
liberty-protecting state, in short, will always establish a preference for protecting rights through 
private means; it will adopt criminal prohibition only in those cases where it seems reasonable 
to believe that private means will be insufficient.” MURPHY, Why Have Criminal Law at All?,
supra note 88, at 11. Kant has a somewhat different view of the role of the state and its officials. 
“Kant’s claim . . . is not that citizens actively entrust their affairs to the state, nor even that 
officials act for citizens considered separately. Instead, officials act for the citizens considered 
as a collective body.” RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 11, at 195. For more 
elaboration, see id. at 194–98.
90 One commentator finds that Kant “assumes that states or nations are moral persons and, 
accordingly, fall under (his) moral rules.” Lloyd P. Gerson, Who Owns What? Some Reflections 
on the Foundation of Political Philosophy, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y FOUND. 81, 84 n.8 (2012) 
(citing IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE (1795), reprinted in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 5, at 311, 318.
91 Analytically and normatively, “[i]t is notoriously difficult to give a clear and plausible 
account of the distinction between civil and criminal law, between ‘private’ and ‘public’ legal 
wrongs . . . .” Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 2, 2001) 
[hereinafter Duff, Legal Punishment] (citations omitted), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/legal-punishment/. “‘What is the essential 
difference between tort law and criminal law?’ One important lesson of historical studies . . . is 
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fact that corrective justice traditionally has aimed exclusively at requiting the harms 
to what have been perceived as the private, direct, immediate victims of autonomy 
invasions; in contrast, retribution has been aimed (also) at requiting the harms to what 
have been perceived as collateral victims of autonomy invasions that were directed 
elsewhere—that is, the general public.92 Under existing doctrine, the private law tort 
requital under corrective justice calls for full compensation for the invadee’s wrongful 
                                                          
that the question has no answer.” David Friedman, Beyond the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 103, 108 (1996) (footnote omitted). “Contemporary philosophy of law has not yet 
reached consensus as to whether or not (or to what extent) the crime-tort distinction is a sound 
one. Thus it seems that requiring such a distinction of a theory of punishment is unreasonable.” 
CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 58, at 46. For example, Barnett’s 
restitutive theory of justice implies “the collapse for most purposes of the traditional distinction 
between crime and tort . . . .” Randy E. Barnett, The Justice of Restitution, 25 AM. J. JURIS. 117, 
119 (1983); see Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the 
Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157 (1996) [hereinafter Barnett, Getting Even]; Randy 
E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279 (1977). For a brief 
look at various views, see Stephen Marks, Utility and Community: Musings on the Tort/Crime 
Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 215, 218–19 (1996); cf. Matthew Dyson, The Timing of Tortious 
and Criminal Actions for the Same Wrong, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 86 (2012).
92 Coffee invokes Roscoe Pound’s “most important objection” to the standard distinction 
between crimes and torts: “events that cause private injuries also cause public ones, because 
public injuries are usually only private injuries writ large. For example, an individual’s private 
interest in the enforcement of a contract can also be described as the collective, public interest 
in the security of transactions.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: 
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 
221 (1991) (citing 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 23–24, 328–30 (1959)). “Historically, 
early English criminal law was compensatory in character. Tort and crime were not clearly 
distinguishable, and the making of a tariff payment of the ‘bot’ to the injured and the ‘wite’ to 
the King could atone even for a homicide.” Id. at 230 (citing 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC 
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 451 (2d ed. 1968)). Under the common 
law from 1200 to 1500, “[i]n most instances, the same wrong could be prosecuted either as a 
crime or as a tort. Nor was the distinction [between crime and tort] a difference between the 
kinds of person who could initiate the actions. Victims could initiate actions of both kinds.” 
David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 59, 59 (1996). For a symposium discussing the tort/crime interface, see Christopher J. 
Robinette, Symposium: Crimtorts, 17 WIDENER L.J. 705 (2008). Simons identifies salient 
differences between tort and criminal law. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction, supra note 64.
“The very idea of defining certain conduct as ‘criminal’ first arose approximately one-thousand 
years ago. Before that, the tort/crime distinction that today serves as the foundation of criminal 
law did not exist.” Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 921 
(2007). “Tort actions were quasi-criminal until the late seventeenth century. For approximately 
five centuries, then, tort liability exclusively addressed situations in which the defendant 
wrongfully (criminally) injured the plaintiff and was required to compensate the plaintiff for 
that wrong. These situations are paradigmatic examples of corrective justice.” Mark Geistfeld, 
Economics, Moral Philosophy, and the Positive Analysis of Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
LAW OF TORTS 250, 253–54 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (footnote omitted). “Until the 
eighteenth century [victims of crimes] had to prosecute at their own expense; gradually the State 
took over this burden . . . .” MARTIN WRIGHT, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 11 (2d ed. 
1996). “Even the most serious crimes have been dealt with by civil procedures in some societies, 
and perpetrators required to pay damages rather than undergo punishment.” Id. at 19.
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harms to direct victims.93 In principle, when balancing liberty and security interests, 
we could expand our notion of who are direct victims of invasive conduct. We might 
grant standing to each member of the general public to bring an action for the wrongful 
harms she suffers from an invader’s conduct, including her parallel, reactive harms 
produced by mere knowledge of the criminal act.94 We choose to do otherwise, 
partially for consequential reasons.95 In an Adam Smithian or Coasean world of zero 
information and administrative costs, we might be more open to grant standing to sue 
to all persons or, at least, to a wider range of harmed persons.96 I pursue this line of 
thought below.97 If every person that an invader’s wrongful conduct harms could fully 
recover for that harm, the question of whether there is any remaining work for 
conceptions of retribution comes into sharper relief. There is indeed work remaining.
It is to account for the invader’s blameworthiness, which gets short shrift under 
corrective justice, at least as it is traditionally conceived.
In the private realm, we have traditionally adopted a conception of corrective 
justice that aims to restore the prior baseline position of the invadee.98 We are not 
concerned with whether the extent of the invadee’s prior resources is deserved or 
whether the invader’s level of resources is deserved.99 These are matters of distributive 
                                                          
93 Bruce Chapman, Wrongdoing, Welfare, and Damages: Recovery for Non-Pecuniary 
Loss in Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 409, 411 (David G. 
Owen ed., 1995).
94 “But it remains controversial whether these duties [under the criminal law] are directed 
or not, that is, whether they correlate with claim-rights or not.” Gopal Sreenivasan, Duties and 
Their Direction, 120 ETHICS 465, 473 (2010) (citations omitted).
Even a direct victim of a crime is typically not able to obtain adequate requital from the criminal 
for her own harms and, even more so, the harms to the public. “As far as imagining that damages 
for criminal activities might be recovered under the civil law, that is stuff and nonsense.” 
CHARLES F. ABEL & FRANK H. MARSH, PUNISHMENT AND RESTITUTION 5 (1984). Along with the 
reality that criminals are most often judgment proof, “this approach shifts an even greater burden 
to the victim. He or she must now take on the state’s role as prosecutor, detective, and should 
an award be granted, enforcer of state decrees . . . .” Id.
95 In terms of striking a balance between security and liberty interests, we choose to grant 
invaders of an individual’s autonomy space the liberty to impose certain costs on collateral 
agents without risk of private requitals. In Coasean, private law terms, it is a cost of living in 
today’s world that occasionally one will suffer collateral harm from wrongful conduct directed 
at others; it is not a cost to the actor that her conduct will produce collateral harm to the public. 
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960).
96 That deontological principles may consider the consequences of adopted maxims, see 
Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 427–28. “Thus whereas the primary 
retributivist justification for both the institution of punishment and particular punishments is 
that the offender deserves it, the secondary retributivist justification for both the institution of 
punishment and particular punishments may consider aspects of social utility.” CORLETT,
RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 58, at 63.
97 See infra text accompanying notes 171–76.
98 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 966.
99 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 43, bk. V, ch. 4, at 1008.
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justice.100 We further ignore what the invadee’s restoration does to the relative balance 
of resources between the invader and the invadee that had existed before the invader’s 
harmful conduct.101 Also neglected is whether the invader’s duty to restore the invadee 
to her prior position disrupts the invader’s relative balance of resources with the 
general public.102 For example, compensating a previously impecunious invadee may 
bankrupt a wealthy invader, as where the invadee’s medical expenses and psychic 
harms (pain and suffering) are enormous. Largely setting aside all other 
considerations, attention focuses on restoring the invadee’s original shielded 
position.103
In the public realm of retributive punishment, attention very much shifts to the 
invader’s blameworthiness.104 This factor is not, however, entirely neglected under 
corrective justice. In contract law, blameworthiness plays a negligible role105 to the 
dismay of some.106 The law of restitution will take into account blameworthiness in 
                                                          
100 Id., bk. V, ch. 3, at 1007 n.4.
101 Id., bk. V, ch. 4, at 1008.
102 See id., bk. V, ch. 4, at 1008–10.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 760 (4th ed. 2004) (“No matter how 
reprehensible the breach, damages are generally limited to those required to compensate the 
injured party for lost expectation . . . .”). Despite supposed basic principles to the contrary, 
blameworthiness emerges in some contract doctrines. For example, while contract damages for 
mental distress is generally disallowed, some courts “have looked to the nature of the breach 
and allowed damages for emotional disturbance on the ground that the breach of contract was 
reprehensible . . . .” Id. at 810 (citing Lutz Farms Co. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638 (10th 
Cir. 1991)). Some courts “suggest[] that a wilful failure to perform is more likely to be regarded 
as material than a non-wilful breach.” JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 683 § 108 
(4th ed. 2001) (footnote omitted). The Restatement agrees. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 241(e) cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
106 It has been proposed that, owing to differences in fairness or blameworthiness, negligent 
breaches should be treated differently from (some) intentional breaches. See, e.g., Thomas A. 
Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, if at All, Should It Be Extended 
Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425 (1981); Patricia H. Marschall,
Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARIZ. L. REV.
733 (1982). Two commentators argue in support of this proposal: “in contrast to conventional 
law and economics wisdom—that supercompensatory damages for willful breach are justified.” 
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach, in FAULT IN 
AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 174, 174 (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010). “Willful 
breach triggers extra resentment for what underlies it—for all the other bad things that the 
breaching party likely did, or, more basically, for the ex ante choice he made to engage in such 
a pattern of behavior.” Id. Insofar as an invadee’s resentment is a protected psychic harm, 
compensation for this would not be supercompensatory, and the supposition of other bad 
conduct is not necessary to justify the additional compensation. Relatedly, two other 
commentators argue for “a distinct measure of [contract] damages, vindicatory damages. These, 
we argue, are neither compensatory nor restitutionary, neither loss-based nor gain-based: they 
are a rights-based remedy.” David Pearce & Roger Halson, Damages for Breach of Contract: 
Compensation, Restitution and Vindication, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 73 (2008).
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measuring recoveries to some degree.107 In tort law, negligence is grounded on a rather 
attenuated form of blameworthiness.108 Yet blameworthiness in producing wrongful 
harm may sometimes be significant in the private realm. This significance is seen, for 
instance, in the greater generosity toward invadees for intentional harms than for 
negligent harms.109 Relaxing the strictures of necessary causal linkage and the types 
or extent of harms recoverable implements this greater generosity.110 At times, we 
bring the invader’s blameworthy mental state onto the front burner, as when providing 
a warrant for the tort of malicious prosecution.111 The requital maxims associated with 
elevated blameworthiness harms may also be more expansive.112 But the degree of the 
invader’s blameworthiness usually drops out of the requital calculation once 
thresholds have been reached.113 One apparent exception is the doctrine of 
                                                          
107 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 50, 51 (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (distinguishing recoveries from innocent and blameworthy obligors).
108 “[N]egligence is out of kilter with notions of moral blameworthiness in several 
significant respects . . . [including,] first, that negligence involves a type of conduct while moral 
blameworthiness typically affixes to states of mind . . . .” James Goudkamp, The Spurious 
Relationship Between Moral Blameworthiness and Liability for Negligence, 28 MELB. U. L.
REV. 342, 349 (2004) (footnote omitted) (adding four more reasons).
109 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 75–79 (2000).
110 See, e.g., id.; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 89, at 37.
111 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 109, at 1223–25; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS, supra note 89, at 882–84.
112 “Being in a particular state of mind may not only be a condition of liability but may also 
affect the quantum of liability. For instance, liability for making a fraudulent mis-statement is
more extensive than liability for making a negligent mis-statement because fraud is considered 
more culpable than negligence.” Peter Cane, Retribution, Proportionality, and Moral Luck in 
Tort Law, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 141, 149 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter Cane, Retribution]. I would put it that the fraudulent misstatement produces a 
protected dignitary harm greater than does a comparable negligent misstatement.
While punitive damages may be granted for torts when the invader’s mental state is exacerbated, 
this is a quasi-criminal requital that directly relies on principles of punishment. See generally
Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
1 (1989) [hereinafter Kuklin, Punishment]. “Punitive damages do not serve the function of 
supplementing the criminal law. The defendant is not charged with a wrong against society, but 
one against the claimant . . . .” ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 86 (2007). Some courts 
have justified punitive damages in terms of requiting dignitary harms. See Jean Hampton, 
Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 
1687 (1992) [hereinafter Hampton, Correcting Harms]. “Many punitive damages cases involve 
affront and dignitary interests, to which the criminal law pays relatively little regard.” Epstein, 
supra note 68, at 16.
113 “Tort law is not interested in the defendant’s culpability aside from the plaintiff’s 
entitlement to redress.” ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 155 (1995) [hereinafter 
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW]. See Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 655, 673–75 (2014) [hereinafter Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws]. “A full 
account of torts as wrongs should explain why damage awards are only loosely tied to 
wrongfulness.” Id. at 674. For the suggestion that the mental state of the invader with respect to 
excuses and justifications should not be taken into account for a tort requital, but should be for 
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comparative negligence, which accounts for the blameworthiness of the invadee as 
well as the invader.114 Nonetheless, even under this exception, we judge the relative 
blameworthiness of the parties, not the absolute blameworthiness.115 On a 
blameworthiness scale of, say, 0.0 to 1.0, the invadee’s recovery is the same when her
blameworthiness (negligence) is 0.2 and the invader’s is 0.4 as when hers is 0.5 and 
the invader’s is 1.0.
Retribution, to the contrary of corrective justice, weighs absolute 
blameworthiness.116 Furthermore, big pockets of strict liability remain in the private 
law,117 such as products liability. Agents are sometimes held to standards that they 
personally are incapable of meeting, such as when the reasonable person standard for 
negligence is beyond the reach of subnormal or uninformed persons.118 In cases such 
as these, blameworthiness is diminished or absent, but the invadee is nonetheless 
returned to her prior protected position at the invader’s expense.119 While 
deontologists may be uneasy and even reject at least some of these areas of the private 
law that ignore the invader’s blameworthiness, they express discontent when 
blameworthiness is disregarded or discounted in the criminal realm, as in strict 
                                                          
a criminal one, see John Gardner, The Mysterious Case of the Reasonable Person, 51 U.
TORONTO L.J. 273, 303–04 (2001).
114 See generally DOBBS, supra note 109, at 503–10; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS, supra note 89, at 468–79.
115 William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 655 (1953).
116 “[A]lthough both tort and criminal law care about culpability, tort law only uses it to 
determine whether the defendant is liable, not how heavy that liability should be. . . . Criminal 
law, by contrast, uses culpability not merely to determine whether, but also to determine how 
severely, to punish.” LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS 152 (1996) [hereinafter KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN 
GAINS].
117 “Because the idea of injury wrongly inflicted is central to corrective justice, as most of 
its advocates conceive it, corrective justice conceptions of tort law have tended to favor fault 
over strict liability.” Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law 
of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 198 (2000) (footnote omitted). Justification for strict 
liability under existing law is mainly welfarist, including principles of cost internalization, risk 
avoidance, loss spreading, and deterrence. See, e.g., Bailey Kuklin, The Asymmetrical 
Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893, 932–33
(1990). Because strict tort liability does not require fault, Goldberg and Zipursky see it as a 
mutation and desire to evict it from torts. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE 
OXFORD INTRODUCTION TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 267 (2010) [hereinafter GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY,
TORTS].
118 See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 1011–20.
119 Existing tort and contract laws relating to strict liability still usually build foreseeability 
into the elements of proximate cause and damages, thus retaining a pinch of blameworthiness. 
See infra note 248.
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criminal liability, absolute criminal liability,120 or criminal liability for negligent 
conduct.121
Sticking as much as possible to purely deontic considerations, this Article will 
explore what follows when conceptions of blameworthiness are the central pillar of 
retribution, leaving other factors and harms to the private realm of corrective justice.122
In turn, the central focus of blameworthiness is on the disrespectfulness that the 
invader manifested through his conduct. For purposes of retribution, disrespectfulness 
is gauged by the reactive response of the public, suitably trimmed of non-deontic 
biases or perceptions, to the choice of the invader to disregard the autonomy 
protections afforded the wrongfully harmed persons, including the immediate 
victim(s) and others.123 The proposition that requital stems from, and is measured by, 
society’s reactive judgment of disrespectfulness sharply sets this view of retribution 
apart from that of corrective justice. Once the relevant features of this reaction are 
identified, we will be in a better position to consider how to apply this conception in 
practice. Driven by first principles and not bound by historical detritus, we may see 
more clearly what is at stake. Problems, unsurprisingly, still remain.
III. RETRIBUTION
Corrective justice and retribution both underpin requitals for autonomy invasions.
Because retribution pulls in the wider, more attenuated autonomy claims of the general 
public, and elevates the importance of conceptions of just deserts, neither of which 
commands much weight in the private sphere of corrective justice, it involves greater 
difficulties.124 Retribution is punishment, with all that entails in our common 
                                                          
120 See infra text accompanying notes 281–285. Duff distinguishes strict liability from 
absolute liability: “[l]iability would be absolute if it required no proof of mens rea as to any
aspect of the offence . . . . Liability is strict if it requires no proof of mens rea as to an aspect of 
the offence . . . .” DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME, supra note 89, at 232 (footnote omitted) 
(including a taxonomy at 233–35).
121 “[N]egligence really isn’t quite a mental state . . . . It’s the absence of a mental state: to 
act negligently means not being aware of a risk of harm. But unlike strict liability, negligence 
at least makes some reference to a mental state—awareness—even if only in absentia.” MARKUS 
D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 47 (2002) [hereinafter DUBBER, CRIMINAL 
LAW]. Simons “argue[s] that conscious recklessness . . . is too high a threshold of criminal 
liability, that culpable indifference . . . is ordinarily an appropriate threshold, and that simple 
negligence . . . is ordinarily too low a threshold.” Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and 
Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 
365 (1994) [hereinafter Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory].
122 For example, federal criminal law requires criminals to provide “full and timely 
restitution as provided in law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(6) (2009) (Crime victims’ rights).
123 Kuklin, Private Requitals, note 2, at 969, 981.
124 “Retributivists claim that the point of legal punishment, and the standard that ought to 
govern the construction of penal institutions, practices and rules, is that the guilty must be 
treated in the way that they morally deserve to be.” Russ Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and 
Desert, 81 PAC. PHIL. Q. 189, 189 (2000) [hereinafter Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and Desert]
(arguing “that there is no plausible index for measuring moral desert . . . .”). Furthermore, 
“retributivists need to supply us with an account of why only certain immoralities merit legal 
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understanding,125 while corrective justice is not punishment, no matter how great the 
invader’s liability.126 Michael Moore provides a foundational understanding of the 
concept of retributivism: “[r]etributivism is the view that punishment is justified by 
the moral culpability of those who receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and 
only because, the offender deserves it.”127 When commentators refer to retributivism, 
                                                          
punishment.” Russ Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, 82 PHIL. STUD. 289, 289 
(1996) [hereinafter Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism].
125 H.L.A. Hart identifies five elements in the standard case of punishment. H.L.A. HART,
Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 4–5 (2d 
ed. 2008) [hereinafter HART, Prolegomenon]. Three of the elements are relevant to the 
discussion here: “(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered 
unpleasant.” Id. at 4. “(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the 
offender. (v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system 
against which the offence is committed.” Id. at 5.
126 Id.
127 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PUNISHMENT AND 
REHABILITATION 94, 94 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Moore, Moral 
Worth of Retribution]. For seven leading confusions, see id. at 94–96. “Retributivism, so 
construed, joins corrective justice theories of torts, natural right theories of property, and 
promissory theories of contract as deontological alternatives to utilitarian justifications . . 
. .” Id. at 96. “[P]unishment is justified on the grounds that wrong-doing merits 
punishment.” John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules (1955), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
PUNISHMENT 105, 107 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) [hereinafter Rawls, Two Concepts]. Hart 
defines retribution “simply as the application of the pains of punishment to an offender 
who is morally guilty . . . .” HART, Prolegomenon, supra note 125, at 9. “The retributive 
theory of punishment, speaking very generally, is a theory that seeks to justify punishment, 
not in terms of social utility, but in terms of this cluster of moral concepts: rights, desert, 
merit, moral responsibility, justice, and respect for moral autonomy.” JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State, in RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED,
supra note 88, at 15, 21 [hereinafter MURPHY, Retributivism]. “Retribution may be defined 
as imposing a sanction that corresponds to individual moral desert. Retributive justice . . . 
insists on proportionality between the severity of the sanction and the gravity of the 
wrong.” Perry, The Third Form of Justice, supra note 58, at 235 (citations omitted). For a 
brief introduction to retributive theories, see Larry Alexander, The Philosophy of Criminal 
Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 815, 816–20 
(Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) [hereinafter Alexander, Philosophy of 
Criminal Law]. Cahill identifies three plausible versions (or extensions) of retributivism: 
the absolutist model, the threshold model, and consequentialist retributivism. Cahill, 
Retributive Justice, supra note 48, at 826–35. Simons briefly reviews three retributive 
theories (choice, character, and ideal agent). Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory,
supra note 121, at 368–70. Bedau finds in Feinberg six versions of retribution and seven 
retributive ideas available for the theory of punishment. Hugo Adam Bedau, Feinberg’s 
Liberal Theory of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 119–20 (2001). Cottingham 
identifies “no less than nine distinct approaches to punishment . . . which are or have been 
labelled [sic] retributive.” John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238 
(1979); see Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” 
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 880–82 (2002) (identifying five varieties of 
retribution). For three mistakes in the “prevailing formulations and defenses of 
retributivism,” see David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1623, 1626 (1992) [hereinafter Dolinko, Three Mistakes]; see also R.A. Duff, Retrieving 
Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM 3, 4–5 (Mark D. White ed., 2011) [hereinafter Duff, 
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they often mention Kant’s emphasis of it, even though some have found Kant’s
arguments for punishment as not entirely within many notions of retribution,128 not 
entirely consistent with his general moral system,129 not fully based on just deserts,130
or exceedingly sketchy,131 among other complications.132
                                                          
Retrieving Retributivism] (distinguishing positive and negative retributivism). For my 
earlier, somewhat different, analysis of retribution, see Kuklin, Punishment, supra note 
112, at 23–85. Kenny throws up his hands. “The retributive theory of punishment is very 
difficult to state accurately . . . [and] it is impossible to state it coherently . . . .” ANTHONY 
KENNY, FREEWILL AND RESPONSIBILITY 69 (1978). That retribution as a general theory 
cannot fully answer any of the main questions about punishment, see ROBINSON, PRAISE 
AND BLAME, supra note 82, at 188.
128 For example, Corlett argues that his “model of punishment . . . renders problematic 
the construal of Kant as a pure retributivist . . . .” J. Angelo Corlett, Making Sense of 
Retributivism, 76 PHIL. 77, 78 (2001) [hereinafter Corlett, Making Sense of Retributivism]. 
“Nevertheless, few would hesitate to place Immanuel Kant’s account of just punishment 
squarely in the retributivist camp.” Sarah Holtman, Kant, Retributivism, and Civil Respect,
in RETRIBUTIVISM, supra note 127, at 107. Kant’s “underlying idea [of punishment] is 
simple, even if its application is complex: whenever someone acts in a way contrary to 
right, others are entitled to constrain the wrongdoer’s conduct. Such constraint is not an 
interference with freedom; it is the hindering a hindrance to freedom.” RIPSTEIN, FORCE 
AND FREEDOM, supra note 11, at 27.
129 “I do not think Kant’s retributivist convictions are supported by any arguments he 
suggests on behalf of them. The theory of punishment that arises naturally out of Kant’s theory 
of right turns out not to be retributivist.” ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS 206 (2008) 
[hereinafter WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS]. “Kant’s retributivism is even in serious tension with 
some of his most fundamental moral doctrines.” Id. For Wood’s argument, see id. at 206–23.
“Some theorists believe that retributivism and deontology go hand in hand, in the sense that one 
requires the other. Yet deontology as such does not require retributivism to be true.” Larry 
Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Nov. 21, 
2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/ethics-deontological/.
130 Hill argues that “although Kant does endorse standards of punishment commonly 
associated with retributivism, his rationale for endorsing those standards is far from the familiar 
retributivist thought that evildoers inherently deserve to suffer.” Thomas E. Hill, Jr., 
Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth, in KANT’S METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 233, 234 
(Mark Timmons ed., 2002) [hereinafter Hill, Jr., Punishment]. For some main points of Kant’s 
theory of punishment, see id. at 235–37. Kant’s “principles are stern but not in the fullest sense 
retributive; and their avowed purpose is not to see that happiness and misery are proportionate 
to moral desert but rather to secure a system of fair laws that maximize liberty.” THOMAS E.
HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY 181 (1992) [hereinafter 
HILL, JR., DIGNITY]; see Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment, 18 
LAW & PHIL. 407, 409, 414 (1999) [hereinafter Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing].
131 “I am not even sure that Kant develops anything that deserves to be called a theory of 
punishment at all. I genuinely wonder if he has done much more than leave us with a random 
(and not entirely consistent) set of remarks—some of them admittedly suggestive—about 
punishment.” JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, in RETRIBUTION 
RECONSIDERED, supra note 88, at 31 [hereinafter MURPHY, Does Kant Have a Theory of 
Punishment?]; see Holtman, supra note 128, at 107 (“Kant’s central discussion of punishment 
occupies only a few pages . . . .”).
132 For example, Brooks finds that Kant invokes two versions of punishment, one 
retributive-based and the other deterrent-based. Thom Brooks, Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and 
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Various justifications exist for the state’s claim to the right to impose retributive 
criminal punishment.133 The two most prominent justifications today are the fairness 
theory and expressionism.134 Under the fairness theory, which is akin to some theories 
of the social contract,135 the state responds to a criminal who has taken advantage of 
the benefits of the law but unfairly refused to pay the costs of it.136 She is a free-rider. 
In the words of H.L.A. Hart, “when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise 
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these 
                                                          
Retribution, 76 PHIL. 561, 562–73 (2001). “Kant . . . had no interest in developing the political 
application of his retributive punishment theory, an application he believed may well take into 
account consequentialist considerations such as reformation.” Markus Dirk Dubber, 
Rediscovering Hegel’s Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1599 n.99 
(1994) [hereinafter Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel’s Theory] (reviewing MARK TUNICK, HEGEL’S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: INTERPRETING THE PRACTICE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1992)). “Kant’s 
formula of ends does not rule out deterrence, or any other principle but retribution, as a vital, 
perhaps even primary, justification of punishment.” R. George Wright, Treating Persons as 
Ends in Themselves: The Legal Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 
286–87 (2002) [hereinafter Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves] (footnote 
omitted). Hill agrees. Hill, Jr., Punishment, supra note 130. “There is . . . rather too much in 
Kant’s own version of retributive theory that should be resisted.” ROBINSON, PRAISE AND 
BLAME, supra note 82, at 190.
133 For a survey of the justifications for punishment, with criticism, see Duff, Penal 
Communications, supra note 48. Boonin discusses, but rejects, versions of retribution that are 
trust-based, debt-based, and revenge-based. DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT
143–54 (2008); see Christopher, supra note 127, at 956–57 (identifying “a wide variety” of 
consequentialist justifications of retributive punishment); Christopher Heath Wellman, The 
Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment, 122 ETHICS 371, 372 (2012) (mentioning six 
justifications for punishment). For a trust based theory of retributive punishment, see Susan 
Dimock, Retributivism and Trust, 16 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1997).
The state’s role in punishment is typically overlooked. 
[A] question that is at least of equal importance [to the issue of the moral legitimacy of 
retributivism] has been almost totally neglected—namely, the question of whether 
retributivist goals, however morally admirable they may be, are legitimate state goals,
goals that it is the state’s proper business to pursue.
MURPHY, Retributivism, supra note 127, at 17 (footnote omitted); see Duff, Legal Punishment,
supra note 91, at 16 (citations omitted) (“[E]ven if [the guilty] deserve to suffer, why should it 
be for the state to inflict that suffering on them through a system of criminal punishment?”).
134 See MURPHY, Retributivism, supra note 127, at 17.
135 See supra text accompanying note 15.
136 “[T]he fairness theory . . . perceives punishment as a way of restoring a fair balance of 
benefits and burdens between the criminal and law-abiding members of the society.” JESPER 
RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT 6 (2004); see Scheid, Davis, supra note 
70, at 375–76 (footnote omitted) (“According to unfair-advantage theories, a criminal gains a 
certain unfair advantage over law-abiding citizens whenever he breaks the law.”); Jeremy 
Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 50 (1992) (first citing SHER, DESERT, supra note 
48, at 91; then citing SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE, supra note 56, at 225) (Under this 
view, “[a]n appropriate punishment is one that offsets this stolen advantage, and restores the 
original distribution.”).
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restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have 
benefited by their submission.”137 Under John Rawls’s version, a person must comply 
with “the rules of an institution when two conditions are met: first, the institution is 
just (or fair) . . . and second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the 
arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one’s 
interests.”138 Many commentators subscribe to versions of this theory,139 while others 
remain critical.140
Under expressionism, Feinberg writes, “punishment is a conventional device for 
the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of 
disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishment authority himself or 
of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”141 Jean Hampton’s famous view 
                                                          
137 H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 77, 85 (Jeremy 
Waldron ed., 1984).
138 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 75, at 96. For Rawls’s duty of “fair play,” see 
RAWLS, Justice as Fairness, supra note 13, at 60.
139 According to Shafer-Landau, unfair advantage theorists include Herbert Morris, Jeffrie 
Murphy, Wojciech Sadurski, George Sher, and Michael Davis. Shafer-Landau, The Failure of 
Retributivism, supra note 124, at 290. For a similar list, see BOONIN, supra note 133, at 119 
(adding John Finnis, Richard Dagger, and, “at least on some interpretations,” Kant and Hegel). 
Von Hirsch sees Kant as an unfair advantage theorist. VON HIRSCH, supra note 51, at 47. Jeffrie 
Murphy agreed with this interpretation. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 217, 228 (1973). He has since changed his view in favor of “some version of Kant’s 
idea of punishing . . . human evil . . . .” Jeffrie G. Murphy, Some Second Thoughts on 
Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM, supra note 127, at 93, 98. For the meaning of “unfair 
advantage,” see Sadurski, Social Justice, supra note 69, at 316 (“benefit of non-self-restraint”); 
Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, supra note 124, at 293 (“extra measure of freedom 
gained through criminal behavior”).
140 See, e.g., BOONIN, supra note 133, at 119–43; DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra
note 82, at 205–17; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 90–95 (1974) [hereinafter 
NOZICK, ANARCHY]; RYBERG, supra note 136, at 36–43; Shafer-Landau, The Failure of 
Retributivism, supra note 124, at 301–04. “Thus, modestly put, I do not think that 
proportionalism follows as easily from the fairness theory as its adherents usually proclaim.” 
RYBERG, supra note 136, at 43.
141 JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING,
supra note 71, at 95, 98 [hereinafter FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment]. “That 
the expression of the community’s condemnation is an essential ingredient in legal punishment 
is widely acknowledged by legal writers.” Id. Punishment “is also a symbolic way of getting 
back at the criminal, of expressing a kind of vindictive resentment.” Id. at 100. “This symbolic 
function of punishment was given great emphasis by Kant, who, characteristically, proceeded 
to exaggerate its importance.” Id. at 103. “Punishment has its two salient features—the 
imposition of hard treatment and the visitation of censure—in order to serve these dual purposes 
[of ‘discourage[ing] conduct’ and ‘express[ing] disapproval of the conduct and its 
perpetrators’].” ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES 52 (1985) [hereinafter VON
HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES] (footnote omitted); see DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS,
supra note 82, at 233–66 (“Expression, Penance and Reform”); Dan M. Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 594–605 (1996) (“The Expressive 
Dimension of Punishment”).
Related to expressionism are communication theories of retribution. Duff posits, “can we 
explain criminal punishment in retributive-communicative terms as a process of communication 
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of expressionism provides that an offender is punished to “vindicate the value of the 
victim denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction of an event that not 
only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the victim but does so in a 
way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.”142 This theory has not 
escaped criticism.143 One must determine how to “vindicate the value . . . denied . . . 
.”144 Doing so need not require punishment.145
                                                          
in which the offender, as well as the polity, is meant to be a participant?” Duff, Retrieving 
Retributivism, supra note 127, at 17. According to Duff, first, “[p]unishment communicates 
censure from the polity to the offender, with a view to persuading him to attend to that censure, 
to face up to the wrong he has done, and therefore also to recognize the need to mend his ways.” 
Id. “The second aspect of communicative punishment draws on an idea, prominent in recent 
penal theory, that punishment has to do with the kind of apology that offenders owe to their 
victims, and to the wider polity (whose values and relationships they have violated).” Id.
(footnote omitted). “[P]unishment can be seen as a communicative process in which a 
perpetrator is, through the conveyance of an appropriate condemnatory message, held 
accountable for his misdeed . . . .” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 6; see Dan Markel, What Might 
Retributive Justice Be? An Argument for the Confrontational Conception of Retributivism, in
RETRIBUTIVISM, supra note 127, at 49.
142 Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 112, at 1686; see Jean Hampton, An Expressive 
Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) 
[hereinafter Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution]; Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are 
Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1158–59 (2008).
143 For discussion and criticism, see RYBERG, supra note 136, at 19–36; Duff, Penal 
Communications, supra note 48, at 31–56; Duff, Legal Punishment, supra note 91, at 18–21
(“Punishment as Communication”). “What these considerations highlight is the fact that not 
much has been done to make clear exactly how the communicative process actually takes place.” 
RYBERG, supra note 136, at 36.
“Nor is retributivism to be confused with denunciatory theories of punishment. In this latter 
view punishment is justified because punishment is the vehicle through which society can 
express a condemnation of the criminal’s behavior. This is a utilitarian theory . . . justified by 
the good consequences it achieves . . . .” Moore, Moral Worth of Retribution, supra note 127, 
at 96 (citations omitted); see SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE, supra note 56, at 248–50.
144 Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (2016).
145 Hampton agrees. “[T]he retributive response is broader than punishment. Or to put it 
another way, there are ways in which one can inflict retribution, but nonetheless not inflict 
punishment.” Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, supra note 142, at 16. “So long 
as there are nonpunitive means of conveying society’s disapproval of an offender’s behavior, 
the state’s right to denounce the offender cannot generate a right to punish her.” BOONIN, supra
note 133, at 178. We may “condemn without intending to make suffer. . . . [T]o condemn is not 
in itself to punish.” GEOFFREY CUPIT, JUSTICE AS FITTINGNESS 139–40 (1996). “Expressive 
views need to explain why hard treatment is the appropriate vehicle for denouncing crimes. As 
T.M. Scanlon has asked, why not say it with flowers, or better still with weeds?” RIPSTEIN,
EQUALITY, supra note 68, at 145 (footnotes omitted) (citing T.M. Scanlon, Jr., The Significance 
of Choice, in VIII THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 149 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 
1988)). Nozick discusses the difficulties in “showing” an offender that she was wrong. ROBERT 
NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 370–74 (1981) (“The Message of Retribution”).
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Both the fairness theory and expressionism are consistent with the idea that 
retribution must account for dignitary harms to immediate victims and the public.146
By free-riding or flouting the law, the criminal implicitly is asserting moral 
superiority,147 as Hampton observes above.148 Similarly, expressionism aims at 
conveying social disapproval of the criminal’s conduct that also implicitly claims 
moral superiority.149 The state, as representative of the public, seeks requital from the 
criminal for her improper rejection of the moral equality of all persons.
Moral agents, in sum, are not to manifest disrespect of another’s dignity by 
invading her realm of protected freedom.150 In the private law of torts, contracts, and 
unjust enrichment, determining whose autonomy space has been invaded is largely, if 
not entirely, straightforward. Controversy under existing law arises over whether 
negligently causing another person a purely economic loss constitutes a tortious 
invasion of her autonomy space or, more generally, whether a particular class of 
persons suffers harms from another’s conduct sufficient to be declared wrongful.151
Furthermore, we debate, among other things, the types and extent of harms that are 
requitable once there has been a recognized invasion.
                                                          
146 “We are all familiar with these retributivist metaphors: punishment restores the moral 
equilibrium of the universe, it pays back a debt, it vindicates the norms flouted by criminals, 
etc. . . . [W]hen pressed for literal sense [these metaphors] never cash out to what you thought 
they would have meant.” Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor 
Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 65, 84 (1999) [hereinafter Moore, Victims and Retribution].
147 “[I]f someone breaks the rules of a particular deal, it is not just that he has gained a 
particular advantage but that he has adopted an unjust superior position—infringed the rights or 
status of his fellows as equal negotiators and deal-makers.” John Wilson, The Purposes of 
Retribution, 58 PHIL. 521, 523 (1983).
148 See Jean Hampton, A New Theory of Retribution, in LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 377 
(R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991); see also supra note 142. For discussion, see 
David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537 (1991), and for doubts, 
see CUPIT, supra note 145, at 145 n.9. Others advance the invader’s flouting of the law as 
grounds for retributive punishment. See, e.g., DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 82, 
at 255; Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to 
Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 932, 935–36 (2010) [hereinafter Markel & Flanders, 
Bentham on Stilts].
149 This is suggestive of Ackerman’s justification for neutrality in the liberal state whereby, 
“[n]o reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert: . . . (b) that, regardless of 
his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.” 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1980). Similarly, Dworkin 
advances the principle of equal concern and respect. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 180–83, 272–78 (1977).
150 Kaiser identifies “three dimensions of the criminal wrong”: “the ‘culpable interference 
with the legally protected freedom of action of another’”; “treating the victim solely as a means 
to an end”; and “culpable expression of disrespect for the victim’s plan of life.” Hanno F. Kaiser, 
The Three Dimensions of Freedom, Crime, and Punishment, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 694 
(2006) (book review).
151 Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort Law, 46 
AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (1998).
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In criminal law matters, the persons harmed by disrespectful invasions of their 
autonomy space are, along with the direct victim and her supporters,152 the members 
of the public who are put at risk of harm at the time of the criminal act or in the 
future.153 Crimes are, generally, frightful to the public.154 They produce insecurity.155
                                                          
152 See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den 
Haag, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 115, 119 n.8 (1985) (“suffering of the victim’s relatives”). One 
commentator “takes a first look at this neglected issue of the role that more remote harms [to 
the family and friends of the victim] should play in sentencing and asserts that accounting for 
these more remote harms would better reflect the basic tenets of harm-based retributivism . . . 
.” Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (2012). She “argues 
that a proximate causation analysis is essential to limit the harms considered in sentencing while 
recognizing the full array of harms caused by criminal conduct.” Id. at 1049–50.
153 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 152, at 1082–85. Criminal acts “had to be ‘injurious to the 
public at large, in distinction from individuals; or else it must be wrong to individuals of a nature 
which the public takes notice of as done against itself.’” Albin Eser, The Principle of “Harm” 
in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests,
4 DUQ. U. L. REV. 345, 353 (1966) (quoting JOEL P. BISHOP, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL 
LAW § 252 (5th ed. 1872)).
154 Nozick asserts that many, but not all, crimes are frightful to the public, which justifies 
punishment beyond compensation to the direct victim. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 
65–71. Rawls imagines a father’s answer to his son’s question of why people are jailed. “‘To 
protect good people from bad people,’ or ‘To stop people from doing things that would made it 
uneasy for all of us; for otherwise we wouldn’t be able to go to bed at night and sleep in peace.’” 
Rawls, Two Concepts, supra note 127, at 107. “Surveys suggest that the fear of crime is 
widespread amongst members of many contemporary westernized societies.” Emily Gray et al., 
In Search of the Fear of Crime: Using Interdisciplinary Insights to Improve the 
Conceptualisation and Measurement of Everyday Insecurities, in SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH METHODS 268, 268 (David Gadd et al. eds., 2012). For an example 
of subscribers to the reaction (fright) theory of (some) crime, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC 
CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 35–36 (1998) [hereinafter FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW]; RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS 26 (1979); Lucia Zedner, Reparation and 
Retribution: Are They Reconcilable?, 57 MOD. L. REV. 228, 243–44 (1994).
Fletcher criticizes Nozick’s “notion of generalized fear [because it] proves too much and too 
little.” Fletcher, Place of Victims, supra note 67, at 56. Because mass torts can “trigger 
widespread public anxiety” and “isolated crimes such as embezzlement . . . [may] engender no 
public fear at all, [i]t is not so easy . . . to distinguish crimes from torts.” Id. at 56–57. My focus 
on disrespect as key for criminal requitals offers, I believe, a reasonable means to distinguish 
the two realms. All fear is prima facie harmful, but not all harmful fear is wrongful. “An 
alternative approach to the public nature of crime might be simply to locate the public dimension 
of the crime in the extrapolation of the concrete harm to the general class of victims.” Id. at 57. 
This strikes me as remaining a matter for corrective justice.
155 “Whoever steals makes the property of everyone else insecure . . . .” KANT, THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 474. Regarding conspiracy and other crimes by 
multiple individuals, “the involvement of several people in an offence may create greater fear 
in victims and greater public alarm.” ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 451 
(6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW]. Dagger refers to the 
“indirect” or “secondary harm” of those who merely hear of a crime. “Indeed, someone who 
never even hears about a particular crime may feel its effects if it creates a climate of fear and 
apprehension that leads to suspicion, distrust, or hostility.” Richard Dagger, Restitution: Pure 
or Punitive?, 10 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 29, 30 (1991). See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 152, at 1085. 
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Beyond these reactive, psychic harms, criminal behavior often induces the public at 
risk to respond by taking costly, protective measures.156 These psychic and economic 
harms may also generate physical illness or increase susceptibility to such illness.157
Psychic harms may ensue from dignitary harms, as where a group that a person 
identifies with is insulted or defamed.158 While fright is a common reactive response 
of the public to criminal conduct,159 the public also responds in many other negative, 
painful, destructive, psychological ways. These include fear, anxiety, insecurity, 
dread, terror, panic, alarm, dismay, suspicion, distrustfulness, consternation, concern, 
outrage, anger, ire, hostility, indignation, resentment, disgust, rage, and fury, among 
others.160 These responses may or may not overlap with fright and one another. In 
                                                          
General reactive fear varies, of course, from crime to crime, to say nothing of person to person. 
For example, “people fear robberies more than securities frauds.” Scheid, Davis, supra note 70, 
at 394.
“Might someone not argue, with Ralf Dahrendorf, that increases in sanction levels would 
reassure the public and reduce fear—even if they did not actually affect crime rates?” Andrew 
von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth, Not Not Just Deserts: A Response to Braithwaite and Pettit,
12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 91 (1992) (citing RALF DAHRENDORF, LAW AND ORDER (1985)).
156 A crime, such as a neighborhood robbery, may frighten neighbors, cause them to make 
expenditures for security systems, decrease property values, increase insurance rates, impose 
opportunity costs, and even deprive unknowing strangers of economic opportunities with the 
neighbors because of these costs, etc. See BOONIN, supra note 133, at 225. “What I call the 
‘secondary victims response’ to the harm to society . . . insists that in such cases the offender 
must make restitution to these people as well.” Id. at 226. The difficulty of doing this is 
discussed, id. at 227. See Alan Wertheimer, Victimless Crimes, 87 ETHICS 302, 311–13 (1977) 
(“Crime as a Social Phenomenon”).
157 “Fear of crime is often seen to constitute a social problem in and of itself, reducing quality 
of life and public health, restricting movements, eroding social and neighbourhood bonds, and 
shaping the very organisation and zoning of a city.” Gray et al., supra note 154, at 268 (citations 
omitted).
158 See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 983.
159 “[T]he participant reactive attitudes are essentially natural human reactions to the good 
or ill will or indifference of others towards us, as displayed in their attitudes and actions.” Peter 
Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 59, 67 (Gary Watson ed., 1982); see JOHN 
MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL 6–7 (1998). “On [one] 
account we engage in ‘blame validation’: We make blame attributions spontaneously according 
to how strongly negative our gut reaction is then we validate our blame assessment by tuning 
evaluations of causation and intention accordingly.” Janice Nadler, Blaming as a Social 
Process: The Influence of Character and Moral Emotion on Blame, 75 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 9 (2012) [hereinafter Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process]. “Reactive attitudes 
invariably concern what someone can be held to, so they invariably presuppose the authority to 
hold someone responsible and make demands of him.” STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-
PERSON STANDPOINT 17 (2006); see id. at 83–85.
160 Feinberg refers to the “responsive attitudes typically expressed by reward and 
punishment—gratitude, appreciation, approval, ‘recognition,’ resentment, disapproval, 
condemnation . . . .” FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 71, at 70. “When we 
blame someone, we may feel—among other things—anger, resentment, irritation, bitterness, 
hostility, fury, rage, outrage, disappointment, contempt, disdain, or disgust. Although these 
feelings differ in important ways, each is always negative . . . .” GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF 
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either event, these reactions might also provide a basis for retributive claims.161 They 
are harms. Reasonable people prefer to be secure from suffering harms. As reasonable 
people, they would take practical measures to avoid them, if sensible. The categorical 
imperative does not, in principle, prevent psychic harms from being declared wrongful 
harms in themselves. Some reactive psychic harms, however, will not survive the filter 
of the categorical imperative, such as those that stem from disrespectful attitudes 
toward outgroups, or indeed, oneself.162 Once identified harms clear the deontic filter, 
society must decide whether to declare them wrongful by means of first-order,
substantive maxims.
After the issue of the obligation to conform to established norms is favorably 
resolved (e.g., a social contract), moral agents have a duty to abide by criminal laws 
that are consistent with the categorical imperative. However, concerns for respecting 
the autonomy of moral agents may not be the driving factor of some laws, such as 
animal cruelty laws.163 Indeed, some laws may run afoul of the mandate under a harm 
                                                          
BLAME 94 (2006). Using Mill’s harm principle, Feinberg invokes such harms to prohibit 
“depraved” or brutal public events. JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 126–33 (1990). 
Nussbaum opines that some emotions (e.g., shame, disgust) are “unreliable as guides to public 
practice, because of features of their specific internal structure.” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING 
FROM HUMANITY 13 (2004).
161 The theorists J.F. Stephen, Adam Smith, and Edward Westermarck opined “that 
resentment and indignation felt by people towards wrongdoers played an essential role in law 
and punishment.” Jarkko Savolainen, Retribution, Self-Respect, and the Emotions, in
RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 142, at 117. That resentment and indignation are 
reactions to dignity harms, see Michael S. Pritchard, Human Dignity and Justice, 82 ETHICS
299, 304–05 (1972). Duff refers to the idea of “retributive hatred.” Duff, Penal 
Communications, supra note 48, at 28–31.
“[T]he moral norms—on which the legal norms of the criminal law are based—protect each of 
us as individuals. . . . [E]ach of us, when the norm is violated, can claim a separate wrong was 
done to him, even if it’s the same act doing the violating.” Moore, Victims and Retribution,
supra note 146, at 71–72.
162 “[B]ehind our judgments of retributive justice,” according to Nietzsche, is “truly a 
witch’s brew: resentment, fear, anger, cowardice, hostility, aggression, cruelty, sadism, envy, 
jealousy, guilt, self-loathing, hypocrisy and self-deception—those ‘reactive affects’ that 
Nietzsche sometimes lumped under the French term ressentiment.” Moore, Moral Worth of 
Retribution, supra note 127, at 106 (citation omitted). Similarly, “some utilitarians have 
proposed [to] ‘purify[]’ desires of ‘imperfection.’. . . Harsanyi wants . . . to ‘exclude all 
antisocial preferences, such as sadism, envy, resentment, and malice.’” Amartya Sen, Well-
Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J. PHIL. 169, 191 (1985) (quoting 
John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, in UTILITARIANISM AND 
BEYOND 39, 56 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982)). “Many [emotional] responses 
that are deeply embedded in human life are morally questionable and unworthy of guiding 
public action.” NUSSBAUM, supra note 160, at 171.
163 Kant was against animal cruelty on the grounds that it would coarsen one’s feelings and 
relations with others. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 239–41 (Louis Infield trans. 1930) 
[hereinafter KANT, LECTURES]; KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 564. For 
discussion, see MATTHEW C. ALTMAN, Animal Suffering and Moral Character, in KANT AND 
APPLIED ETHICS 13 (2011); Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our 
Duties to Animals, in 25 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 77 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 
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principle to respect the freedom of people to make choices that are not harmful to 
others,164 as in, for instance, truly victimless crimes.165 Kant, however, insists that one 
must conform to the universalized laws of the state.166 One has a moral duty to obey 
the law.167 Like others, I question the political obligation said to come from social 
contracts that are not deeply consensual, such as Kant’s.168 Hence, I set aside this claim 
by Kant that one must meet laws regardless of whether deontic principles immediately 
justify them.169 I address requitals that are apt for violations of maxims directly 
consistent with the categorical imperative and not those stemming from a general duty 
to obey the law.170
I have mentioned two categories of persons who are subject to invasions of their 
autonomy space. The direct victim, such as the object of a battery, is in the first 
category—immediate victims. She clearly suffers wrongful harm. Often she suffers 
wrongful physical, economic, and psychic harms, but even when she does not suffer 
these harms, she suffers at least a wrongful dignitary harm. The invader has 
disrespected her autonomy through nonconsensual, improper touching. Other 
individuals close to the victim may suffer similar harms resulting from the invader’s 
battery of the direct victim. Kin, kith, and other affiliates suffer when they empathize 
and sympathize with the direct victim, support her, depend on her, and so forth. Her 
pain is their pain. Therefore, we may adopt maxims that protect against these indirect 
harms in particular circumstances, thereby declaring that the autonomy space of these 
indirect victims encompasses this source of harm. The tort of the negligent infliction 
                                                          
2005); Allen W. Wood & Onora O’Neill, Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature, 72 
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 189, 211 (1998).
164 Regarding a harm principle, see supra text accompanying note 37.
165 Husak considers judging the harmfulness of the victimless crimes of most drug offenses 
under a “social-standard analysis.” “Very roughly, a social-standard analysis would assess the 
magnitude of various non-victimizing offences by the degree to which they make the society a 
worse place to live.” Douglas N. Husak, Desert, Proportionality, and the Seriousness of Drug 
Offences, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 187, 208 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin 
Wasik eds., 1998) [hereinafter Husak, Desert]. This may equate to harm to the general public. 
For difficulties and deficiencies in arguments regarding victimless crimes, see id. at 208–09; 
Wertheimer, supra note 156.
166 See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 461–66.
167 See id.
168 See Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 379–80; Kuklin, Private Requitals,
supra note 2, at 968 n.15.
169 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 966.
170 As Moore points out, laws (such as coordination norms) may give rise to reasonable 
reliance or expectations, in which case a violation may wrongfully dash them, thereby 
producing a wrongful harm. But such deontic wrongfulness comes from the dashing, not 
directly from the law itself. MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 72–73 (1997) [hereinafter 
MOORE, PLACING BLAME]; see Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d 777, 778–79 (Cal. 1943) (finding 
it “negligence as a matter of law to disregard [a] stop-sign” that was erected pursuant to a 
defective statute because “any reasonable man should know that the public naturally relies upon 
their observance”).
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of emotional distress is such a maxim.171 This tort is limited to close family 
members,172 but not because other intimate supporters do not suffer substantial indirect 
harms, but rather, the limit is because of administrative and other concerns with 
spreading the legal protection more widely.173 When a family member is protected 
under this tort, she has a direct claim against the invader.174 She then is seen as a direct 
victim herself. As the connections to the immediate victim become more diluted,175
the harms to third parties typically dissipate until they are indistinguishable from 
strangers to the events. This is not to say that strangers suffer no harms themselves. 
They may pay to bar their windows from personal fright, for instance, to say nothing 
of their discomfort from sympathetic identification with the immediate victim. They 
constitute a second category of persons—the general public category. Thus, these two 
categories, immediate victims and the general public, are polar limits, not sharply 
distinguishable, to the field of those who might suffer harms from an agent’s conduct.
Before turning to the general public’s claims stemming from an autonomy invasion 
of an immediate victim, let us briefly look the possible effects of the autonomy 
invasion on the invader’s kin and kith. These individuals also may suffer harms.176
Psychic harm from seeing one’s loved one or friend endure the distress of a civil or 
criminal process and outcome is easy enough to imagine. Economic and physical 
harms to the supporters may follow. Even dignitary harms are likely, such as when
others shun a criminal’s family members. We can also envision an invader’s kin and 
kith angrily thinking, if not saying: “You jerk, what did you think your wrongful 
conduct would do to me? Don’t you love (respect) me enough to protect me from these 
harms, such as the sympathetic distress and personal shame I feel?” Proper substantive 
maxims that protect against these types of harms, and requital maxims that offer relief, 
though extremely unlikely, would not run afoul of the categorical imperative. The 
security interest of the invader’s kin and kith may be declared to outweigh the liberty 
interest of the invader, especially since the invader’s supposed liberty entails the 
wrongful invasion of an immediate victim’s protected autonomy space.
                                                          
171 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
48 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); DOBBS, supra note 109, §§ 308–09; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 89, § 54.
172 This tort is further cabined severely by doctrines such as the impact rule, the zone of 
danger rule, or a quite restrictive foreseeability rule. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 109, at 839–
41; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 89, at 362–67.
173 One concern is not to “overpunish” the invader. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS, supra note 89, at 366.
174 DOBBS, supra note 109, at 841.
175 An intricate web of harms may flow from an autonomy invasion. For example, while a 
person may not know the direct victim, she may be close to, and sympathize with, a family 
member of the victim who suffers from the victim’s invasion.
176 See, e.g., Serge F. Kovaleski, Killers’ Families Left to Confront Fear and Shame, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2012, at A1; Ryan, supra note 152, at 1085.
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IV. DIGNITY AND HARM
The duty to respect the dignity of others sits at the dead center of Kant’s moral 
system.177 Breach of this duty produces a dignitary harm.178 There are two direct forms 
of dignitary harm.179 The first is insult harm.180 The invader offends the invadee by 
conveying a disrespectful message to her.181 The invader communicates, explicitly or 
implicitly, that she is morally superior to the invadee or, equivalently, that the invadee 
is morally inferior.182 Even when the invader and invadee are the only parties privy to 
this communication, the invadee still suffers an insult harm. She has reason to feel 
slighted. The invader herself may be unaware of the message she is communicating, 
as where her facial expression or body language inadvertently conveys the idea of 
disrespect, which the invadee, as a reasonable person, interprets accordingly. In this 
case, the invader may be marginally blameworthy, if at all, for producing the insult 
                                                          
177 “Respect (reverentia) is, again, something merely subjective, a feeling of a special kind, 
not a judgment about an object that it would be a duty to bring about or promote.” KANT, THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 531. “Dignity is an expressive value demanding 
that people’s behavior, physical and verbal, convey a certain attitude to other people, namely 
an attitude of respect. There are many ways in which respect can be conveyed and, 
correspondingly, many ways in which it can be withheld.” Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and 
the Victim’s State of Mind, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 759, 771 (2000).
178 Historically, dignitary and reputational harms have been requited by apologies, shows of 
respect, seeking pardons, and compensation, among other means. See JAMES GORDLEY,
FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 222–30 (2006). “One can see a remarkable degree of continuity 
in the civil law. Rights to dignity and reputation have always been protected.” Id. at 230. The 
common law has been somewhat less protective. See id. at 233–39. Gordley opines: “[d]ignity 
and reputation belong to a person in much the way property belongs to him.” Id. at 242. Practical 
reasons argue for limits to their legal protection, such as “the public interest in the exchange of 
information. But otherwise, if they are rights which in principle should not be infringed, then 
what matters is their infringement, not whatever mental suffering it may or may not cause.” Id.
“In the Aristotelian tradition, the rules of distributive justice constitute the structure of society. 
. . . If honor and reputation are rights accorded to an individual [as the late scholastics asserted], 
then they should be protected just as the law protects his property.” Id. at 243.
179 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Restatement, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN 
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 25 (1988) [hereinafter Murphy, Forgiveness and 
Resentment].
180 Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, supra note 142, at 5–6.
181 Id.
182 Relying on Kant, Hampton identifies “what it is that makes an action wrong—i.e., the 
fact that it is an action that does not respect that person’s worth.” Id. at 5. “An immoral response 
to a person, whether or not it produces harm, carries with it a message, in particular, an insulting
message. . . . [A]n immoral action is insulting in the sense that it sends a message which 
challenges the victim’s worth.” Id. at 6. Murphy ascribes the resentment from moral injuries not 
only to their tangible or sensible harms, but also to their “messages—symbolic communications. 
They are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to us, ‘I count but you do not,’ ‘I can use you for my 
purposes,’ or ‘I am here up high and you are there down below.’ Intentional wrongdoing insults
us and attempts (sometimes successfully) to degrade us . . . .” Murphy, Forgiveness and 
Resentment, supra note 179, at 25; see Josh Bowers, Blame by Proxy: Political Retributivism & 
Its Problems, a Response to Dan Markel, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 135, 140 (2012).
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harm. Aware that she has sent this false signal to others in the past, she may even have 
been careful not to do so this time, but she failed because of her quirky mannerisms. 
She did not intend to be disrespectful nor did she believe she was being so. She may 
even believe that the invadee is morally superior to her.
The second direct form of dignitary harm is defamation harm.183 This type occurs 
when a third person is privy to and understands a message conveyed by the invader’s 
words or conduct as disrespectful to the invadee.184 The harm injures her reputation.185
This form of dignitary harm likewise may be manifested without the awareness or 
intention of the invader or, for that matter, the awareness of the invadee, as she may 
be inattentive, incapable of understanding, comatose, or deceased.186 Nevertheless, a
third party gets the message. Again, the invader may not be blameworthy for evincing 
this message. Thus, we may say, direct dignitary harms come in two types: insultive 
and defamatory. We declare some of their permutations to be wrongful and subject to 
sanctions.
Closely associated with dignitary harms are the standard types of harms recognized 
in law and morals: physical, economic, and psychic.187 Their close association can be 
seen from two perspectives. First, in balancing the liberty and security interests of 
moral agents, protective boundaries are drawn around these three types of harms at 
the point where society perceives them to be unreasonable or unacceptable and 
                                                          
183 See Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 440–41.
184 “Most of us tend to care about what others (at least some others, some significant group 
whose good opinion we value) think about us—how much they think we matter. Our self-respect 
is social in at least this sense . . . .” Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, supra note 179, at 
25. “And thus when we are treated with contempt by others it attacks us in profound and deeply 
threatening ways.” Id. “At their core, the torts of libel and slander enjoin us not to utter 
statements that attribute to others qualities or actions that ordinarily tend to lower them in the 
esteem of others.” GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, TORTS, supra note 117, at 310. “Both [defamation 
and privacy invasions] identify conduct as being wrongful and injurious for altering the way in 
which third parties view the victim and interact with her.” Id. at 307 (emphasis omitted). On the 
“four types of losses which the law of defamation aims at compensating,” including both the 
insultive and defamation interests I mention, see Eric Descheemaeker, Protecting Reputation: 
Defamation and Negligence, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 603, 612, 611–15 (2009).
185 “The interest in reputation . . . protects a good which is both non-pecuniary and 
immaterial. . . . As a result, in a system whose default and main remedy for violation of a right 
is the award of money damages, reputation is a very difficult interest to take into account.” 
Descheemaeker, supra note 184, at 610. Kant objects to monetizing a dignitary harm, in some 
sense. Dignity “is exalted above any price . . . .” KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra
note 13, at 557; see id. at 579; KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra
note 5, at 84. I have suggested elsewhere a surrogate for monetizing a dignitary harm. If we 
look to a reasonable person’s psychic reaction to the disrespectful conduct, then we have an 
indirect means to put a price on, as Kant asserts, the priceless dignitary harm. See Kuklin, 
Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 439–42. While this gambit is debatable, at least it 
accommodates the intuition that dignitary harms vary greatly in degree, and this should be taken 
into account when requiting the invadee.
186 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 443.
187 Id. at 444.
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therefore adopted maxims declare the harms as wrongful.188 A rational, sensible moral 
agent would forgo the liberty to impose these harms on others in exchange for the 
security from suffering them from others.189 Second, from another perspective, the 
material freedom an agent has to choose and conduct her life depends on her resources 
or wherewithal.190 At one extreme, where she has nothing, she can do virtually nothing. 
Accordingly, physical, economic, and psychic harms hinder her freedom, irrespective 
of her remaining resources.191 At some point and under certain circumstances, these 
harms are declared wrongful as invasions of an agent’s autonomy space.192 For these 
reasons, a person’s choice is blameworthy when she chooses to engage in conduct that 
wrongfully causes these three types of harms to another person.193 It disrespects the 
invadee’s autonomy, her equal dignity as a moral agent, and her established freedom 
to conduct her life as she fairly chooses.194 The invader deserves to suffer a just 
requital, private or public, for her transgression.
In identifying apt requitals for disrespectful conduct, we must be careful to avoid 
confusion from the multiple meanings of “respect” and related terms such as “dignity,” 
for we may respect1 everyone equally as moral beings, but respect2 some persons more 
or less than others because of their (mis)achievements.195 The first meanings of respect 
and related notions are based on equality-oriented conceptions of desert.196 Let us 
identify them as respectE or dignityE. They are based on what one is (e.g., a rational, 
moral being).197 The second meanings of these notions are based on liberty-oriented 
conceptions of desert.198 They may be denominated respectL or dignityL. They are 
                                                          
188 Id. at 387–88.
189 At first glance, these three types of harms seemingly fall within the security domain. We 
wish to be secure from suffering them. They may, however, also be seen as falling within the 
liberty domain. A person may suffer one or more of these harms if she is denied a liberty, such 
as the right to buy a car. As for physical and psychic harms, these may also result from a person’s 
reaction to the denial of a liberty.
190 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 389.
191 Id. at 429.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 446.
194 This argument is suggestive of the interest theory of rights, as contrasted to the will 
theory. See Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 2.2.2 (Dec. 19, 2005), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/rights/.
195 See supra text accompanying note 80.
196 Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 
626 (2009) [hereinafter Ristroph, Respect and Resistance].
197 FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 71, at 58–59.
198 Id. at 61.
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based on what one does.199 Kant’s imperative to respect others is equality based.200 As 
equal moral beings, persons are entitled to respectE. His standards for punishment are 
liberty-based.201 One deserves punishment for one’s blameworthy conduct.202
Therefore, the argument may go this way: we respectE an invader’s responsible choice 
and conduct to wrongfully harm another person by granting her the respectL she 
deserves by means of apt punishment.203 This resolves to a matter of distributive 
justice—that is, just deserts.204
                                                          
199 “If a person is deserving of some sort of treatment, he must, necessarily, be so in virtue 
of some possessed characteristic or prior activity.” FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert,
supra note 71, at 58. On the positive side of the desert ledger where compensation is in the form 
of social benefits, “desert is relevant to justice in distribution only where it expresses an actual 
burden, that is, when in involves some effort, sacrifice, work, risk, responsibility, inconvenience 
and so forth, when it is linked with an expenditure of energy and time.” SADURSKI, GIVING 
DESERT ITS DUE, supra note 56, at 116. “No benefits are ‘deserved’ when a proposed ground of 
‘desert’ cannot be meaningfully described as a burden, and that is precisely the case of natural 
abilities, talents and skills.” Id. at 130. However, distinguishing “genetic and environmental 
influence and the relative role of a person’s deliberate effort of self-development is probably 
doomed to failure because it is the dynamic interplay and mutual reinforcing of those factors 
that shapes the character, personality and behaviour of human beings.” Id. at 141.
200 Robin S. Dillon, Respect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 10, 2003), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/respect [hereinafter Dillon, Respect].
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 112, at 1667 (“Kant had two theories 
of [human] worth . . . .”).
203 Likewise, “Hegel insists that when I have committed a crime, punishment is my ‘right,’ 
because it is something that I myself have willed. Not only is punishment ‘in itself just,’ he says, 
but ‘it is also a right posited in the criminal himself, in his existing will, in his action.’” ALLEN 
W. WOOD, HEGEL’S ETHICAL THOUGHT 113 (1990) (quoting HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,
supra note 11, § 100). For an introduction to Hegel’s retributivism, see Dubber, Rediscovering 
Hegel’s Theory, supra note 132. The distinction between respectE and respectL is responsive to 
Ristroph’s accusation of inconsistency. “To many ears—including my own—these claims of 
respectful punishment ring hollow. It is difficult to see how we can simultaneously stigmatize 
an offender and show respect for him; stigma and respect seem fundamentally incompatible.” 
Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance, supra note 196, at 627 (first citing Christopher, supra
note 127, at 967–70; then citing Dolinko, Three Mistakes, supra note 127, at 1632–33, 1642–
56). Her related points remain intact. After observing the conditions in prisons, Ristroph asks, 
“With respect like this, who needs insults?” Id. at 628. “Other retributive arguments are simply 
circular: they assert that responsible agents must be punished, and that failure to punish is failure 
to recognize the criminal as a responsible agent.” Id. (citing Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: 
A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 260–61 
(2009)). “In fact, judgments of responsibility and agency are independent of judgments of how 
to respond to a responsible agent.” Id. (footnote omitted). I argue for punishment for 
autonomous choices, gauging such punishment by the degree to which the invader acts 
disrespectfully regarding the invadee.
204 As to the deontic justification for the community’s claim to impose punishment on 
invaders according to their just deserts, we are again relegated to the social contract. See supra
text accompanying note 19. The invader “consents” to the community’s authority to punish. 
The community as a collective declares that it has the duty to individual members of the 
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The distinction between equality and liberty conceptions of respect, dignity, and 
related notions is important in understanding the relevant dignitary harm to an invadee.
The relevant harm is an equality-based conception. The dignitary harm from a murder 
is independent of who the invadee is. Murdering an elected president is no more of a 
dignitary harm to her than murdering a tyrant is to him. We may rightfully respectL
the president more, but as Kantians, we center our moral duty to respect others on 
dignityE. While intuitively an appealing declaration is that the intentional murder of a 
person because she is president is more blameworthy, the other side of that coin is that 
the intentional murder of a person because he is a vicious tyrant is not very 
blameworthy, indeed, it may be laudable. These intuitions, however, invoke 
conceptions of distributive justice and of respectL.205 Non-consensually requiting a 
person’s just deserts for what she has done, that is, desertL, is a duty for the 
government, not private parties.206 Private parties may only judge and requite a person 
for her desertL if she consents, as where she enters an agreement with a school that 
includes fair grading or with sponsors of a fair talent or athletic contest.207
In gauging the degree of the invader’s blameworthiness for wrongfully harming 
the invadee and thus for imposing an indignity on her,208 we rely upon the judgment 
of the reasonable observer,209 suitably freed of biases toward the invader and invadee, 
as well as other distortions that would fail to survive the deontic filter of the categorical 
                                                          
community to punish blameworthy wrongdoers as well as the right and duty to the wrongdoer 
herself to punish her.
205 “[K]illing a saint is more heinous than killing a sinner (hence the well-known defense 
attorney’s ploy of ‘putting the victim on trial’).” MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE
272 (1988).
206 According to H.L.A. Hart, as noted above, one of the five elements in the standard case 
of punishment is that “[i]t must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a 
legal system against which the offence is committed.” HART, Prolegomenon, supra note 125, at 
4–5; see supra note 125.
207 An offended person may reasonably deem another’s conduct as a substantial insult or 
defamation, though it falls outside a protective maxim, as where the person is not elected into a 
hall of fame after a judgment by an admission committee.
208 For difficulties with the concept and measurement of dignity, and caution about ignoring 
the dignity of the invader, see RYBERG, supra note 136, at 131–42.
209 “The only way to judge [criminal] responsibility for reckless and negligent risk-taking is 
to measure the actor’s conduct against community expectations. The choice to disregard the risk 
is not per se culpable; it is culpable only if it falls short of the community standard of reasonable 
[law-abiding] behavior.” FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 154, at 119. 
Wallace “postulate[s] a close connection between holding someone responsible and a central 
class of moral sentiments, those of resentment, indignation, and guilt. To hold someone 
responsible, [he] argue[s], is essentially to be subject to emotions of this class in one’s dealings 
with the person.” R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 2 (1994). 
“[T]hese emotions are distinguished by their connection with expectations.” Id.; cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“A bodily contact is offensive 
if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.”).
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imperative.210 The reasonable observer focuses on the invader’s mental state.211 The 
observer’s judgment of the blameworthiness of the invader’s mental state is the gauge 
used to determine the invader’s just deserts.212 The actual consequences of the 
invader’s chosen conduct does not necessarily reflect her mental state with regard to 
the invadee at the time of her conduct. This implies that criminal attempts may be 
punished the same as completed crimes.213 Furthermore, the objective observer ignores 
the psychic and other reactions experienced by the particular invadee, as well as her 
own self-regarding reactions (e.g., “She might do that to me”; “I feel for the 
invadee.”). These are matters for corrective justice. In gauging the invader’s just 
deserts, we must stick to distributive justice.
The reasonable observer’s judgment of the blameworthiness of the invader’s 
mental state may partially stem from her objective, psychic reaction to the revealed 
facts and circumstances. Many such facts and circumstances are evidentiary of the 
degree of the invader’s disrespectfulness toward an invadee, whether the invadee 
experiences direct or indirect harm (e.g., a supporter or sympathetic observer of a 
directly harmed person).214 The invader’s foreseeability of the invasion and its 
repercussions on the invadee is of supreme relevance.215 Among the other 
considerations are: the duration of the invasion, as in false imprisonment for a short 
or long period;216 the foreseeable duration of the wrongful risk or invasive effects, 
                                                          
210 Hurd and Moore identify Adam Smith, Rawls, Plowden, and Posner as among those who 
have been “helped in their ability to reach justified conclusions [about risk imposition] by asking 
what some epistemically idealized person would do or think.” Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. 
Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 333, 358 (2002). “Holding someone to a 
community standard, therefore, is not necessarily a form of injustice. So long as the defendant 
is excused on the basis of objective, conduct-influencing factors, such as physical impediments, 
the standard of responsibility remains attentive to individual capacity.” FLETCHER, BASIC 
CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 154, at 120. That it may be difficult to create an 
accurate filter, see KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 58, at 425–26.
211 For example, “the coolness of a scoundrel makes him not only far more dangerous but 
also immediately more abominable in our eyes than we would have taken him to be without it.” 
KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 5, at 50. “[T]he desire to 
commit a wrongful action for its own sake seems incrementally worse that intending to commit 
a wrongful act as a means to a generally permissible end. Killing or torturing, or disfiguring for 
the sheer joy of it seems paradigmatic of true evil.” Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability,
supra note 59, at 323. “Killing without a motive can usually be just as wicked as killing after 
detached reflection about one’s goals.” GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 254
(1978) [hereinafter FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW]; see JOEL FEINBERG, What Is So 
Special About Mental Illness?, in DOING AND DESERVING, supra note 71, at 272, 287.
212 Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process, supra note 159, at 14.
213 This issue is addressed below, see infra text accompanying notes 330–38.
214 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85, at 264.
215 Id.
216 For a proposed culpability-based criminal code, Alexander and Ferzan “take into account 
the duration of the risk as the actor perceived it. . . . We propose that for every additional two 
minutes, the offense level be multiplied by the number of two-minute increments for which the 
risk continued.” ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85, at 283.
39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018
284 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:245
including whether a full recovery can be anticipated;217 the frequency of invasions, as 
where three false imprisonments occur either a week apart or a year apart; the 
continuity or intermittency of the invasion, thus distinguishing a single false 
imprisonment of four hours from four imprisonments of one hour each; whether the 
invader plans to repeat the invasion against the particular invadee or others;218 and the 
foreseeable resilience of the invadee.219 The reasonable observer may also factor in:
the invadee’s known risk disposition because those who prefer risk are likely to 
respond to harmful risks differently from risk avoiders;220 the risk of an invader’s 
retaliation for reporting or litigating the invasion, or willingness to settle; the invader’s 
remorsefulness;221 the reaction of the invader’s cohorts, such as fellow gang members, 
to the invasion;222 peak and end considerations regarding the wrongful harms;223 the 
                                                          
217 “In our view, the anticipated duration of risk of harm also affects the actor’s culpability. 
. . . An actor who imposes a risk for a longer period of time imposes more risk than an actor 
who imposes a risk for a shorter period of time.” Id. at 243 (footnote omitted).
218 This ties in to recidivism. See infra text accompanying notes 345–68.
219 Bentham identifies some of these factors in discussing the “value of a lot of pleasure or 
pain.” JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
ch. IV, at 38–41 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789) (“Value of a Lot of Pleasure or 
Pain, How to Be Measured”).
220 The invadee’s foreseeable risk attitudes may require deeper analysis. For instance, she 
may have one attitude about putting herself at risk, as by mountain climbing, and another 
attitude about having others put her at risk.
221 “Joel Feinberg, Herbert Morris, and the late Jean Hampton . . . have all argued that the 
truly repentant criminal in general deserves less punishment than the unrepentant criminal . . . 
.” Murphy, Some Second Thoughts on Retributivism, supra note 139, at 94. Murphy cautiously 
embraces this position. Id. at 95. In Robinson’s view, “[g]enuine remorse, public 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing, and sincere apology can all . . . reduce an offender’s 
blameworthiness—and, thereby, the amount of punishment deserved.” Paul H. Robinson, The 
Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice”, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 
380 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson, Virtues of Restorative Processes]. In the attached footnote, 
Robinson states, “I do not know that retributivists as a group would agree with this . . . .” Id. at 
380 n.12. Duff is one who does. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 82, at 289, 289–
91 (“[S]he has recognised [sic] and repented her crime, and subjected herself to the pain of 
remorse . . . .”). This position regarding remorse has overtones of the character theory of 
punishment rather than the act theory. Holtman doubts that retributivism has the wherewithal to 
account for remorse, as well as victim reaction and other issues. Holtman, supra note 128, at 
125.
222 See Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness, supra note 46, at 192–93.
223 “Summary assessments [of extended experiences] . . . tend to focus on only a few features 
. . . , [including] the intensity of the state at key instances, in particular the most intense (peak)
and the final (end) moments.” Dan Ariely & Ziv Carmon, Gestalt Characteristics of 
Experiences: The Defining Features of Summarized Events, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
191, 191 (2000); see Daniel Kahneman, Evaluation by Moments: Past and Future, in CHOICES,
VALUES AND FRAMES 693, 694–702 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Daniel 
Kahneman, Experience Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach, in
CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES, supra, at 673, 675–77.
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publicity given to the invasion;224 and whether the invasion is of a liberty or a security 
interest.225
The relevance of the psychic response of the reasonable observer differs from the 
fright theory of punishment, at least when we focus on fright and not other negative 
reactions. Under the fright theory, persons are concerned for the welfare of themselves 
and those they care for.226 The invader’s mental state suggests that she is willing to put 
others at risk of wrongful harm.227 Under the view explored here, the relevant 
emotional response of the observer is that which her empathy and antipathy (or 
sympathy) arouses toward the invader in light of the invader’s violation of substantive 
maxims and, perhaps, her ensuing corrective justice obligations.228 This reaction is 
other-regarding, not self-regarding.229 To highlight the difference between these two 
sources of harms, even those with enmity toward the immediate invadee and her 
supporters, who rejoice in their harms, may suffer fright harms from insecurity as they
worry that the invader may direct her blameworthy conduct at the observer or her
favorites. Contrariwise, those who are not the least bit frightened by a perceived risk 
from the invader’s willingness to wrongfully harm others may suffer from sympathy 
with the immediate invadee, her affiliates, and the invader’s affiliates.
In the end, there seems to be something deeply troubling about my position on how 
one gauges an invader’s just deserts. Apparently, I have dragged someone off the 
Clapham Omnibus to judge our invader. The difference between my bus rider and the 
one Lord Devlin230 looks to for judging whether conduct is sanctionable on the grounds 
of immorality is that I have put our bus rider through a short course in deontic 
morality.231 Our reasonable person’s values have been purified, if you will. Still, this 
                                                          
224 Regarding the relevance of the stigma from a crime’s publicity, see Douglas N. Husak, 
Already Punishment Enough, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 79–80 (1990) [hereinafter Husak, Already 
Punishment Enough].
225 Violating a security interest may be perceived as worse than violating a comparable 
liberty interest under the common reaction of loss aversion that “losing hurts more than winning 
feels good.” See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 283–86 (2011); Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES,
supra note 223, at 1, 3.
226 NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 66–67.
227 KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT, supra note 70, at 128.
228 Id. at 125.
229 “Some have suggested that the public indignation or resentment caused by an act is a 
proper measure of wrongfulness.” Id. (first citing EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN 
SOCIETY 90 (G. Simpson trans., 1933); then citing 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883)). Kleinig worries that public “indignation is too 
easily affected by considerations . . . extraneous to the determination of desert,” such as “the 
face of the offender.” Id. To avoid this, I would insist that relevant reactions survive the deontic 
filter. Kleinig raises other concerns about determining wrongfulness by reliance “on some 
simple appeal to the amount of indignation or harm caused by some act.” Id. at 127. Without 
responding to his several concerns one by one, I believe my proposals survive his caution.
230 See PATRICK DEVLIN, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS
1 (1965).
231 See id.
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purification seems to leave some influences to chance and the normative breezes of 
the day. I think this is, unfortunately, unavoidable. Conceptions of responsibility and 
disrespect are socially constructed.232 Looking back to anthropology, sociology, world 
history, news sources, and the like demonstrates that what passes muster in one 
community, or at one time, may fail in another.233 The parameters of responsible and 
disrespectful conduct are not deducible from Kantian principles. They entail a double 
judgment. First, society must judge where to draw essentially contestable standards 
that balance liberty and security interests within the constraints of the categorical 
imperative and with an understanding of the human (mental) condition.234 For even 
where fuzzy lines are to be drawn in light of these considerations, reasonable people 
may differ. Second, agents of society must judge whether, or the extent to which, these 
standards or lines have been crossed.235 We ask our reasonable people, be they judges, 
juries, others, or some combination, to judge both aspects of individual cases because 
we have no useful, accurate data and algorithms to feed to ideal computers. As the 
Legal Realists and postmodernists have made clear, society has no hope in turning to 
a mechanical jurisprudence, be it legislative or judicial.236
Since this section is central to my analysis of retribution, let me summarize how I 
got this far. The ordinary wrongful harms suffered by invadees are to be requited, if at 
all, by conceptions of corrective justice. Protected invadees might include the 
immediate invadee, her kin, kith, supporters, and onlookers. For that matter, this 
category might include those who suffer because of their linkage to the invader, such 
as the invader’s family members. But this principle does not mean that all harms are 
requited. Adopted maxims must still delineate whether a harm is requitable and, if so, 
the reach of permissible requitals. We may decide that some harms, such as those from 
crowd jostlings, are simply, in Coasean terms,237 the cost of living in the modern 
world, and thus are not wrongful. Once all the wrongful harms of each invadee have 
been allowably requited, at least in principle, by private law remedies aimed at 
returning an invadee to her prior protected position, a residual concern centered on the 
                                                          
232 Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, supra note 142, at 10.
233 “The type of behavior that counts as either respectful or insulting is a matter of social 
convention. What passes for acceptable conduct in New York will be regarded as outright 
rudeness in Iowa.” Id. To give the point a communitarian grounding, “the notion of desert is at 
home only in the context of a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both 
of the good for man and of the good of that community and where individuals identify their 
primary interests with reference to those goods.” ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 250 
(3d ed. 2007). I would express this good mainly in terms of the security-liberty tradeoff.
234 For “essentially contestable concepts,” see WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 10–44 (3d ed. 1993); W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1956).
235 Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (1788), reprinted in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 5, at 133, 268–69 [hereinafter KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON]
(“[E]mployment of the faculty of judgment”). For elaboration and criticism, see Robert Hanna, 
Kant’s Theory of Judgment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 28, 2004), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/.
236 Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 752–53 (2013).
237 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 393 n.60.
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invader’s conduct remains. She was disrespectful to the direct and indirect invadees 
by wrongfully invading their autonomy space. A criminal requital under notions of 
distributive justice may be an apt means to treat the invader’s just deserts. This draws 
attention to the blameworthiness of the invader in the form of both responsibility and 
disrespect blameworthiness.
V. BLAMEWORTHINESS
Deontic blameworthiness has two foci. The first focus is responsibility 
blameworthiness, Br, which reflects the invader’s degree of responsibility for making 
her choice to act or refrain from acting.238 The second, disrespect blameworthiness, 
Bd, refers to the invader’s mental state and conduct with respect to those who are put 
at risk by her act. In other words, the focus relates to the extent to which she violates 
her duty to other persons to respect their dignity.239 Despite the vagueness of the idea 
of blameworthiness, various key factors have been identified or advanced.240 Some of 
                                                          
238 Id. at 446.
239 “[T]he study of culpability is [a] poly-dimensional enterprise. Not only does it include 
considerations on mens rea, but it also involves considerations of personal responsibility.” 
RYBERG, supra note 136, at 68. As Alexander analyzes it, “the two essential elements of 
culpable acts are the following: First, there is the defendant’s subjective assessment of the risk 
of harm to others his act presents . . . . Second, there is the defendant’s reason for acting in the 
face of the risk.” Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 3 
(1994) [hereinafter Alexander, Crime and Culpability]. In his explication, Alexander omits 
reference to coercive forces on the agent. Id. at 3–5. “Two basic elements determine an 
offender’s degree of blameworthiness: the nature and seriousness of the harm caused or 
threatened by the crime and the offender’s degree of culpability in committing the crime.” 
Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73 (2005) (identifying several 
factors to culpability: intent, capacity, motives, “and, for multi-defendant crimes, the 
defendant’s role in the offense . . . .”).
240 “Blameworthiness is not easy to define, but it would appear that a manageable approach 
would be to consider (1) the harm actually inflicted (or attempted) and (2) the mental state 
(culpability; mens rea) of the offender.” SINGER, supra note 154, at 34. Fletcher’s “General 
Framework of Retributive Punishment” recognizes various factors: “(1) the likelihood that the 
defendant’s act will result in the violation of a protected legal interest and (2) the harm, if any, 
represented by this violation.” George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 54, 56 (1982) [hereinafter Fletcher, Recidivist Premium]. Additional factors are the 
defendant’s degree of responsibility, which has two dimensions, control and “the degree of 
awareness and knowledge.” Id. at 56. Furthermore, there seem to be “two theories of desert that 
interweave in the analysis of just punishment,” one stresses responsibility and the “other focuses 
on culpability . . . .” Id. at 56–57. “[I]f rationality [which “clearly ranges along a continuum”] 
is a criterion for responsibility, then responsibility, too, should in theory be a matter of degree 
which ranges along a continuum.” Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Capacity, in ACTION AND 
VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 239, 249 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Morse, 
Diminished Capacity]. “Responsibility or blameworthiness has two distinct dimensions and one 
presupposition that attaches to both. The presupposition is that any being who is held 
responsible must be sufficiently rational and autonomous to be a moral agent.” Moore, Prima 
Facie Moral Culpability, supra note 59, at 319 (footnote omitted). “The first [dimension] is that 
one has done something morally wrong, something that violates one’s moral obligations. . . . 
The second dimension of responsibility requires that one must have done such wrong culpably.” 
Id.
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the factors tend to decrease the invader’s relative blameworthiness (e.g., un-
foreseeability, duress), while others tend to increase it (e.g., malice, contempt). For 
any one wrongful action, there may be a combination of blameworthiness elements at 
work that, overall, either exacerbates or moderates the blameworthiness in relation to 
the threshold for wrongfulness.241
A. Responsibility Blameworthiness, Br
As Aristotle instructs, for an agent to be responsible for her conduct,242 the agent’s 
choice must largely be free of avoidable ignorance, Bri, and coercion, Brc.243 The 
factors of ignorance and coercion may be independent of one another, as where an 
actor is fully aware of the risks of her conduct but is coerced to act by a gun to her 
head, or where the risks are entirely unknown to her while she otherwise acts freely. 
Ignorance may have sources that are external (e.g., fraud, misleading bargain frames) 
or, as uncovered by cognitive and other sciences, internal (e.g., salience distortion, 
cognitive dissonance).244 An important aspect of ignorance is the degree of 
foreseeability of the potential consequences of considered actions.245 The more 
foreseeable to her a risk of harm to others is, the more the agent is in a position to 
rationally choose (i.e., consent to, of sorts) her conduct,246 and thus the more that agent 
                                                          
241 For additional discussion of these two blameworthiness foci, see Kuklin, Constructing 
Autonomy, supra note 1, at 446–57; Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness, supra note 46,
at 175.
242 “Active responsibility theories that relate a person to a harm via the properties of 
voluntariness, intentionality, causation, knowledge (absence of mistake), freedom (absence of 
compulsion), and rationality (absence of insanity, infancy) . . . are the theories long enshrined 
in Anglo-American criminal law.” MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 170, at 40. “[T]hey all 
require some kind of action by a person before that person may be held responsible.” Id.
(discussing “four distinct views of responsibility here” further).
243 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 43, bk. III, ch. 1, at 964.
Behind the voluntary act requirement of criminal law “is the idea that no one is blameworthy 
for his acts if his rational agency is sufficiently impaired at the time. The impairment might 
affect his will . . . [o]r it might affect his rationality . . . .” Alexander, Philosophy of Criminal 
Law, supra note 127, at 825. “It seems to be a logical rather than a normative matter that we 
can be morally responsible (i.e. properly held responsible) only for that over which we had or 
could have some control.” DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME, supra note 89, at 58; see, e.g.,
CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 58, at 4–5; FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra
note 159, at 12; Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship 
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1519 (1992); Holly Smith, 
Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REV. 543, 548–54 (1983).
244 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 399–400.
245 Id.
246 “Most crime has always involved some degree of conscious or unconscious risk-taking.” 
PAT O’MALLEY, CRIME AND RISK 53 (2010). To account for liability for omissions, Husak 
“submit[s] that the presence or absence of control, and not the presence or absence of choice or 
action, establishes the boundaries of deserved punishment and responsibility.” Douglas N. 
Husak, The Relevance of the Concept of Action to the Criminal Law, 6 CRIM. L.F. 327, 340 
(1995) (book review).
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is responsible for her choice and the ensuing wrongful harm to invadees.247 Some 
commentators argue that every general element of a tort accommodates foreseeability, 
and contract and criminal law also emphasize foreseeability.248 Coercion, like 
ignorance, also may have sources that are external (e.g., force, economic duress, 
necessity, barriers) and internal (e.g., addiction, irresistible impulse, starvation),249 as
Kant notes.250 For example, insofar as an invader lacks resources prior to an autonomy 
                                                          
While the controversial doctrine of double effect may justify foreseeable harms, it generally 
does so by finding that persons are not being purposively harmed and circumstances allow for 
the harm. See infra text accompanying note 480.
247 Many fortuitous contingencies affect the direct invadee’s and the public’s reactive harms, 
including: the amount of publicity about the invasion, which may turn on the happenstance of 
the news cycle, other concurrent newsworthy events, the identity of the direct invadee, and so 
forth; the size of the public within the reasonable spheres of the risk of future wrongful risk; 
whether the invasion is one in a series by the invader or part of a crime wave; the socio-economic 
class of the invadee, and even the invader; ad infinitum. Some of these contingencies are 
foreseeable to some degree. When, then, are they declared wrongful? Some of the reactive 
harms (e.g., race-based) fail to clear the deontic filter.
A fortuity may be beneficial to an invader, as where an invasion is never made known either to 
the direct invadee (e.g., an undiscovered theft) or the general public (e.g., the direct invadee 
does not reveal it). Does the invader’s foresight of these contingencies make her conduct more 
blameworthy? She believes she will “get away” with her invasion. Her confidence in escaping 
punishment would seem to increase the risk of future wrongful risks.
248 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 1145, 1204 (1970); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, The Unsolved Mysteries of Causation and 
Responsibility, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 349 (2011); Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 
987–89; see generally Hurd & Moore, supra note 210, at 336; David G. Owen, Figuring 
Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277, 1290 (2009); Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1248–
49 (2009); Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Many Faces of Foreseeability, 10 KAN. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 156, 156–57 (2000).
249 For example, we do not see it as disrespectful conduct when a lost mountain hiker caught 
in an unexpected blizzard breaks into another’s cabin, consumes the food there, and leaves 
behind an apology on her business card. See Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 112, at 
1686 (“[A] starving man’s theft of food . . . carries no insult, and therefore should not be 
punished.”). Even Barnett, the libertarian, would allow the hiker to break in to save herself, 
though she would be liable for damages. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 170–
72 (1998) [hereinafter BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY]. Owing to necessity, the Model Penal 
Code rejects the criminality of the conduct. See DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 
197.
250 “The degree of responsibility depends on the degree of freedom. . . . The greater the 
obstacles to action which we must overcome, the more accountable we are for the action; the 
less an action results from our freedom, the less responsible we are for it.” KANT, LECTURES,
supra note 163, at 62–63. “If, for instance, a starving man steals something from the dining-
room, the degree of his responsibility is diminished by the fact that it would have required great 
self-restraint for him not to do it.” Id. at 63; see KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra
note 13, at 382. “[T]he violence of passion, or temptation, may sometimes alleviate a crime; as 
theft, in case of hunger, is far more worthy of compassion, than when committed through 
avarice, or to supply one in luxurious excesses.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *15. 
Taking this tack, Morse observes: “[c]ontrary to my earlier writing on this subject, I now believe 
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invasion seeking basic necessities,251 and thus has reduced opportunities for, say, 
legitimate economic activities, the more others may believe that coercive factors 
influenced her conduct.252
As suggested by these observations, unavoidable ignorance and coercion may 
interrelate in complex ways.253 Both ignorance and coercion have scalar qualities,254
so we must determine at what degree the freedom from them suffices to hold an agent 
responsible. For purposes of retribution, once past the threshold, the reasonable 
observer judges the extent to which the heightened satisfaction of the requisites to 
responsibility also reflects the invader’s greater disrespect of the persons put at risk 
by her conduct.255
A closer look at the scalar qualities of ignorance and coercion may be edifying. 
Under idealized standards, let us suppose that for an agent who is perfectly informed 
and capable of rationally processing information, Bri = 1.0, and for an agent who is 
perfectly free of every form of coercion, Brc = 1.0. Hence, Bri and Brc range from 0.0 
to 1.0. At some point, the agent is sufficiently blameless to be considered not 
responsible for her harm to the invadee, at which point the harm may be considered 
not wrongful.256 For the reasonable person of existing law, both aspects of 
                                                          
that the law should adopt a generic partial excusing condition, ‘Guilty But Partially 
Responsible,’ based on diminished rationality [owing to coercive impairments].” Stephen J. 
Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 265 (2000) (footnotes omitted); 
see id. at 265–66.
251 For a discussion of the role of enablements in a deontic regime, see Kuklin, Constructing 
Autonomy, supra note 1, at 404–06.
252 A $1000 theft by a rich person seems more blameworthy than such a theft by a poor 
person. In Boonin’s view, it is wrong to assume 
that if a rich offender and a middle-class offender commit identical offenses, then the 
amount of harm they cause is identical. This assumption is mistaken because the 
objective insecurity and subjective anxiety caused to others will be much greater if the 
offender is rich than if he is of average means.
BOONIN, supra note 133, at 260 (citing Stephen Wilkinson, Restitution Without Punishment: Is 
It Enough to Make Criminals Pay?, in PUNISHMENT, EXCUSES AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 35,
50 (Henry Benedict Tam ed., 1996)).
253 See Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 396–401. I examine these 
complexities in great detail in Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness, supra note 46, at 173.
254 See Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness, supra note 46, at 173.
255 “The concept of responsibility involves being appropriately responded to in a certain 
way for a certain action. . . . The same point can be made more sharply with respect to 
blameworthiness.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, 
and Moral Luck, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 97, 122 (2008) [hereinafter Zipursky, Two Dimensions 
of Responsibility]. Our negative reactive attitudes toward a person’s harmful conduct are 
moderated by knowledge of the person’s shortfalls from fully responsible choice. See Strawson, 
supra note 159, at 64–67.
256 “In problematic cases . . . legal responsibility is something to be decided, not simply 
discovered.” JOEL FEINBERG, Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals, in DOING AND 
DESERVING, supra note 71, at 25, 27.
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responsibility blameworthiness are satisfied somewhat short of the ideal, say, Bri ? 0.5 
and Brc ? 0.3. This disparity in thresholds is supposed since existing law seems to be 
less sympathetic to coercion than to ignorance (e.g., unforeseeability). The minimum 
thresholds for the two aspects of responsibility blameworthiness may vary according 
to the type of conduct (e.g., battery versus the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress), whether the shortfalls stem from internal or external sources (e.g., irresistible 
impulse versus economic duress), whether the claim is criminal or civil, the type of 
harm in issue (e.g., physical versus dignitary harm), and other similar 
considerations.257 Furthermore, an agent who is more skilled or knowledgeable than 
the standard reasonable person or better able to resist coercive pressures (e.g., a 
hardened stoic) may be found more blameworthy for a wrongful harm than an ordinary 
reasonable person, or may be found to have committed a harm that is wrongful because 
of her superior capabilities that would not be wrongful if done by the ordinary 
reasonable person. Because of her superior capabilities, the risk of harms may be more 
foreseeable and easier to avoid, perilous temptations may be easier to resist, and so 
forth. As we do for medical practitioners and other experts, we may hold her to a 
higher standard because, owing to her superior capabilities, doing so is not more 
personally demanding of her.258 A particular agent may have a complex combination 
of qualities that relate to responsibility blameworthiness. She may have, for example, 
superior knowledge, ordinary reasoning skills, and subnormal resistance to coercive 
pressures or temptations.
B. Disrespect Blameworthiness, Bd
Disrespect blameworthiness, Bd, centers on the degree of the invader’s 
disrespectfulness toward an invadee at the time of the conduct in question. Under the 
categorical imperative, an agent must consider other persons as moral equals and must 
so treat them.259 Thus, as with responsibility blameworthiness, there are two aspects 
of disrespect blameworthiness: disrespectful attitude, Bda, and disrespectful treatment 
Bdt. In judging the first aspect of the invader’s disrespectfulness, her superior attitude, 
the observer must gauge the invader’s subjective mental state.260 This may require 
                                                          
In questioning how the law should “respond to justifiable claims for partial responsibility,” 
Morse doubts that the law can “sensibly and even-handedly make fine judgments about morally 
relevant discrete, marginal differences in rationality and fear of dysphoria.” Morse, Diminished 
Capacity, supra note 240, at 271. If such a judgment is to be made, it should be done by the jury 
“because it represents the community’s moral judgment . . . .” Id.
257 See Morse, Diminished Capacity, supra note 240, at 271.
258 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
12 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
259 See, e.g., HILL, JR., DIGNITY, supra note 130, at 55; ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL 
KANT’S MORAL THEORY 198 (1989); Allen Wood, Humanity as End in Itself, in 2 DEREK 
PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS 58, 62–63 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 2011); Kuklin, Constructing 
Autonomy, supra note 1, at 449–54; Dillon, Respect, supra note 200.
260 Kant holds that duties of respect are strict duties “classified according to the kinds of 
actions that would constitute violations of them: arrogance, defamation, and ridicule.” WOOD,
KANTIAN ETHICS, supra note 129, at 178 (citation omitted). While defamation and ridicule 
involve the failure to treat another person with respect, arrogance is a mental state that seems 
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complicated evaluations,261 including the drawing of inferences from the invader’s 
manifested conduct,262 such as in the difference between recklessness and 
negligence.263 To what extent was the invader’s conduct a product of, even motivated 
by, a sense of moral superiority to those put at risk by her conduct? What was her 
intention or her purpose?264 Was she indifferent to the risks to others, or did she believe 
other societal values outweighed the risks? Was the manifestation of disrespect a 
product of the invader’s ignorance, inadvertence, or insensitivity?265 While 
foreseeability is an important factor in gauging responsibility blameworthiness, it also 
bears on disrespectfulness.266 The more an invader knows or has reason to know of the 
nature or extent of the negative impact on the invadee’s autonomy space, or the harms 
that may well ensue, the greater the likely disrespectful mental state driving the 
conduct in question, ceteris paribus.267 Likewise, perhaps, in benefitting from an 
                                                          
independent of conduct. Loving paternalism appears independent of all three of Kant’s specified 
forms of disrespect.
261 As one example, suppose that an invader knows she could request, and get, a gift of a 
book from the invadee, but chooses to steal it from her instead. Would we say that the additional 
(psychic) payoff from the theft over the gift reflects heightened disrespect of the invadee? Do 
we consider whether the invader obtains a perceived benefit from the invasion? What if an 
invader rubs the invadee’s nose in her harm, even if originally not a product of 
blameworthiness?
262 Brudner defends a subjectivism that “avoids the excessive empiricism of which critics 
complain, incorporating as it does the standpoint of an ideal thinking Agent whose inferences 
from the empirical agent’s choices are imputed to those choices.” BRUDNER, supra note 63, at 
59.
263 “The difference between negligence and recklessness is entirely a matter of attitude. 
Recklessness implies a conscious disregard of the risk; negligence requires neither awareness, 
nor disregard, of the risk.” DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 76. Under negligence, 
“I should have been aware, but wasn’t.” Id. at 77.
264 Strawson “insist[s] on . . . the very great importance that we attach to the attitudes and 
intentions towards us of other human beings, and the great extent to which our personal feelings 
and reactions depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions.” 
Strawson, supra note 159, at 62.
265 “Jurisdictions should adopt aggravation doctrines [in criminal law] based on quality of 
contemplation or the opportunity for such.” Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Plotting Premeditation’s 
Demise, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 105 (2012) [hereinafter Ferzan, Plotting 
Premeditation’s Demise] (discussing “enhanced decisionmaking”); see id. at 103–08.
266 Id.
267 “Under the risk-based paradigm . . . [c]ulpability would be a scalar function of the various 
harms the actor believed he was putting at risk, the degrees of risk of the various harms he 
believed his act was imposing, and his reason(s) for undertaking the act.” Larry Alexander, Duff 
on Attempts, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ANTONY 
DUFF 215, 237 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Alexander, Duff on Attempts]. “The 
magnitude of dignitary harms is also [along with the invader’s (A) disregard of the invadee (S)] 
a function of the nature of legitimate interest on S’s part that A manifests himself as ready to 
abridge.” PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT 149 (2004) [hereinafter WESTEN, LOGIC OF 
CONSENT]; see H.L.A. HART, Intention and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 125, at 113, 122 (opining that the difference between “direct and oblique intention” 
may be relevant to penalty judgments, though not conviction judgments); Adam Kolber, The 
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interchange that is disadvantageous to an invadee, the more the invader knows or has 
reason to know of the invadee’s shortfalls from full responsibility—that is, the 
coercive forces on her and her relevant ignorance—the greater the disrespect 
blameworthiness, whether or not the invader is the source of these shortfalls (e.g., 
exploiting the invadee’s lack of education).268 Knowledge of an invadee’s unusual 
sensitivity may not affect compensation under tort law (e.g., noise nuisance), but it is 
relevant to judging the invader’s disrespectful attitude and, for that matter, the second 
aspect of disrespectfulness, treatment, Bdt.
Knowingly denying a person’s legal and moral rights to liberty or security is an 
obvious example of disrespectful treatment. Disrespectful treatment, however, may 
not correlate with disrespectful attitude, as disrespectful treatment requires an 
independent evaluation.269 For example, for paternalistic conduct driven by love for a 
susceptible invadee, an observer may judge that the invader was not (very) 
disrespectful even though she denied the invadee the freedom to choose for herself 
under the circumstances. By nonconsensually hiding the susceptible invadee’s candy 
while she is on a taxing diet, for instance, the invader’s disrespectful attitude may be 
minimal or nonexistent. Nevertheless, while the invader may have had a respectful 
attitude toward the invadee by considering her an equal (“I myself would prefer and 
benefit from this type of paternalism”), by denying her the freedom to choose whether 
to eat her own candy, the invader did not treat the paternalized invadee with (complete) 
respect.270 Yet, the invader was not using the paternalized person as a means only to 
her own ends.271 In some overall sense, perhaps, the invader was respectful of the 
invadee.272 As another instance, an observer may similarly view as minimally 
blameworthy, if at all, the invader who helps euthanize a rational, imploring invadee 
                                                          
Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 627–31 (2011). Nonetheless, we must take 
into account such considerations as the doctrine of double effect. See infra text accompanying 
note 480.
268 See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 1001–05.
269 Id.
270 Meyers identifies three components of respect, one subjective and two objective. “[T]hese
three components can be at odds. One’s respectful attitude may fail to find expression in one’s 
conduct; one may act respectfully despite an indifferent or disrespectful attitude; one’s respectful 
conduct may be addressed to an object unworthy of respect.” Diana T. Meyers, Self-Respect and 
Autonomy, in DIGNITY, CHARACTER, AND SELF-RESPECT, supra note 80, at 218, 224.
271 Respectful paternalistic behavior may be quite extreme, as where an agent imprisons an 
invadee against his will to save him from himself (e.g., drug addiction) or from others who have 
put him at risk (e.g., threat of mob hit). This conduct may be costly to the agent and without any 
personal benefit, as where the agent is ambivalent about the propriety of her conduct. We might 
conclude that beneficent paternalism is a dignitary harm (an objective insult, of sorts), but not 
disrespectfully blameworthy (a subjective insult) in that it was done for the purpose of, and 
succeeded in, advancing the net interests of the invadee. Still, however, the agent did not treat 
the invadee with unqualified respect since she denied him the freedom to choose for himself.
272 Could we say that the respectful attitude toward the paternalized agent outweighed the 
disrespectful treatment that denied the agent immediate, free choice under the circumstances?
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with strong grounds for her insistence. As for the malicious invader out “to get” the 
invadee, this is disrespect of the first order.273
As with responsibility blameworthiness, Br, the two aspects of disrespect 
blameworthiness, Bda and Bdt, have scalar qualities, say, from 0.0 to 1.0.274 Regarding 
attitude, the disrespectfulness of an invader’s mental state may vary greatly.275 Kant asserts 
that the evil mental state of a criminal makes him worse.276 Existing law recognizes a wide 
range of mental states as sufficient for requitals, either privately under corrective justice or 
publicly under retribution or distributive justice.277 Requitals may ensue from strict 
liability, inadvertence, negligence, recklessness, wantonness, intention, purposiveness, 
willfulness, and malice. The latter part of this list easily implies disrespect, but even strict 
liability may suggest a degree of disrespect under some particulars, as where substantial 
statistical risk to product users (e.g., of cars without available, inexpensive safety devices 
installed) is known or knowable to producers. Criminal law invokes conceptions of mens 
rea to identify degrees of blameworthy mental states.278 The Model Penal Code resorts to 
four categories: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.279 Commentators 
debate the meaning and usefulness of these and other applied terms.280 A difficult deontic 
                                                          
273 Again, if the direct invadee or others suffer psychic and other harms from knowledge of 
the invader’s ill-will, this is a matter for corrective justice. Protected harm, if any, is based on 
the invadee’s reasonable reaction, generally not directly on the blameworthiness of the invader’s 
conduct. Corrective justice usually establishes thresholds of blameworthiness, after which this 
element typically drops out. The doctrine of comparative negligence is an exception. See supra
text accompanying notes 113–14.
274 For example, Bd = 0.0 in the ordinary, arms-length, fully negotiated contract, where the 
autonomy of both parties is fully respected during the contracting process, neither one being 
used as a means only to the other’s ends. Bd = 1.0 where (bear with me) an invader tortures a 
baby for fun knowing that, and because, the parents, family, and others are looking on.
275 “The magnitude of dignitary injuries varies, depending upon the species of disregard an actor 
manifests.” WESTEN, LOGIC OF CONSENT, supra note 267, at 149. Thus, Westen asserts that the 
manifested purpose or desire to harm another is a worse indignity than simply a willingness to harm, 
just as harm from indifference is worse than harm from inadvertence. Id. “Even very tiny risk-
impositions can be reckless if imposed for insufficient or misanthropic reasons, just as very large risk-
impositions can be nonculpable if supported by weighty reasons.” Larry Alexander, Insufficient 
Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 931, 934–35 (2000) 
[hereinafter Alexander, Insufficient Concern] (footnote omitted).
276 See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 382.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). “The states of mind found in 
tort law are deliberation, intention, and recklessness.” Cane, Retribution, supra note 112, at 149 
(providing explications). For tortious recklessness (willful or wanton conduct), see, for 
example, DOBBS, supra note 109, at 51; JOEL FEINBERG, Sua Culpa, in DOING AND DESERVING,
supra note 71, at 187, 193.
280 “Criminal statues have resorted to a bewildering variety of adjectives to characterize the 
mental states required by various offenses.” LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 186 (1987) 
[hereinafter KATZ, BAD ACTS]. “Recently, drafters have tried to limit themselves to four basic terms:
intention, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. The meaning of these is superficially obvious. 
On closer inspection it becomes harder to grasp.” Id. at 209. For a taste of the breadth and depth of 
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issue is whether the law should have strict liability crimes.281 Some commentators insist 
not,282 others find in such crimes an aspect of mens rea,283 or sufficient defendant control,284
and still others are satisfied with the justifiability of strict outcome responsibility.285
                                                          
the debate, see, for example, ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85, at 23–
85. “I believe that these three culpable mental states—purpose, knowledge, and recklessness—all 
exhibit the single moral failing of insufficient concern for the interests of others.” Alexander, 
Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra note 127, at 828 (footnote omitted); see Alexander, Insufficient 
Concern, supra note 275, at 931. Despite the debate over the usefulness of delineated mental states, 
the studies of three researchers “show that people are able to make explicit distinctions about the 
states of mind of others that more or less correspond to legally relevant categories.” Pam A. Mueller 
et al., When Does Knowledge Become Intent? Perceiving the Minds of Wrongdoers, J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 859, 859 (2012).
281 “Whatever one might think of strict obligations of repair, punishment in the absence of 
fault is generally considered extremely difficult to justify. And the more severe the punishment, 
the more difficult is the justificatory task.” PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY
109 (2002) [hereinafter CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY]. Simons supports strict 
liability punishments, if not strict liability crimes. “Notwithstanding the demands of retributive 
desert, strict criminal liability is sometimes defensible when the strict liability pertains, not to 
whether conduct is to be criminalized at all, but to the seriousness of the actor’s crime.” Kenneth 
W. Simons, Is Strict Criminal Liability in the Grading of Offences Consistent with Retributive 
Desert?, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 445, 445 (2012) [hereinafter Simons, Strict Criminal 
Liability] (referring to “holistic culpability, attention to the degree of unjustifiability of the risk, 
and rough comparability in culpability.”).
282 “As far back as the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas pronounced that ‘a man 
should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment.’” Christopher, 
supra note 127, at 904–05 (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE II, part 2–2, quest. 
108, 4th art.). “One important difference between tort and criminal law is that although a 
deontological account of tort can support an injurer’s genuine strict liability duty to a victim, a 
deontological account of criminal law does not support an injurer’s genuine strict liability duty.” 
Simons, Deontology, supra note 68, at 296. More generally, strict liability “may have its legal 
uses but seems irrational as a moral position.” THOMAS NAGEL, Moral Luck, in MORTAL 
QUESTIONS 24, 31 (1979); see generally PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 125.
283 See, e.g., HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 343, 346–47, 357–58 (1979); 
Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 741–44
(1960); see generally DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME, supra note 89, at 229–61; Kenneth W. 
Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075 (1997).
284 “I maintain that there is an interpretation of strict-liability offences possible which does 
not violate the retributivist principle of punishment.” SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE, supra
note 56, at 241. “[E]ven in the strict-liability cases, the defendant must have had at least some
control (minimal as it might be) over his action and some means of reducing the risk.” Id. at 
243. “Presumably, an actor is given a fair chance to arrange her circumstances so as to avoid 
any call for performing the knowing, intentional acts forming the predicate for the strict liability 
crime in question.” R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of Criminal Responsibility and 
the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 459, 460 n.4 (1994). Likewise, 
regarding strict tort liability, “[h]owever difficult it may be to refrain from [such] a tort, it is 
virtually never practically impossible,” as by “opting out of the profession or activity . . . .” 
Hanoch Sheinman, Tort Law and Corrective Justice, 22 LAW & PHIL. 21, 56 (2003); see GROSS,
supra note 283, at 346–47, 357–58.
285 Christopher argues “that retributivism justifies punishment under a standard of 
liability—an extreme form of absolute liability—in which not merely many, but every, innocent 
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Blameworthiness, I have observed, may play a role at two points. First, harm may 
require a threshold level of blameworthiness (e.g., negligence) for a particular 
autonomy space interference to be considered wrongful, an autonomy invasion. This 
relates to first-order, material maxims. Second, once a protected harm occurs, 
blameworthiness then may be a factor in measuring the legal response (e.g., extent of 
damages or penalty). This relates to second-order, requital maxims.286 Mens rea plays, 
perhaps, a role in both types of penal maxims.287
The harmed person’s conduct, which is presumably a manifestation of her mental 
state, may also be relevant to the observer’s calculus of the agent’s disrespectfulness. 
Her mental state may make the agent’s conduct (somewhat) justifiable, for example, 
as where she self-defensively reacts to the other person’s threats or provocation. This 
takes us to justifications and its sibling, excuses.
C. Excuses and Justifications
One may analyze the defenses of excuse and justification as denials of 
blameworthiness under the analysis presented here.288 Excuses, such as duress,289
provocation,290 irresistible impulse, diminished capacity, insanity, and infancy, 
generally center on the negation or reduction of responsibility blameworthiness.291
Moore’s analysis of excuses exemplifies this. Examining excuses, he separates them 
                                                          
defendant would be convicted and punished.” Christopher, supra note 127, at 908; see Ken 
Levy, The Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm Is Just as Punishable as the 
Wrongful Action that Causes It, 24 LAW & PHIL. 263 (2005) (justification based on assumption 
of risk principles). For citations to those who accept and reject the retributive relevance of 
ensuing harms outside the actor’s control, see id. at 267 n.7 (“Equal Punishment Argument”). 
For more on outcome responsibility and moral luck, see infra text accompanying notes 334–38.
286 That lex talionis does not consider blameworthiness is cause for complaint. Among other 
problems, lex talionis “suffers from the defect that it makes no allowance for the mental state 
of the criminal or for the circumstantial aspects of the crime. In short, it simply ignores the other 
major component of seriousness, namely, the criminal’s culpability.” RYBERG, supra note 136, 
at 68 (footnote omitted).
287 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)–(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (describing 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances for death penalty sentences); but see infra note 413.
288 “Think of justifications and excuses as having modes of culpability attached to their 
elements.” DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 191; see id. at 249 (opining that perhaps 
the Code’s common principle for justification and excuse is “the general, and unexplored, 
notion of blameworthiness”); see generally ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY,
supra note 85, at 86–168 (“Defeaters of Culpability”). Fletcher and Moore see justification as 
negating wrongdoing, while excuse negates blameworthiness. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 154, at 85; MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 170, at 482–83.
289 For the confusions and complexities of the excuse of duress under the Model Penal Code, 
see DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 251–59; see generally Joshua Dressler, Exegesis 
of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1331 (1989).
290 See DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 265–71. “Provocation is a partial, rather 
than a complete, excuse because it mitigates the actor’s blameworthiness, rather than precluding 
it.” Id. at 267.
291 See, e.g., id. at 247–51.
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into three sets: mislabeled (“called”) excuses, true excuses, and status excuses.292 First,
the set that are not true excuses “are simply ways of showing the absence of voluntary 
action . . . , intentionality . . . , or causation . . . .”293 “[T]rue excuses,” the second set, 
“are conditions of mistake . . . or of compulsion . . . .”294 Finally, Moore refers to the 
third set as “status excuses—infancy, insanity, perhaps involuntary intoxication.”295
Justifications, such as self-defense, largely spring from a denial of disrespect 
blameworthiness.296 For example, the key provision in the Model Penal Code, 
“Justification Generally: Choice of Evils,” begins, “[c]onduct that the actor believes 
to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided 
that: [it is a lesser evil and not otherwise excluded] . . . .”297 Conduct motivated by the 
necessity to protect oneself or another is not normally disrespectful of others harmed 
by the defensive response. As with excuses, however, creating rigid categories of 
justifications is questionable.298 Scholars have also questioned the distinctiveness of 
excuses versus justifications.299 But the bottom line for our purposes is the top line 
above: both excuses and justifications are denials, in one way or another, that the 
agent’s conduct was blameworthy.300
                                                          
292 Other commentators, on the other hand, have challenged the definitiveness of particular 
excuse categorizations. “The search for a unifying theory of excuses has been less productive, 
partly because different authors set out to rationalize different groups of defences (some 
including denials of capacity, others excluding them).” ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 155, at 235 (citing Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 LAW &
PHIL. 289, 300 (2006)). Wallace, for instance, analytically divides excuses “into four broad 
classes: inadvertence, mistake or accident; unintentional bodily movements; physical 
constraint; and coercion, necessity, and duress.” WALLACE, supra note 209, at 136 (footnote 
omitted).
293 MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 170, at 42.
294 Id.
295 Id. (footnote omitted).
296 See id.
297 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). “Necessity is the mother of all 
justifications [under the Model Penal Code] . . . .” DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 
194.
298 See supra note 292 (noting excuses). “Yet the situations that may justify an actor in doing 
something otherwise criminal are so various that no set of specific justificatory defenses can 
describe them all—‘fact is richer that diction’, as one ordinary language philosopher once put 
the point.” MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 170, at 675.
299 Duff contends that “needless confusion has been bred by attempts to fit all defences into 
a simple two-part schema of ‘justification’ and ‘excuse’.” DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME, supra
note 89, at 263–64. “With only a little legerdemain, you can turn any justification into an excuse 
(and vice versa).” KATZ, BAD ACTS, supra note 280, at 65 (following with examples). “All this 
fanciful arguing is not meant to deny that there is a tremendous difference between a 
justification and an excuse, one that’s a lot more profound than most others the law hangs its 
hat on.” Id. at 66.
300 KATZ, BAD ACTS, supra note 280, at 65–66.
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D. Overall Blameworthiness
In some cases, the invader’s disrespect blameworthiness cuts one way while her 
responsibility blameworthiness cuts the other way. More specifically, complicated 
differences and interconnections may exist among the four aspects of 
blameworthiness: Bri, Brc, Bda, and Bdt.301 For instance, suppose an invader consciously 
acts with complete indifference to whether her conduct puts others at wrongful risk of 
harm, or, if she did know of the risk, she would act with malice toward potential 
invadees. This exacerbates her disrespect blameworthiness. At the same time, the 
invader is acting under partial economic coercion and is reasonably ignorant that her 
conduct actually will put another person at risk. This decreases her responsibility 
blameworthiness. These sources of blameworthiness offset one another to some 
degree.302
How these two components of blameworthiness are to be combined in an overall 
judgment of blameworthiness is not obvious.303 Suppose we measure each component 
on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0. Are they to be multiplied? That is, to simplify, B = Br x Bd. Or 
should we combine them in some other more complex manner, as by partial addition 
and partial multiplication depending on the particularities of the invasion? As a 
society, we must resolve this question in adopting detailed, retributive, requital 
maxims.304 Standing back, I think this scenario presents many reasonable possibilities 
that would satisfy the categorical imperative. Let us adopt one or more of them.
It is particularly troublesome to our objective observer if, after considering both 
the invader’s responsibility and disrespect blameworthiness, she concludes that the 
invader is liable under private, corrective justice and adopted public sanctions much 
beyond her just deserts. The observer may be sympathetic to the invader who she 
perceives must unduly suffer for conduct that has been declared wrongful. Still, there 
is normally sympathy for the invadee who suffers from the invader’s conduct.305 She 
did nothing to deserve her harms. Our observer prefers to see that, in the end, the 
invadee is not left to suffer and the invader is not made to suffer unduly. Both 
preferences may not be achieved at the same time.306 The two (relatively) innocent 
parties conundrum arises. Yes, the invadee should happily be returned to her ex ante 
                                                          
301 Id.
302 Deeper analysis would call for an explication of how the two components of 
blameworthiness relate to the wrongful harm of particular crimes. For example, Ryberg finds a 
“serious challenge which mens rea generates: the challenge of absolute comparison. . . . [W]hat 
exactly does it imply to say that a person is more culpable if a harm is caused intentionally than 
if it is the result of recklessness?” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 70.
303 “Here is what I mean by doing justice: Giving a wrongdoer punishment according to 
what he deserves—no more, no less—by taking account of all those factors that we, as a society, 
think are relevant in assessing personal blameworthiness.” Robinson, Virtues of Restorative 
Processes, supra note 221, at 380 (footnote omitted).
304 “In so far as proportionalists accept that there are not one but several factors which affect 
the culpability of a criminal, it needs to be explained how these factors should be combined.”
RYBERG, supra note 136, at 76. Ryberg summarizes the problems of comparing and combining 
various aspects of culpability. Id. at 83–84.
305 See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 66, at 303–28.
306 See id.
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position, but one may not find quite right the fact that the invader is entirely 
responsible to return her to that point in light of the nature of the invader’s 
blameworthiness and, perhaps, the extent of her civil and criminal liability to the 
particular invadee, other wrongfully harmed parties, and the state.307 Usual 
conceptions of corrective justice and retribution cannot resolve this quandary. Perhaps 
the state, dispenser of distributive justice, should provide a (partial) resolution.308
To further pursue this deep moral dilemma, recall that under existing legal 
doctrines blameworthiness plays a subordinate role in corrective justice.309 We may 
establish blameworthiness as a threshold requirement for protected harms, as in 
tortious negligence, but, even here the legally competent person physically or mentally 
incapable of completely satisfying the standard of the reasonable person may be liable 
for harms resulting from conduct for which she is not responsibility blameworthy in 
any significant material sense.310 She is effectively strictly liable as in various explicit 
pockets of strict liability, such as products and enterprise liability.311 Once even a fully 
reasonable person is held liable for negligence, she may be responsible for harms 
unforeseeable to her, such as under the thin-skull rule and a conception of moral 
luck,312 in which case her responsibility for these unforeseeable harms falls short of 
Aristotle’s requirement that responsible choices be substantially free of unavoidable 
ignorance.313 Corrective justice here is driven by the aim to restore an invadee to her 
prior protected position irrespective of the invader’s actual level of blameworthiness 
                                                          
307 Smith offers justifications. First, even if incapable of complying with the norm, the 
injurer is a beneficiary of a society which observes such a norm; second, the victim’s reliance 
on the norm will “falter” if she cannot recover for violations; and third, “the norm will lose 
some of its force and value if society tolerates violations—even violations committed by 
subjectively incompetent individuals.” Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the ‘Crisis’: A 
Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 794 (1987).
308 Coleman’s abandoned annulment theory of corrective justice may offer some guidance. 
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 66, at 303–28 (“The Mixed Conception of 
Corrective Justice”). “[T]he core principle of [Coleman’s theory] was the moral demand that 
wrongful losses be eliminated or annulled. . . . The annulment theory did not insist, however, 
that the annulment of the wrongful loss was necessarily the responsibility of the agent who had 
brought it about.” Perry, The Distributive Turn, supra note 66, at 315 (citing Jules L. Coleman, 
Tort Law and the Demands for Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992)). For criticism of 
Coleman’s retreat from the annulment theory, see Gardner, Corrective Justice, supra note 67. 
“While Coleman recognizes that corrective justice is distinct from distributive justice, he does 
not, unlike some other contemporary corrective justice theorists, regard the two as completely
independent of one another.” Perry, The Distributive Turn, supra note 66, at 317 (referring to 
COLEMAN, supra note 66).
309 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 109, at 277–81.
310 See, e.g., id.; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 86–89 (Mark D. Howe ed., 
1963) (1881); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 89, at 173–85. 
Regarding the diminished role of blameworthiness in contract and restitution law, see supra text 
accompanying notes 105–14.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 105–14.
312 On moral luck, see infra text accompanying notes 333–44.
313 See generally MURPHY & HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 179.
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with respect to an established objective threshold.314 Retribution, on the other hand, as 
grounded on distributive justice, should arguably always keep blameworthiness on the 
scales.315 Consequently, the applications of these two forms of justice in particular 
cases may further lead to disquieting results. The criminally responsible invader, for 
example, may be tortiously liable for an enormous recovery for a minor offense much 
beyond her relative blameworthiness, her just deserts, in which case we are tempted 
to declare, “that’s not fair to the invader! She has suffered enough.”316 Choosing to 
reduce her punishment for this reason is not a matter of distributive justice for penal 
behavior. Private liability, no matter how great, is not punishment and is not gauged 
by the degree of just deserts. Instead, any reduction in punishment is based on other 
normative considerations, such as mercy.317
VI. RISK AND HARM
The identification of most harms is straightforward, like a punch in the nose. From 
intentional, nonconsensual touching to the disappointment of reasonable expectations, 
society supports a common view as to what constitutes a harm, a setback to interests. 
While room for debate exists on whether particular types of conduct produce harms at 
all, such as the creation of certain kinds of minimal, nuisance-like externalities, the 
main debates center on whether or when a recognized type of harm should be declared 
wrongful by means of an adopted maxim. When considering harms that derive from 
the imposition of a risk alone, the complexities grow, especially in the context of 
retributive punishment.318 In the criminal realm, for instance, particularly knotty are 
questions about apt requitals for the wrongful harms, if any, from the risks ensuing 
from inchoate crimes, such as attempts, and from the risks relating to recidivism. 
Therefore, attention to some of the complexities relating to whether particular risks 
are harms, or should be declared wrongful harms, is necessary before one can focus 
on acceptable requitals for such identified harms.
                                                          
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 An example may be where an invader commits a minor criminal battery and, because the 
invadee has a “thin skull,” causes enormous, unforeseeable harm.
317 On mercy, see id.; Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution, 
Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319 (2004); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1421 (2004). “With regard to crimes of subjects against one another it is absolutely not 
for [the sovereign] to exercise [the right to grant clemency]; for here failure to punish . . . is the 
greatest wrong against his subjects.” KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 
477. “But that mercy by the state can ever be justified is unclear to the retributivist, at least the 
Kantian sort of retributivist who holds that punishment is both the state’s right and perfect duty 
of justice to punish wrongdoers.” Corlett, Making Sense of Retributivism, supra note 128, at 
106 (footnote omitted).
318 Some commentators have recommended that harms from risks that do not come to 
fruition should be punished according to the severity of the risked harm discounted by its 
likelihood of maturing at the time of the conduct. See Don E. Scheid, Constructing a Theory of 
Punishment, Desert, and the Distribution of Punishments, 10 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 441, 
487 (1997) (identifying suggestions by Paul Robinson and Douglas Husak).
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Scholars have not reached a consensus on whether an imposed risk is a wrongful 
harm in itself, or even a harm in itself.319 Criminal prohibitions almost always require 
more than the creation of a risk. In traditional terms, both actus reus and mens rea must 
be met.320 Thus, criminal sanctions require risk “plus.”321 Once this “plus” is satisfied, 
attention returns to whether the risk imposition should be sanctionable—that is, 
whether the risk imposition is wrongful.322 As a prelude to this discussion, I must say
a few words about the temporal relationship between a risk and the types of harms that 
may ensue.
Risks can be analyzed as falling into three temporal categories: past, present 
(occurrent), and future.323 Different categories may give rise to different types, 
manners, or degrees of harms. Harms from occurrent risks exist between the time a 
risk is created and the time at which the risk either comes to fruition or dissipates.324
When an individual throws a shoe at another person, an immediate, occurrent risk 
results, from which physical and other harms may eventuate.325 Many of the harms 
from the occurrent risk depend on the invadee’s knowledge of it at the time, such as 
those that arise from her reaction to the unfolding risk.326 But at least one harm does 
not require the invadee’s knowledge of the risk at the time. If third persons are aware 
of the occurrent risk to the invadee, they may perceive it as defamatory and as 
expressing the invader’s disrespect, which is a dignitary harm to the invadee.327
                                                          
319 I have briefly addressed this question elsewhere. See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra
note 2, at 1005–13 (“Risk Imposition”).
320 Dubber identifies “the Model Penal Code’s complete scheme of criminal liability: A 
person is criminally liable if he engages in 1. conduct that a. inflicts or threatens b. substantial 
harm to individual or public interests 2. without justification and 3. without excuse.” DUBBER,
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 29. “The Model Penal Code defines conduct as encompassing 
both [actus reus and mens rea]: conduct is ‘an action or omission and its accompanying state of 
mind.’” Id. at 30 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(5) (AM. LAW INST. 1962)). “The analytic 
schemes of the Model Penal Code and the common law are more or less interchangeable . . . .” 
Id. One commentator “argue[s] that this most basic organizing distinction is not coherent.” Paul 
H. Robinson, Should the Criminal Law Abandon the Actus Reus—Mens Rea Distinction?, in
ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 240, at 187, 187. For the slipperiness of mens 
rea, see Kuklin, Punishment, supra note 112, at 58–72.
321 “One of the usual reasons for requiring mens rea in the criminal law but not in private 
law is . . . that the seriousness of criminal sanctions means they should be directed only at the 
morally most heinous conduct.” WILLIAM LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 392 (2007) 
(citation omitted).
322 Alexander and Ferzan provide an answer: “An actor who culpably imposes a risk to 
others’ legally protected interests should be punished for that risk-imposition whether or not 
any harms to those interests result from the act.” Alexander & Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate 
Crimes, supra note 85, at 105.
323 See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 1011–13.
324 Id.
325 We may wish to play this invasion in slow motion to give the invadee time to contemplate 
the meaning of the approaching shoe. Otherwise, some of the harms may be retrospective only.
326 Id.
327 Id.
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Similar observations can be made about harms from past and future risks. As an 
invadee looks back at a risk, whether or not it ripened, all four types of harms may 
ensue from the retrospection, such as from reactive illness, work interruption, trauma, 
and insult. On the other hand, retrospection may reduce an invadee’s continuing 
reactive harms, as where she comes to understand that the invader’s conduct occurred 
with minimal responsibility or disrespectfulness. Turning to the future, another array 
of the four types of harms may arise from prospection. The invadee, whether or not 
she was the direct object of the past wrongful conduct, may suffer physical harm (e.g., 
illness from feelings of insecurity328), economic harm (e.g., expenditures for protective 
measures), psychic harm (e.g., anxiety), and dignitary harm (e.g., ongoing insult and 
defamation).329 The immediate wrongful harms from future wrongful risks often 
dominate the justification for the claims of the general public for requitals. For 
inchoate crimes, harms from past and occurrent risks may be particularly prominent. 
For recidivism considerations, present harms from future risks take center stage.
With the temporal categories of risks in place, let us turn to the harms from 
inchoate crimes,330 particularly attempts.331 Once sufficiently targeted by an invader, 
the knowledge of the invadee and third parties of an ongoing or past inchoate crime 
may produce physical, economic, and psychic harms, but the dignitary harm may 
predominate. The inchoate crime manifests disrespect of the invadee, whether or not 
any risk ripens. At the very least, the inchoate crime produces a wrongful dignitary 
                                                          
328 That burglary victims suffer ongoing worries of vulnerability and other negative 
emotions, see Frederick M. Lawrence, Comment: The Limits of Domination, 76 B.U. L. REV.
361, 368 n.33 (1996) (citing many examples in the footnotes).
329 Id.
330 “An inchoate crime . . . is a crime that occurs while the actor still has the ability to choose 
to refrain from imposing the risk.” Alexander & Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes, supra note 
85, at 105. See Michael T. Cahill, Attempt by Omission, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1123–20 (2009) 
[hereinafter Cahill, Attempt by Omission] (“What Is an ‘Inchoate’ Crime?”). “Inchoate offenses 
not only create a risk of harm, they are harms in themselves. Thus the debate surrounding 
inchoate offenses . . . focus[es] . . . on whether the harm from inchoate offenses is substantial 
enough to merit prohibition and punishment by the criminal law.” Paul H. Robinson, A Theory 
of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 
269 (1975). Regarding an unsuccessful attempted crime, “even when no one is made aware of 
the failed attempt, a would-be offender does cause wrongful harm to his intended victim. He 
does so by exposing his victim to a risk of harm.” BOONIN, supra note 133, at 251 (footnote 
omitted). I would also say that he causes a dignitary harm, at least. Not all commentators note 
or agree with my dignitary harm analysis. Cf. Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the 
Role of Resulting Harm Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 727 
(1988) [hereinafter Ashworth, Criminal Attempts]; Cahill, supra 330, at 1209; Epstein, supra
note 68, at 17; Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World Is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157 
(1994).
331 “The Model Penal Code . . . has a large number of substantive offences defined in the 
inchoate mode—for example, assault, false alarms, indecent exposure, forgery, deceptive 
business practices, self-abortion, perjury, hindering apprehension, disrupting meetings, and 
many bribery offences.” Ashworth, Criminal Attempts, supra note 330, at 765 (footnotes 
omitted). While the Model Penal Code lists the four “inchoate offenses” of attempt, conspiracy, 
solicitation, and possession, it is the inchoate offense of attempt that is of particular interest in 
our context. See DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 121, at 141.
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harm.332 At some point, we may adopt maxims under corrective justice to grant 
invadees private requitals for some or all of the four types of ensuing harms, more so 
as the relative administrative costs diminish. We might even grant the state standing 
to bring suit on behalf of the harmed public, as in the public nuisance context.
The centrality of the two components of blameworthiness to the conception of 
retribution that I champion implies that punishment for attempts and other inchoate 
crimes should not turn on whether they are successful.333 Whether the individuals
succeed in executing these crimes is often a matter of moral luck.334 In the debate over 
moral luck, a Kantian would likely come down on the side that believes consequences 
outside the reasonable foreseeability or control of an actor should not count against 
                                                          
332 “[B]ecause the magnitude of dignitary harms is a function of the readiness of a person to 
act with mens rea, it does not depend upon whether A commits a completed crime or attempts 
to commit a completed crime.” WESTEN, LOGIC OF CONSENT, supra note 267, at 149. When the 
agent’s conduct has not yet focused on a specific invadee or an identifiable group of potential 
invadees, the dignitary harm to any one individual may be minimal, perhaps not wrongful with 
respect to that individual. Here, the state, as in public nuisance, has a role to play to protect 
against these diffuse harms.
333 “When an actor knowingly risks harm to others, she manifests her respect (or lack 
thereof) for others and their interests. In our view, this theory of culpability sets forth not only 
the necessary conditions for blameworthiness and punishment but also the sufficient 
conditions.” ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85, at 171 
(disagreeing with the current law insofar as it considers resulting harm as a factor in deserved 
punishment). See Alexander, Crime and Culpability, supra note 239, at 3. The Model Penal 
Code “propos[es] that with one exception punishments for attempts should be equal to those for 
the completed crime attempted.” Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of 
Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 239 (1994) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE §
5.05(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962)). “Since then many criminal law theoreticians who have 
addressed the issue have concurred . . . .” Id. (identifying twelve concurring theoreticians). A 
thirteenth theoretician argues, “[t]he result of one’s completed attempts—whether it turns out 
to be a successful crime—is out of one’s control once one has completed the attempt. [The 
outcome is a matter of luck.] Luck cannot affect culpability. And culpability is all that affects 
negative desert.” Alexander, Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra note 127, at 834. Moore 
“think[s] the standard educated view to be mistaken.” Moore, supra at 240. In Moore’s view, 
“culpability and wrongdoing are two independent desert-bases—and the only two, at that . . . . 
[E]ach is an independent determinant of how much punishment an offender deserves, given the 
presence of the other.” Id. at 237. For commentators who believe that attempts should normally 
be punished less than completed crimes, see, for example, ANTONY DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS
350–54, 398 (1996); FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 211, at 362, 472–81; 
see GROSS, supra note 283, at 430–34; Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
963, 963–64 (2003). My prior view put me in this latter camp. See Kuklin, Punishment, supra
note 112, at 77–79. “Desert . . . contains within itself internally contradictory values: the 
question whether an attempt truly deserves less punishment because it caused no harm generates 
the subcategories of harm-retributivism and intent-retributivism.” Marc O. DeGirolami, The 
Choice of Evils and the Collisions of Theory, in RETRIBUTIVISM, supra note 127, at 192, 201.
334 Broadly speaking, the moral luck principle “provides that whatever culpability an actor 
displays in act A—intention, knowledge, recklessness, negligence, strict liability—that actor 
deserves greater censure or punishment if A results in consequence B or occurs in circumstance 
C (even though whether B or C occurs is ‘fortuitous’ in the relevant sense).” Simons, Strict 
Criminal Liability, supra note 281, at 459. “Retributivists who support increased punishment 
due to moral luck have said very little about how large that increase should be . . . .” Id.
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her in a deontic regime.335 She is not disrespectful to those put at risk by her conduct 
when she cannot reasonably control or foresee the relevant consequences of the 
conduct.336 Her reasons for acting cannot fairly weigh in the unforeseeable or 
uncontrollable.337 She is disrespectful to those put at substantial risk when she can 
reasonably control and foresee the relevant consequences of her risky conduct.338 For 
                                                          
335 “Kant believed that good or bad luck should influence neither our moral judgment of a 
person and his actions, nor his moral assessment of himself.” NAGEL, supra note 282, at 24. 
“[T]he seriousness of the crime [is] determined by the amount of harm it generally causes and 
the degree to which people are disposed to commit it.” FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of 
Punishment, supra note 141, at 118. 
Justice in punishment takes a broader perspective [than the thin skull rule of tort 
recoveries pursuant to corrective justice]. Because crime is considered a public as well 
as a private wrong, victims must be understood as representatives of the public as a 
whole. It is not the particular victim who matters, but the typical victim of homicide, 
rape, or mugging.
FLETCHER, GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 88, at 261 (footnote omitted). For 
considerations of moral luck in criminal law, see, for example, ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 155, at 77–78; CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY, supra
note 281, at 65–78; TONY HONORÉ, Responsibility and Luck. The Moral Basis of Strict Liability,
in RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 14 (1999); NAGEL, supra note 282, at 31; Cane, Retribution,
supra note 112, at 141; David Enoch & Andrei Marmor, The Case Against Moral Luck, 26 LAW 
& PHIL. 405, 406 (2007); Goldberg & Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, supra note 64, at 
1123; Stephen J. Morse, Reasons, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
363; Norvin Richards, Luck and Desert, 95 MIND 198 (1986); Zipursky, Two Dimensions of 
Responsibility, supra note 255. Some commentators are not unduly troubled by moral luck. See, 
e.g., TONY HONORÉ, Introduction, in RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT, supra, at 1, 9; Cane, 
Retribution, supra note 112, at 142 (“[T]aking responsibility for conduct and outcomes, even 
those outside our control, is essential to having a sense of ourselves as moral agents rather than 
mere victims of fate.”); Nicola Lacey, Book Review (reviewing ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME 
AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85), 121 ETHICS 633, 636 (2011). Zipursky estimates “that there 
is substantially greater support among leading criminal theorists for the view that an asymmetry 
in punishment based on whether a crime is an unsuccessful attempt, as opposed to a successful 
attempt, is indefensible than there is for the view that a completion asymmetry is defensible.” 
Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility, supra note 255, at 107 (emphasis omitted) 
(footnote omitted).
336 Arthur Ripstein, Philosophy of Tort Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY LAW, supra note 127, at 656, 664.
337 “The requirement that the class of plaintiffs and type of injuries be foreseeable reflects 
the law’s role in articulating standards of conduct. Those standards can only guide conduct if 
they tell people what to do, and no standard can tell people to avoid an unforeseeable 
consequence.” Id. at 663. “The intuitive idea is straightforward: you are only answerable for, 
and so potentially liable for, the consequences of your acts if it makes sense to include those 
consequences among your deeds.” Id. at 664; see, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 109, at 277.
338 “[F]or completed attempts at least, attempts are essentially mental crimes, constituted by 
the beliefs and desires of the attempter.” Alexander, Duff on Attempts, supra note 267, at 217. 
In discussing attempts versus completed offenses, Fletcher notes, “[t]he culpability-centered 
theory focuses exclusively on the actor who has formulated a criminal intent and has started to 
act upon it.” FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 154, at 173. “The harm-
centered conception of crime focuses on the victim. The evil of the offense lies . . . in bringing 
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corrective justice, on the other hand, we may be more expansive in holding an agent 
liable for harms to others from such risks.339 Even when the agent is minimally 
blameworthy, the invadee usually is even more relatively free of blameworthiness.340
Under current legal principles, the aim of corrective justice—to restore the invadee’s 
prior protected condition once the invader meets a threshold for liability—overwhelms 
the concern for the degree of the invader’s responsibility and disrespect 
blameworthiness.341 The “two innocent persons” principle, among others, also 
obtrudes, as well as welfarist considerations such as cost internalization, risk 
avoidance, loss spreading, and moral hazard.342 Proposals to account for the invader’s 
relative blameworthiness in measuring requitals under corrective justice generally 
have been rejected.343 Doctrines of comparative negligence are an exception.344
Let us turn to the nature of the harms from the prospect of recidivism.345 One can 
characterize these harms as stemming from a present risk of a future wrongful risk.346
                                                          
about harm to a concrete individual.” Id. at 174. “[T]he basic philosophical tensions in the law 
of attempts have yet to find a proper resolution.” Id. at 181; see generally ALEXANDER &
FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85, at 197–225 (“When Are Inchoate Crimes 
Culpable and Why?”).
339 NEIL MACCORMICK, The Obligation of Reparation, in LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL 
DEMOCRACY 212, 214 (1982).
340 MacCormick struggles with the notion that a blameless invader must compensate the 
invadee. Though the invadee, since she did not trigger the loss, has a comparative desert claim 
against the invader, this is a thin, troublesome reed. Id. The twists from doctrines of comparative 
negligence complicate this statement.
341 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 382–83.
342 See generally BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 36–42
(1994) [hereinafter KUKLIN & STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW].
343 Id.
344 See supra text accompanying note 114.
345 “What proportionalists who defend the importance of prior record will have to assert is 
that previous convictions affect either the harm or the culpability of the current crime or that it 
in itself constitutes a further dimension contributing to the seriousness.” RYBERG, supra note 
136, at 77.
346 Punishment based on the risk of future wrongful risk is akin to, but different from, 
punishment for character flaws. An invader with an exceedingly evil character who, during her 
criminally invasive action, becomes a quadriplegic is not much of a present risk of a future 
wrongful risk. Some commentators assert that character should be a factor in punishment, and 
some even advance it as a factor in describing the underlying crime. See FLETCHER, GRAMMAR 
OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 88, at 35–37. Fletcher distinguishes three systems of criminal 
law: (1) “act-based criminal law,” which centers on criminal acts; (2) “attitude-based criminal 
law,” which “focuses exclusively on the guilt or subjective disposition of the offender, 
regardless of any action that he or she has performed”; and (3) “actor-based criminal law,” 
where “punishment is inflicted on the suspect because of the kind of person he or she is (say, a 
dangerous offender) . . . .” Id. at 27–28 (footnote omitted). “The argument for a criminal law 
based on acts, and not on guilt or character, is ultimately one of political theory.” Id. at 37 
(footnote omitted). “If the basis [for retributive desert] is character, and only derivatively 
culpable choice, then chosen acts are only evidentiary, not constitutive of desert, and choice 
may be sufficient, but it is not necessary, for assessing desert.” ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME 
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When proscribed by a substantive maxim, the present risk becomes a present wrongful 
risk of a future wrongful risk.347 In other words, an agent’s conduct reveals that she 
currently is a substantial future risk to others.348 She might not be a risk to others at 
                                                          
AND CULPABILITY, supra note 85, at 16 (adopting the choice basis of desert). One commentator 
finds the character theory of culpability in the writings of Joel Feinberg, George Fletcher, Robert 
Nozick, Michael Bayles, Nicola Lacey, George Vuoso, Kyron Huigens, and Victor Tadoros. 
See Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the 
Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1034–35 
(2004). For a summary of objections punishing character, see id. at 1037; see generally
BRUDNER, supra note 63, at 64–70 (discussing and critiquing “the character theory”). Sendor 
“suggest[s] several reasons that support the law’s principle that a defendant’s bad character 
should not be a criterion of guilt but that a defendant’s good or bad character should be a 
criterion of punishment (although not the only criterion of punishment).” Benjamin B. Sendor, 
The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 99, 101 (1996) (justifying this punishment view on the grounds of the risks of 
recidivism). The federal rules of evidence generally proscribe evidence of bad character in 
criminal cases. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 404. “In general, our legal system eschews the role of 
character in criminal liability determinations, relying instead on an act-based system of 
inculpation.” Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter M. McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the 
Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 260 (2012) (footnote omitted). Interestingly, 
experimental evidence suggests that “[o]ur emotional reactions are not only a product of the act 
and the outcome, but also a product of inferences about the general virtuousness of the person 
who performed the act that caused the harm.” Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process, supra note 
159, at 28; see Nadler & McDonnell, supra, at 256 (noting, in the article’s abstract, that “three 
original experiments that suggest that an actor’s bad motive and bad moral character can 
increase not only perceived blame and responsibility but also perceive causal influence and 
intentionality”).
For a character theory of damages for contract breach, see Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 
106, at 174. These commentators argue for “supercompensatory damages for willful breach  . . 
. .” “Willful breach . . . reveals information about the ‘true nature’ of the breaching party—that 
he is more likely than average to be a ‘nasty’ type who readily chisels and acts in dishonest 
ways, and may have acted in other self-serving, counterproductive ways that went undetected 
and unpunished.” Id.
347 See Barbara H. Fried, The Limits of a Nonconsequentialist Approach to Torts, 18 LEGAL 
THEORY 231, 239 (2012) (“[I]mposition of risk and imposition of harm are not distinct forms of 
conduct. They are identical conduct viewed from an ex ante and ex post perspective, 
respectively.”). The law often protects against the harms of ex ante risks alone. See id. at 242–
44. Among the deontic explanations for this protection are: “1. Harm Includes Expected Harm; 
. . . 2. Risk Creation Is a Completed Harm; . . . [and,] 3. Risk Creation Violates a Different Right 
from the Right to Be Free from Harm.” Id. at 244–48.
348 “An offender who has shown himself capable of committing an offence is, at least in the 
actuarial sense, more likely to commit another one than someone who has not. ‘Nothing predicts 
behaviour like behaviour’, even if its predictions are often wrong.” NIGEL WALKER, WHY 
PUNISH? 40 (1991) (footnotes omitted). “If our concern is with future dangerousness, we do not 
need the outcome harm to occur in order to know that the offender is dangerous.” Finkelstein, 
supra note 333, at 988 (discussing risky conduct that does materialize). Wright cites rather 
alarming statistics. One study showed that fifty-four percent of robbery suspects had prior 
convictions, eleven percent of which having had ten or more. R. George Wright, Criminal Law 
and Sentencing: What Goes with Free Will?, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 28 (2012). About forty 
percent of released prisoners return to prison within three years. Id. In the case for preventing
future crimes, Barnett invokes “the principle of self-defense, which permits persons to use force 
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the immediate moment, however, as where she is imprisoned or temporarily disabled. 
Depending on the degree and nature of the future risk, a retributive requital maxim 
may call for immediate or enhanced punishment.349 Some examples will point to the 
complexities of this position. If a person enters an illegal gambling contract with 
another individual, she is subject to punishment, but this conduct implies a limited 
wrongful risk to others in the future.350 She may be a recidivist, but the harm from this 
risk is attenuated since the criminal conduct was (presumably fully) consensual. The 
situation presents no necessary disrespect of the other party insofar as she knowingly 
consented.351 On the other hand, the taste for illegal gambling may be statistically 
                                                          
to repel a threat of harm before the harm occurs.” Barnett, Getting Even, supra note 91, at 160; 
see BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 249, at 190. I would say that a threat of harm 
is or produces a harm. If the predicted threats would prove incorrect, nonetheless Barnett 
“claim[s] that they have communicated a message that they will violate the rights of others and 
have assumed the risk that others might take their communication seriously.” Barnett, Getting 
Even, supra note 91, at 165. Others reason similarly. “Sometimes what actors do justifies acting 
on predictions of what they might do in the future. This is the framework of self-defense.” 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations of 
the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 146 (2011) [hereinafter Ferzan, Beyond 
Crime and Commitment] (footnote omitted). “The self-defense model demonstrates that there 
are grounds for substantially depriving responsible agents of their liberty to prevent their future 
crimes.” Id. at 146–47. “[I]f there is a false positive as to the necessity of stopping the culpable 
actor, it is the actor’s fault.” Id. at 175 (footnote omitted). “Any forward-looking form of legal 
regulation that aims to prevent future harm is generally justified by every person’s right not to 
suffer unjustifiable harm and the lack of a right to inflict such harm.” Stephen J. Morse, Blame 
and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113, 116 (1996) [hereinafter 
Morse, Blame and Danger].
349 “[A]ctions at one time that create a risk of a later harm are culpable at the time the risk 
is first created (for instance, when one gets unjustifiably drunk).” Ferzan, Plotting 
Premeditation’s Demise, supra note 265, at 102 (citing ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND 
CULPABILITY, supra note 85, ch. 7). One reason that criminal risks of harm create substantial 
risks of future wrongful risks is that conviction rates are so low. See Paul H. Robinson & John 
M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 461 (1997) (stating that the average 
rate of conviction for listed offenses is 1.5%).
Fletcher finds standard retributive justifications for recidivist enhancements wanting. Fletcher, 
Recidivist Premium, supra note 240, at 57–59. He turns to utilitarianism for support. “However 
difficult it is to justify recidivist penalties under retributive criteria, they are a common practice. 
. . . If they are justified at all, they must be so under the utilitarian principle that social protection 
justifies the longer period of confinement of those who have shown themselves to be 
dangerous.” FLETCHER, GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 88, at 237. The question of 
whether the nature of a prior crime should be considered when gauging future risks is more 
difficult than the question of whether the nature of the immediate crime should be so considered. 
Accounting for a prior crime introduces an element of double punishment.
350 Complications arise if we bring in possible claims of the criminal’s dependents and 
supporters and perhaps some select others.
351 But victim consent is often not enough to fend off the criminal law. Consent to a tortious 
act, for example, may not preclude criminal prosecution for a parallel crime. See Vera 
Bergelson, Consent to Harm, 28 PACE L. REV. 101 (2008). This position may be partially a 
product of paternalism. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 THE MONIST 64, 66 (1972); Eyal 
Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 230 (1998). Does a criminal act 
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linked to other future criminal behavior, as where gambling habits or addictions lead 
to property crimes.352 Similarly, entirely noncriminal behavior may be linked to future 
crimes. A person who drives recklessly on her own property may be more likely to 
later drive recklessly on public roads.353 For that matter, a person with a genetic 
disposition for risky behavior may be more likely to commit future crimes.354 We 
certainly would decline to penalize some of these present risks of future risks, but not 
because the risks are necessarily insubstantial. It is not because others do not react to 
the present risks in ways that are harmful to them as, for example, by inducing them 
to reallocate some of their resources toward protective measures.355 Rather, we decline 
to penalize some of these risks because other considerations, such as those behind the 
requirements of actus reus and mens rea, predominate in our weighing of the balance 
between liberty and security interests.356 Punishment for dangerousness alone 
challenges these fair limitations.357
                                                          
against a consenting victim imply an increased risk that the actor will commit a comparable act 
against another, nonconsenting person? Might this turn on the nature of the criminal act?
352 See M. Neil Browne et al., The Role of Ethics in Regulatory Discourse: Can Market 
Failure Justify the Regulation of Casino Gaming?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 37, 71–72, 71 n.141 (1999).
353 Coleman and Ripstein mention that one may violate her duty and “cross” her own 
boundary but, from luck, not cross another’s boundary (i.e., not harm anyone). Jules Coleman 
& Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 109 (1995). Duff makes a 
similar observation. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME, supra note 89, at 125. A future risk or harm 
empirically linked to the boundary crossing is a harm.
354 See, e.g., J.C. Barnes et al. Examining the Genetic Underpinnings to Moffitt’s 
Developmental Taxonomy: A Behavioral Genetic Analysis, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 923 (2011); Nita 
Farahany & William Bernet, Behavioral Genetics in Criminal Cases: Past, Present, and Future,
2 GENOMICS SOC’Y & POL’Y 72, 73–75 (2006); J. Tiihonen et al., Genetic Background of 
Extreme Violent Behavior, 20 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 786 (2014); see generally Symposium, 
The Impact of Behavioral Genetics on the Criminal Law, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2006).
355 As always, we must judge the reactions to make sure they survive the deontic filter. For 
example, suppose a recidivist Christian-American commits a robbery and an equally recidivist 
Muslim-American commits a like robbery. Because of the fears generated by the 9/11 attack, 
the general public’s perceived future risk and reactive harms may be greater in the latter case. 
Even though the Muslim-American could have foreseen the increased reactive harms, she is not 
blameworthy for them, it would seem, because they ensue from the general public’s 
disrespectful attitude towards her. Likewise, an invader who randomly robs someone who 
unforeseeably turns out to be famous, resulting in greater publicity that increases the public’s 
perceived future risk and reactive harms, is not blameworthy for the heightened harms.
356 “In general, the first principle of just punishment—equal liberty, capacity, and 
opportunity—justifies the general mens rea requirement as a predicate of criminal liability.” 
David A.J. Richards, Human Rights and the Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal 
Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 1395, 1431 (1979).
357 Many commentators have discussed issues relating to punishment for dangerousness. 
See, e.g., ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, at 109–33; VON HIRSCH, DOING 
JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 87, 126; VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 141. R.A. 
Duff, Dangerousness and Citizenship, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY, supra note 
165, at 141, 150–63; Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment, supra note 348, at 163; Hessick, 
supra note 142, at 1158–59; Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 
CRIME & JUST. 1 (1985); Morse, Blame and Danger, supra note 348, at 113; Stephen J. 
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Tracing out this theme that particular conduct implies various statistical future 
risks leads to some curious points. For example, a person who kills her spouse, though 
highly disrespectful, may not be much of a recidivist risk.358 Likewise is an embezzler 
of an employer’s assets.359 Once aware of this criminal conduct, others are in a good 
position to protect themselves by avoiding a financial relation with the criminal 
invader. This is not to say that the invader is less disposed to commit a future crime 
than other convicted criminals, but only that the opportunity to commit a comparable
future crime is diminished owing to the specifics of the past one. To the contrary, a 
theft of a petty amount from a stranger, though less disrespectful of that person than 
the spouse killing or embezzlement, may signal greater future risks to others.360 All 
four types of harms may immediately ensue. Individually, we usually have more to 
fear from a thief than an embezzler. Another likely factor in the chances of recidivism 
is the attitude of the caught or punished criminal, such as remorse or defiance.361
The present risk of a future risk, then, is itself a harm, or produces harms.362 When 
the future risk is proscribed by a proper substantive maxim, the ensuing harms are thus 
wrongful.363 The associated moral or legal requital maxims pursuant to corrective 
justice may, as usual, vary greatly from extensive restraints (e.g., protections from 
prospective spousal abuse) to minimal apologies (e.g., for careless crowd jostling). 
My preferred conception of retribution, however, does not turn on wrongful harms
alone. My conception turns on the blameworthiness of disrespectful conduct. Greater 
                                                          
Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 
with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 69 
(1996). The Model Sentencing Act of 1962, “makes available, for the first time, a plan that 
allows the sentence to be determined by the defendant’s make-up, his potential threat in the 
future, and other similar factors, with a minimum of variation according to the offense.” MODEL 
SENTENCING ACT, Introduction 1, 2 (2d ed., 1972). “There is no reason to suppose . . . that either 
preventive detention or a deterrence theory of punishment must at some point violate the 
Kantian formula of ends.” Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves, supra note 132, at 
290.
358 “[S]econd degree murders are typically intra-family killers who are highly non-recidivist, 
so on incapacitation grounds this class of criminals should be punished least.” MOORE, PLACING 
BLAME, supra note 170, at 29.
359 See, e.g., id.
360 Similarly, “a record of lesser offenses may be as good a predictor of recidivism as a 
record of more serious crimes. It may, in fact, be a better predictor—since lesser crimes typically 
are repetitive and serious crimes have low recidivism rates.” Andrew von Hirsch, Desert and 
Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591, 621 (1981) (footnote omitted).
361 Id.
362 The risk of a future wrongful risk applies to the private law also—for example, a future 
battery, a future conversion, or a future breach of contract. This is seen in the rationale for the 
contract right to reasonable assurances of a future promised performance. See U.C.C. § 2-609 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). Relatedly, that a present risk should be 
compensable without the occurrence of actual injury, see Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic 
Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985). “The argument 
for recognizing risk as a sufficient basis for liability is as strong from corrective justice norms 
of fairness as from norms of efficiency.” Id. at 789.
363 Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 1011–20.
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wrongful harms imply greater disrespect, ceteris paribus. This observation brings the 
wrongful harm in through the side door. I reserve the front door for blameworthiness,
disrespect, and indignity in themselves. For ordinary crimes, we have little trouble 
identifying the person who is substantially disrespected—the direct invadee. For 
criminal attempts and some other inchoate crimes, the substantially disrespected 
person is the targeted invadee or range of persons substantially at risk from the 
invader’s conduct. Under responsibility blameworthiness, the greater the foreseeable, 
uncoerced, wrongful harm to the invadee, the greater is the implied disrespect.364
Under disrespect blameworthiness, the more egregious the invader’s attitude and 
conduct with respect to the invadee’s harmed dignity interest, the greater the 
disrespect.365 Bringing considerations of recidivism to bear, the question then arises, 
in what sense or degree is the present risk of a future risk to others disrespectful to 
them?
In addressing this issue regarding recidivism, I set aside responsibility 
blameworthiness. The context of recidivism does not produce unusual complexities 
for responsibility blameworthiness as it does for disrespect blameworthiness. Let us 
assume that the invader is completely free of coercion and perfectly informed of the 
risks her conduct raises with respect to her future wrongful risks to others. With this 
established, the question becomes, when is this future wrongful risk disrespectful to 
others? Well, future wrongful risk does knowingly harm others by inducing insecurity 
in them and causing an array of possible reactive responses, including ones to 
ameliorate that insecurity.366 But how disrespectful is that to another individual in the 
community? For a committed terrorist, very disrespectful. For a serial killer, 
seemingly somewhat less so. For an ordinary petty criminal, usually hardly at all. If 
she preys only on a specific small group or community, the disrespect to each member 
of that community is more significant because the risk to each specific one of them is 
accordingly greater. At some point, we should consider granting these individuals at 
risk relief under corrective justice. Yet enhancing this petty criminal’s retributive 
punishment for recidivism seems odd if it simply is because she preys on a small 
community rather than a large one.367 I am not, however, the judge of this. Instead, we 
turn this question over to our reasonable observer, who reflects deontic social values 
in judging when, and how much, criminal standards have been abridged by 
disrespectful conduct. In some communities, disrespectful conduct of certain types to 
neighbors may be sufficiently worse than the same type of conduct directed at more 
distant persons so as to warrant a requital or a requital enhancement.368
                                                          
364 Id. at 969–70.
365 Id. at 970–71.
366 Id. at 1013.
367 In some sense, the invader’s net disrespect may be mathematically independent of the 
size of the community preyed upon. For instance, if a recidivist will commit one crime per 
month, the overall, total disrespect to community members is the same whether the community 
has one hundred or one thousand members insofar as the degree of disrespect considers the 
likelihood of any one person being victimized each month. In these and related situations, when 
deciding whether an agent’s disrespect of others warrants a prohibiting maxim or requital, is 
her overall disrespect somehow aggregated or averaged?
368 Elsewhere I refer to this moral question as the boundary problem. See Bailey Kuklin, The 
Morality of Evolutionarily Self-Interested Rescues, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 453, 489–504 (2008). For 
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In sum, then, we allow our reasonable observer to consider community values 
regarding future risks if the overarching deontic duty to respectE the risk-producing 
actor is met. Here, the questions come down to when the actor’s duty to respect others, 
and society’s duty to respect the actor, support the justifiable standard of an adopted 
maxim and, when such legitimate standard is violated, the nature of the allowable 
requital. If the manifest disrespect to others from future risks to them is minimal, we 
may choose to reject a legal requital in favor of a moral one (e.g., an apology), or none 
at all.
VII. ASPECTS OF AUTONOMY SPACE AND INVASIONS
To reconnoiter, retributive punishment under deontic conceptions is gauged by 
disrespectfulness. Disrespectfulness stems from either a blameworthy attitude or 
conduct. It is manifested by an invasion of another’s autonomy space, delineated by a 
complete and coherent set of substantive and requital maxims that is adopted to 
balance a moral agent’s interests in both liberty and security.369 An invasion produces 
wrongful harms of one or more of the four types of harms. As already posited, the 
disrespect blameworthiness of an invader’s conduct is partially judged by the 
foreseeability to her of the consequences of her invasion and her purposiveness—
factors that also relate to responsibility blameworthiness.370
In light of this deontic foundation, in considering apt retributive requitals for 
invasions, the extent of the invasion of the invadee’s autonomy space seems, at first 
glance, an important factor. The greater the invasion’s foreseeable harms or 
disrespectful purposiveness, the greater the blameworthiness.371 Examining more 
closely the notions of autonomy space and invasions of it is useful before going further 
with this intuition. In gauging these, one must first determine a baseline. To do this, I
begin by looking at three aspects of autonomy space: hypothetical, formal, and 
material. I then turn to three types of effects from the loss of security or liberty from 
autonomy space invasions: operative, preferred, and felt losses.
Autonomy space comes in three types or modes.372 The first is hypothetical 
autonomy space.373 This type is the autonomy space of a person with the capabilities 
of the ideally rational and responsible person.374 Not only is she presumed to have the 
capabilities to make fully rational choices, but also she is presumed to have the 
wherewithal to implement them.375 She has sufficient resources to engage fully in the 
activities of civic and private life, and the demands or limitations of an unjust social 
                                                          
utilitarians, this question amounts to issues over whose wellbeing is to count and how much. 
For Kantians, it directs attention to the generalization-universalization distinction. How general 
are maxims to be?
369 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 455.
370 See id. at 455.
371 Id. at 446–47.
372 See id. at 408–14 (“Types of Autonomy Space”). 
373 Id. at 409.
374 Id.
375 Id.
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environment (e.g., undue prejudice) do not unreasonably constrain her.376 This is the 
default gauge of wrongful harms for invasions of public, political rights.377 Examples 
of such invasions are where an agent of the state wrongfully denies a private person 
the democratic right to run for office, or wrongfully denies her a driver’s license. This
type of invasion does not include violations of every established political or legal 
right.378 Denying a person the right to exercise a nondeontic law, such as one that 
requires or allows injurious discrimination on the basis of race or religion, is not cause 
for complaint that one’s hypothetical autonomy space has been invaded.
Formal autonomy space is exemplified by a person with the capabilities of the 
law’s reasonable person.379 She is presumed to have normal capabilities.380 Her 
resources and social environment suffice for usual quotidian activities.381 For wrongful 
harms from interactions between private parties, this is the default baseline.382 As 
noted before, this may differ from the standard for existing legal wrongdoing, under 
which some types of harms (e.g., pure economic harms) are not legally protected in 
various circumstances.383
Material autonomy space is that of the specific agent in question based on her 
actual capabilities, resources, and social environment.384 For example, the denial of an 
individual’s protected freedom to buy a yacht is a material autonomy invasion for a 
sufficiently wealthy person who attempts to do so, but only a formal autonomy 
invasion for a person without the necessary resources. Likewise, the wrongful denial 
of a person’s freedom to go to a movie is a material autonomy invasion for a person 
planning to do so, but only a formal invasion for a person with no such plans.
                                                          
376 Id.
377 See id.
378 See id. at 410.
379 Sugden summarizes the social choice literature on the measurement of opportunity. One 
main approach “measures the ‘pure quantity of choice’ offered by a set of options, 
independently of preferences.” Robert Sugden, Opportunity as a Space for Individuality: Its 
Value and the Impossibility of Measuring It, 113 ETHICS 783, 784 (2003). The other main 
approach aligns with the proposal here. It “assesses the extent of opportunity offered by a set of 
options by considering how well it caters to the range of ‘potential’ preferences that is in some 
sense normal, reasonable, or eligible for the relevant type of person.” Id. Opportunity matters, 
in one view, because “being able to choose how to live one’s life is an aspect of individual well-
being in its own right.” Id. at 785. Sugden concludes, “no measure of opportunity can fully 
capture the scope that a person has to develop and express his or her individuality.” Id.
380 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 411.
381 Id. at 410.
382 Id.
383 Examples of harms not legally cognizable under existing law are economic harms within 
the economic loss doctrine, dignitary harms for wrongful imprisonment in some jurisdictions 
when the imprisonment is unknown to the invadee, dignitary harms from depriving a poor 
person of the protected freedom to buy a yacht or disallowing a rich person from buying a yacht 
who neither desires or attempts to, and breach of contract causing no legal damages.
384 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 412.
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As some of these examples show, autonomy invasions may have differing types 
of impacts on specific individual or classes of agents. For particular agents and 
circumstances, autonomy space varies in its functionality.385 Accordingly, invasions 
may produce various kinds or flavors of realized harms. Psychic and dignitary harms 
are particularly contingent. To categorize some of these salient variations, we may 
distinguish operative, preferred, and felt losses of security or liberty.
Operative autonomy space is the part of a person’s autonomy space that is actively 
used.386 It refers to her delineated range of liberty and security that is regularly 
exercised or needed.387 For example, the psychic harm from denying a person the 
liberty to ski likely is less for nonskiers than for regular skiers. Even if an agent has a 
strong desire to ski, she may have other, greater interests or duties that induce her not 
to do so, thus perhaps making the psychic harm from the wrongful denial accordingly 
less.
Preferred autonomy space refers to the conative value that a person ascribes to a 
particular aspect of her sphere of liberty and security, whether for present use 
(operative), future use, future options, or from principle alone.388 Persons vary in the 
                                                          
385 If freedom is thought of as a range of choice, “what would make one range of choices 
larger or smaller than another?” GORDLEY, supra note 178, at 27 (citing WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW, supra note 113, at 73, 83). Gordley rejects two potential standards: “the number 
of alternatives among which a person might choose, whether he wants them or not”; and “the 
extent to which a person can choose what he wants since, then, the scope of each person’s 
freedom would depend on the extent of his desires.” Id. (citing WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE 
LAW, supra note 113, at 212–13).
386 See MARTIN RHONHEIMER, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 219 (Gerald 
Malsbary trans., 2000).
387 Sen agrees with Hayek “in distinguishing between (1) the derivative importance of 
freedom (dependent only on its actual use) and (2) the intrinsic importance of freedom (in 
making us free to choose something we may or may not actually choose).” AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 292 (1999). Is a reduction of options always a loss of freedom? 
“[Gerald] Dworkin has, in an influential article, defended the view that the question ‘Is more 
choice better than less?’ may well be answered in the negative.” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 
174 (citing Gerald Dworkin, Is More Choice Better than Less?, in 7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY 47 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1982)). “[The question remains] whether the mere 
formal burden of reduced options is what we should focus on rather than some sort of 
experienced burden.” Id. Ripstein observes that “[y]our entitlement to the means that you have 
does not depend upon the particular purposes to which you might wish to put them,” including 
whether you leave them unused or even that they are useless. Arthur Ripstein, As if It Had Never 
Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1966–67 (2007). Nonetheless, the degree of the 
harms ensuing from an autonomy invasion may relate to whether the entitlement is operative.
388 See Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 393. Kant argues that preventing a 
person from exercising a free choice that is undesired is a restriction on freedom nevertheless. 
See Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Kant on the Right to Freedom: A Defense, 120 ETHICS 791, 810–
12 (2010). Hayek contends that the importance of a specific freedom is unrelated to the 
likelihood of it being exercised. “It might even be said that the less likely the opportunity to 
make use of freedom to do a particular thing, the more precious it will be for society as a whole.” 
F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 31 (1960); AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND 
FREEDOM 604 (2002) [hereinafter SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM] (quoting HAYEK, supra, at 
31). Dignitary and even psychic harms, at the least, likely are produced by the restriction of 
such an unused freedom.
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strength of their preferences for particular liberties and securities, whether or not they 
are within reach. The desirability of a liberty or security may range from the agent’s 
willingness to die for the interest on principle to total indifference, or even a preference 
that it not exist (e.g., access to certain irresistible, fatty treats). For example, an ascetic 
may be indifferent to the right to the material goods of life, while a hedonist feels quite 
to the contrary. Personality dispositions affect the desirability of aspects of autonomy 
space.389 An aggressive, egocentric person, for instance, may strongly desire the liberty 
to take advantage of other people’s foibles while a passive, benevolent person does 
not. A person may presently wish to preserve an unused liberty or security for a future 
exercise (e.g., in case she wins the lottery) or simply out of principle. A person also 
must make room for the fact that preferences change, perhaps owing to changes in 
relevant capabilities, resources, or opportunities.390
Finally, felt autonomy space looks to the extent to which an autonomy invasion 
actually impacts on the invadee, psychically or otherwise.391 Usually the protection 
against dignitary and psychic harms can account for many of these variations.392 An 
insult of a stoic, for example, produces the same dignitary harm as it would to anyone 
else, but her psychic harm is muted. Likewise are some of the harms to those who 
have prior damage to their nervous system. Furthermore, studies have shown that 
extremely harmed (and benefitted) parties typically return to their prior state of 
                                                          
“Whether we would prefer to have one set of opportunities rather than another is an obvious 
question to ask in evaluating freedom, and in this evaluation, it would seem natural to include, 
inter alia, our preferences over those options.” Id. at 596. Sen “argues for an interpretation of 
effective freedom as ‘a person’s ability to get systematically what he would choose no matter 
who controls the levers of operation.’” Sugden, supra note 379, at 790 (quoting AMARTYA SEN,
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 65–69 (1992)); id. at 790 n.15 (citing additional criticism of Sen’s 
arguments). Hobbes takes the position “that being externally hindered in the choice of a given 
option takes from your freedom only if you have ‘a will to’ do it; only if you prefer that option.” 
Philip Pettit, The Instability of Freedom as Noninterference: The Case of Isaiah Berlin, 121 
ETHICS 693, 696 (2011) (quoting Hobbes). Berlin disagrees with Hobbes: “Freedom is . . . ‘the 
absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities.’” Id. at 698 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN,
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xxxix (1969)).
389 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 401.
390 “Many authors have drawn attention to the similarity between the relevance of multiple 
preferences related to a person’s autonomy and the preference for flexibility with uncertainty of 
future tastes.” SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 388, at 618.
391 One commentator sees that justice depends on the value a person places on elements of 
his life (e.g., a beloved pet killed by a hooligan). Wilson, supra note 147, at 526.
392 Tadros discusses “limitations on the intrinsic value of freedom”: “Firstly, the freedom to 
do something which Peter does not wish to do is not very valuable where Peter already has 
plenty of choices: there is a law of diminishing return when it comes to the intrinsic value of 
choice.” VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 202 (2005); see Kuklin, Constructing 
Autonomy, supra note 1, at 414–16 (“The Declining Marginal Increase of Autonomy Space”). 
“Secondly, there is no support for the position that the coerced actions always lack the full value 
of comparable voluntary choices. The argument that freedom is intrinsically valuable in some 
circumstances is compatible with the claim that it is intrinsically disvaluable in others.” TADROS,
supra, at 202 (emphasis omitted). See the discussion below, infra note 397, about “The Tyranny 
of Choice.” “Thirdly, the argument provides no support for the claim that the existence of 
entirely valueless choices is intrinsically valuable.” TADROS, supra, at 202.
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wellbeing within a few years of the causative event.393 Some invadees are quick to 
forgive;394 others hold a grudge forever. A relatively minor invasion may produce great 
lasting harm, while a major invasion soon fades into the invadee’s past. A pickpocket, 
for example, may prevent the invadee from ever pursuing her educational dreams, 
whereas a nasty battery may leave no lasting traces.395
Felt autonomy space invasions become even more curious when an invasion 
produces not (only) harms, but psychic or other benefits to the invadee. Beneficent 
paternalism appreciated by the invadee may produce benefits for her that outweigh 
dignitary and other harms, as where an addictive personality is denied her irresistible, 
deleterious wants.396 Some persons may welcome certain painful invasions, even more 
so than if they had been consensual. The benefits an invadee obtains from her 
supporters after an invasion may more than offset the harms she suffered from it. A 
person who is denied her favored activity, say skiing, may come to discover that a 
previously ignored alternative activity gives her even greater satisfaction. For the 
maximizer who insists on, or cannot resist, the substantial effort to make the “very 
best” choice available, denying her the liberty of such a wide range of options may be 
psychically beneficial to her.397 The businessperson or industrialist who would be 
competitively disadvantaged if she pursues her desire to “do the right thing,” as by 
environmental protections or consumer disclosures, may be psychically benefited by 
a government regulation that limits a business’s liberty to do otherwise.398 These 
                                                          
393 See infra note 460.
394 Perhaps one must not be too quick to forgive. One commentator interprets Murphy as 
arguing, “readiness to forgive—or even refusal initially to display resentment—tends to reveal 
one’s lack of respect, not just for oneself, but for others as well.” Savolainen, supra note 161, 
at 119 (citing Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in 7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 387, at 505). Savolainen disagrees. See id. at 124–25. Murphy has 
further developed his position that one should not be too quick to forgive. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
GETTING EVEN (2003). “What are the values defended by resentment and threatened by hasty 
and uncritical forgiveness? I would suggest three: self-respect, self-defense, and respect for the 
moral order.” Id. at 19.
395 Should we distinguish between harms that are primarily immediate (e.g., temporary 
physical injury) from those that are future-oriented (e.g., disruption of marriage or career plans)?
396 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 443.
397 See Barry Schwartz, The Tyranny of Choice, SCI. AM. 71 (Apr. 2004). The research made 
“a distinction between ‘maximizers’ (those who always aim to make the best possible choice) 
and ‘satisficers’ (those who aim for ‘good enough,’ whether or not better selections might be 
out there).” Id. at 71. “We found . . . that the greatest maximizers are the least happy with the 
fruits of their efforts.” Id. at 72. “[T]he presence of an enormous variety of options can, in some 
circumstances, have a somewhat dazzling effect on a chooser, so that a person may actually 
prefer to have a small range of options.” SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 388, at 
606. “[S]ometimes we seek ‘a freedom of second order: freedom from decision.’” Id. (quoting
W.V. QUINE, QUIDDITIES 68 (1987)). You may do your own study the next time you are in a 
large drugstore. See how many of the myriad toothpastes and cold remedies by a single 
manufacturer have the same ingredients but are differently packaged and promoted. Was it 
worth the effort of getting exactly the right one? And did you?
398 See Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 657 
n.16 (1992).
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examples turn on benefits to the invadee, but do not simply resolve into a social 
welfare calculus. Restricting the range of choices of people in the marketplace, though 
beneficial to some maximizers, may be costly overall to consumers as a class, most of 
whom are, say, simply satisficers.399 The issue here is whether the psychic or other 
benefits to an invadee should ever be considered when she seeks a private requital or 
when retributive punishment is at stake. I leave this issue to another day.
The invader’s foreseeability of the functionality of the autonomy space invaded 
affects our perceptions of her blameworthiness.400 It is one thing to knowingly interfere 
with an unused, undesired right and another if the right is understood as central to the 
invadee’s identity. The same may be said in distinguishing knowing invasions of 
material, formal, or hypothetical autonomy space, the actual harms from which may 
vary according to the extent to which they are within the reach of the invadee.
There are, then, three aspects of autonomy space: hypothetical, formal, and 
material. The functionality of the particular type of autonomy space also comes in 
three flavors: operative, preferred, and felt. The disrespectful blameworthiness of an 
invasion varies according to which of these types and flavors of autonomy space the 
invader foreseeably or purposively invades. In gauging an apt requital for these 
invasions, these aspects and flavors of the invader’s autonomy space may thus be 
found relevant.401
VIII. REQUITAL GAUGES
It is time to cash out the standard of retributive punishment based upon the just 
deserts of an invader for her blameworthy conduct that invades the autonomy space 
of one or more other people. The invasion was proscribed by a substantive maxim that 
triggers a criminal requital maxim. The invader is responsible for her conduct that 
wrongfully disrespectsE an invadee.402 Distributive justice calls for her punishment. 
On the one side of the scales of justice we place the amount that an objective observer 
quantifies the blameworthiness of the invader for her harmful conduct. To right this 
imbalance, we place on the other side of the scales . . . . Well, this is where controversy 
rages.403 First, how does one quantify the observer’s judgment of blameworthiness or, 
                                                          
399 Id. at 651–52.
400 See Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 455.
401 Sunstein points out how difficult it is to gauge capability losses. “First,” he asks, “[w]hat 
kinds of capability losses are legally cognizable? Second, how can capabilities be translated into 
monetary equivalents? At first glance, a notion of normal human functioning would seem to 
provide the baseline from which to measure capability losses . . . .” Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory 
Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157, S178 (2008) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted); see id. at 
S178–81 (exploring answers to the two questions beyond the first glance suggestive of some of 
the distinctions drawn above).
402 To recall the meaning of the subscript, see supra text accompanying notes 195–202.
403 “[R]etributivism, which adopts a backward-looking perspective focusing on the moral 
duty to punish past wrongdoing, is a justificatory theory, but seemingly not a prescriptive one. 
It offers retribution as a justifying ideal but does not explain how legal institutions are supposed 
to make retribution real.” Cahill, Retributive Justice, supra note 48, at 818 (footnotes omitted); 
see LUCY, supra note 321, at 414. “The problem of matching crime with punishment has 
occupied philosophers for centuries, and any theory of punishment that offered a simple formula 
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for that matter, any other adopted standard of retribution? Second, how does one 
balance the invader’s requiting punishment? Even if we can sensibly gauge the amount 
that the observer’s pan sinks with apt disapproval, no evident way can offset this with 
like for like.404 There is no apparent coin of this realm. We are comparing apples to 
smoke.405 While Kant and others commonly advance the imposition of pain or 
suffering on the invader,406 this coin has several significant flaws, as will be discussed. 
Whether suffering is a fit response to blameworthiness may even be questioned.407 I
                                                          
for determining punishments should be immediately suspect.” Daniel McDermott, The 
Permissibility of Punishment, 20 LAW & PHIL. 403, 425 (2001) (footnote omitted).
404 Under retributive principles, “determining moral desert becomes a matter of correlating 
punishment, typically incarceration, with something that is usually very different from it [such 
as embezzlement or rape]. . . . The drastic differences in kind between punishment and offense 
should make us suspicious about moral desert’s ability to do what retributivists require of it.” 
Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, supra note 124, at 308. Corlett proposes a 
“Matching Principle of Proportionate Punishment” whereby “[a]s far as humanly possible, 
criminals ought to be punished in ways which match the harm they caused to others.” CORLETT,
RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 58, at 86 (emphasis omitted). “Considerations 
that might vitiate against this mode of punishment would include cases of extortion, or 
embezzlement, and the like where treating criminals in ‘tit for tat’ ways seems ludicrous, if not 
impossible.” Id. at 87.
405 “There is no ‘natural’ measure of punishment, that is to say, no rationally determinable 
and uniquely appropriate penalty to fit the crime.” John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s 
Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 103 (1999) [hereinafter Finnis, Retribution]. “The severity 
of the punishment can be made proportionate to the seriousness of the crime only if degrees of 
seriousness can be distinguished. However, the judgement that one crime is more or less serious 
than a very different crime seems much like dealing with apples and oranges.” Husak, Desert,
supra note 165, at 189. “The difficulty posed by this problem [of incommensurables] has led 
many legal philosophers to despair about the prospects of applying desert theory to the real 
world.” Id. at 190. “The problem of incommensurables is compounded because the seriousness 
of crime is a function of two variables . . . , ‘the degree of harmfulness of the conduct, and the 
extent of the actor’s culpability.’” Id. (quoting ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS
29 (1993)). “Even Hegel himself, along with Kant the most influential retributivist, concedes 
retributivism’s inability to determine the just punishment for any particular offense . . . .” 
Christopher, supra note 127, at 893.
406 See supra text accompanying notes 125–27, infra notes 426–32. “Retributivists, in 
general, reply [to utilitarians] that it is morally necessary that wrongdoers be made to suffer. 
Those I call deep retributivists held this is as a fundamental moral principle, which can serve to 
justify retributive policies of punishments.” Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing, supra note 130, at 
411–12 (footnote omitted). For Hill’s distinctions among mixed retributive theories, derivative 
retributive policies, basic retributive principles, the intrinsic desert thesis, and related notions, 
see id. at 412–14. “[Retributive] punishment is essentially a matter of humbling a criminal’s 
will—it is in this sense that punishment must make her suffer.” DUFF, TRIALS AND 
PUNISHMENTS, supra note 82, at 196; see, e.g., JACOB ADLER, THE URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE: A
THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 80 (1991) [hereinafter ADLER, URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE]; FEINBERG,
The Expressive Function of Punishment, supra note 141, at 98; HART, Prolegomenon, supra
note 125, at 4; KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, supra note 116, at 155; VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE,
supra note 51, at 35; RYBERG, supra note 136, at 6, 14–19; Hampton, An Expressive Theory of 
Retribution, supra note 142, at 3.
407 Rather than suffering as the object of desert, “[i]t might be held that a fitting response to 
wrongdoing would be reproach, blame, reproof or criticism; in which case it would no longer 
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will examine a few other plausible coinages as well.408 None of the possibilities is fully 
satisfactory. There is no gold standard for our penal legal tender.409 Blind trust in the 
fairness of socially promised, or threatened, IOUs is inevitably somewhat necessary, 
unfortunately.
Compounding the difficulties with identifying the coin of the realm of retributive 
punishment is the commonly articulated position that a fair punishment is to be 
proportionate.410 It is not to be one for one as in lex talionis, an eye for an eye.411 Even 
more certainly, it is not to be based on vengeance, which may demand more-than-one 
for one.412 Calculating one for one is hard enough. After determining what 
“proportionate punishment” means,413 further twists and turns await if we adhere to it 
                                                          
be obvious that punishment would be the appropriate instrument.” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 
16. Even if suffering is intended, punishment may not cause it in particular instances. See
ADLER, URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 406, at 80. “[A] punishee may want[] to submit to 
punishment [because she] believes that she can achieve reconciliation, atonement, expiation, 
renewed innocence, greater moral knowledge, or some other good by undergoing the 
punishment.” Id. at 91; see KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT, supra note 70, at 23. “But while 
I do not think it to be a necessary characteristic of punishments that they be experienced as 
impositions, I would insist that they be intended as impositions.” Id. at 24.
408 Shafer-Landau summarizes ten “candidates for commensurating punishment and moral 
desert,” including “the same kind of treatment,” “the same amount of suffering,” “the degree of 
responsibility . . . multiplied by [the] wrong” (Nozick), what “is necessary and sufficient for 
nullifying the message of inferiority” (Hampton), similar “suffering or hard treatment” 
(Waldron), that which “is authorized by a democratically enacted sentencing rule,” proportional 
treatment within “a set of proportional punishments,” “equal treatment,” “that amount of liberty 
that [was] unfairly gained,” and that which “is efficacious in achieving some valuable goal.” 
Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and Desert, supra note 124, at 208–09. I will not explore all of 
these candidates.
409 “[J]ustice cares about amount, not method of punishment. Thus, one could impose 
deserved punishment through any variety of alternative methods without undercutting justice—
fine, community service, house arrest, curfew, regular reporting, diary keeping, and so on . . . 
.” Robinson, Virtues of Restorative Processes, supra note 221, at 386 (emphasis added). “[O]nce 
the punishment amount is determined, one could look to any number of non-desert purposes to 
determine how that fixed amount of punishment is to be imposed.” Robinson, Limiting 
Retributivism, supra note 70, at 11 (footnote omitted).
410 See, e.g., Frase, supra note 239, at 73. “Some theorists, I believe, simply take this 
principle [of proportionate retributive punishment] as an elementary intuition.” Scheid, Davis,
supra note 70, at 397 (footnoting his interpretation of Kant as among these theorists).
411 See RYBERG, supra note 136, at 68.
412 See id.
413 Kant’s meaning of proportional punishment is not clear. See MURPHY, Does Kant Have 
a Theory of Punishment?, supra note 131, at 58. Without argument, Kant “seems to think that 
the claim [for proportionality] is self-evident or intuitively obvious . . . .” Id. at 60. In this regard, 
one commentator identifies two accounts of culpability, one being proportionate culpability. 
“This principle states that punishment must be in accord with or in proportion to culpability, 
and it is sometimes endorsed by courts and overwhelmingly by scholars.” Darryl K. Brown, 
Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability’s Relevance, 75 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (2012) (footnotes omitted). The other account is threshold 
culpability, the apparent favorite of courts and legislatures. “On this view, proof of mens rea is 
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as the standard.414 Among those twists and turns are, for one, that we must consider 
whether there is a lower limit to a just proportion. If criminal sanctions are too low, it 
would seem to be disrespectful of the invadee who was wrongfully harmed by the 
invader. Another twist is that we must determine whether a set proportion is to apply 
equally to all types of harms and crimes. Rather, since my preferred conception of 
retribution centers on the blameworthiness of the invader, and only indirectly looks to 
the nature of the harms to the invadee, this second issue may morph into the question 
of whether a proportional punishment may vary according to the degree of
blameworthiness, as in progressive or regressive taxation. For blameworthiness just 
beyond the threshold for retributive punishment, the proportion may be, say, 0.4, and 
as the blameworthiness increases, the proportion may likewise increase or decrease, 
though not necessarily in a linear fashion.
Let us step back for a moment to consider whether proportionate punishment 
should directly consider the nature and extent of the various types of wrongful harms, 
and even the class of the invadees or other factors, rather than simply lumping together 
these aspects of an invasion under a broad gauge of blameworthiness. Recall that 
harms are the focus for our judgment of where to strike the balance between one’s 
liberty and security interests. The propriety of restrictions on liberty and disruptions 
of security are evaluated by the physical, economic, psychic, and dignitary harms they 
produce.415 Harms, by curtailing an invadee’s resources, also usually reduce her 
wherewithal to exercise her range of freedom established by the baseline balance 
struck by adopted maxims.416 Blameworthiness springs from an invader’s attitude and 
conduct in causing wrongful harms.417 This suggests that greater refinement in gauging 
apt retributive punishment may be facilitated by looking through the blameworthiness 
element to the features of the wrongful harms behind it. We may decide, for instance, 
that wrongful physical harms are more blameworthy than equally monetized, wrongful 
economic harms. Or we may decide that, say, economic harms accompanied by 
physical harms, or face-to-face frightful confrontations, are worse than equally 
monetized economic harms alone. For example, a purse snatching that causes minimal 
or no physical harm but causes an economic loss of $100 may be worse than an online
                                                          
needed only to determine whether one is innocent or blameworthy for some offense. . . . [I]t 
plays no necessary role in setting the magnitude of a sentence nor places an upper limit on 
punishment.” Id. at 111. Strict liability crimes and sentencing indifference to moral luck reflect 
this second view. See id. at 111–12, 128–29. Ryberg represents this latter account. He contends 
“that the proportionality principle does not constitute a plausible candidate as to how 
punishment should be distributed.” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 8. Ryberg’s view is based on 
his conclusions that the justification of the proportionality principle is morally doubtful, it has 
difficult theoretical problems, and, finally, “the principle faces problems once we take the step 
from the ideal spheres of penal theory to actual penal practice.” Id. On what is proportionalism, 
see id. at 12–14. “[I]t is difficult to elucidate with any confidence the principles of 
proportionality that the most defensible retributive theory requires.” Simons, Strict Criminal 
Liability, supra note 281, at 446 (exploring a “bottom-up analysis” of proportionality).
414 See, e.g., Dolinko, Three Mistakes, supra note 127, at 1636–37; Duff, Penal 
Communications, supra note 48, at 57–61.
415 Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 452.
416 Id. at 382.
417 Id. at 452.
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scam that produces an economic loss of $10,000, even when the full tort recovery 
under corrective justice for the snatching would be considerably less than for the 
$10,000 scam. We seem to punish white-collar crime proportionally less than 
comparably monetized, blue-collar crime. If differences such as these are accepted, 
there may be a few ways of getting there. On the one hand, we could judge that 
committing the purse snatching is more blameworthy and disrespectful than the scam, 
and hence greater punishment is appropriate. More specifically, face-to-face invasions 
producing direct physical or psychic harms are more disrespectful, perhaps especially 
if weapons are involved,418 than are comparable economic harms alone.419
Alternatively, we could judge that both crimes are equally blameworthy but that 
we punish crimes involving direct confrontations proportionally more than other 
crimes. If we take this second route, we should come up with a justification for the 
distinction.420 I do not have one to offer. The better route, I believe, is the first one that 
simply declares that certain types or combinations of harms—depending on the 
particularities—are more blameworthy than are others, irrespective of the corrective 
justice monetization. The umbrella of dignitary harm could encapsulate this notion.
For instance, cultural norms can hold direct, immediate physical or insultive harms to 
produce greater overall associated dignitary harms than do equally monetized,
economic or nonconfrontational insultive harms. They are more offensive, insulting, 
defamatory, disrespectful, and assertive of moral superiority when holding all else 
equal.421 Under this tack, the proportion in punishment could remain the same for all 
crimes, the gauge of blameworthiness for producing a dignitary harm incorporating 
any distinctions based on features of the other underlying harms.422
When considering possible distinctions based on the classifications of the 
invadees, lines of reasoning like the ones above may apply. When calculating the apt 
proportion of the punishment, we could, for example, explicitly differentiate among 
autonomy invasions of family members, friends, neighbors, associates, clients, 
strangers, and the like, and we could finely subdivide each general category. We could 
even adopt permutations depending on the types of harms combined with the class of 
                                                          
418 Does use of a weapon imply the invader’s assertion of greater moral superiority than do 
other types of crimes?
419 I say “direct physical or psychic harms” to suggest another category for these harms that 
stem from an invadee’s reaction, as where she becomes physically ill from being scammed.
420 Because we are focusing on retributive punishment for the wrongful harms to the direct 
invadee, we must set aside the fright these invasions may produce in the general public. I have 
pushed requitals for these types of societal reactive harms mainly into the bailiwick of corrective 
justice. Insofar as these reactive harms are disrespectful to third parties, retributive 
considerations would, in principle, arguably focus on each invadee separately.
421 We must consider, of course, other factors, as where the holdup is from desperation while 
the economic crime is from greed.
422 Kolber notes that “[c]ulpability seems to be a continuous variable . . . . So if the pertinent 
continuous input (culpability) yields a proportional continuous output (punishment severity), 
then retributivists who subscribe to the widely held principle of proportionality should seek laws 
that support this smooth relationship.” Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, supra note 113, at 
670–71 (footnote omitted).
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invadees.423 Or, we may lump these differences into our overall judgment of 
blameworthiness, again under the umbrella of dignitary harm. We may declare 
physically harming a loved one more or less a dignitary harm as compared to, say, an 
equal physical harm to a neighbor.424 Being wrongfully harmed by an associate seems 
a greater insult than by a stranger.
Many hurdles hinder the commensuration of an objective observer’s judgment of 
an invader’s blameworthiness with an apt retributive punishment. In what follows, I 
examine some of the plausible currency.425 The most obvious place to turn first is to 
the four types of harms that are the focus when adopting maxims to balance liberty 
and security interests. In light of their sufficiently close affinity and the standard 
practice of commentators to not distinguish among them in this context, I here discuss 
physical, psychic, and economic harms together, leaving dignitary harm for separate 
attention.
Before discussing plausible requital harms, let us take a quick look at Kant’s 
observations, which are representative of the views of many other commentators as 
well. Kant cashes out retributive punishment largely in terms of the invader’s pain and 
suffering,426 as do others.427 At the same time, Kant does not dwell on the pain and 
suffering of the victim as the basis for retribution.428 Kant, and often other 
                                                          
423 We might go even further by declaring that the threshold for finding a harm to be 
wrongful varies among the harms and the class of invadees. For example, the monetized 
threshold for a wrongful dignitary harm may be $0 for strangers and $100 for family members 
and other permutations for the other three types of harms. Aggregation of some sort may also 
be embraced.
424 Many other permutations are possible within the confines of the universalization form of 
the categorical imperative. For instance, one may adopt maxims imposing greater duties to one’s 
family than to strangers, so long as duties to strangers meet the respectfulness threshold. This is 
a matter of adopted generalization, not universalization.
Within any one classification, circumstances would affect our judgment of the dignitary harm. 
An equal economic loss wrongfully imposed on a commercial client, for example, may produce 
a greater dignitary harm on the client who dropped her guard because of nonbinding assurances 
by the invader than a client who maintained arm’s distance.
425 “Oregon has implemented a system of punishment units. . . . One problem, however, with 
this approach is that it is very difficult for commissions or sentencers to reach a conclusion 
about exchange rates, i.e. what amount of community service is really equal to X days in 
prison.” Karen Lutjen, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME
J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 389, 437 (1996) (footnote omitted). Morris and Tonry struggle with 
penal commensurability. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND 
PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 37–108 (1990).
426 “[P]unishment is a physical harm . . . .” KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra
note 235, at 170. “[F]or Kant, punishment is a physical harm, properly understood. 
Psychological punishments or non-painful punishments are not seriously considered for most 
varieties of crime. . . . The criminal ‘pays’ for the crime she committed by experiencing a certain 
amount of, potentially lethal, pain.” Brooks, supra note 132, at 565–66 (footnotes omitted).
427 See supra text accompanying notes 125–27, 406.
428 Corlett identifies a “Harm-Based Principle of Proportional Punishment”: “Punishment is 
justifiably inflicted on an offender only if it ‘weighs’ the same for the offender on a scale of 
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commentators, are not clear as to whether the invader’s retributive suffering is to be 
from one or more of the four types of harms, or some combination of them, or even 
from other types of harms.429 Some aspects of Kant’s discussion of punishment do not 
necessarily entail painfulness. For example, he favors capital punishment, castration 
for rape and pederasty, and “expulsion from civil society” for bestiality, none of which 
are, somewhat imaginatively, necessarily painful (overall), at least in modern times.430
Perhaps he should be read as holding that punishment involves the deprivation of the 
criminal, irrespective of her suffering. Others have taken this position.431 Kant gets to 
his currency for retribution by, essentially, hand waving.432 He is far from alone in this 
                                                          
suffering as the offence ‘weighs’ (or would ‘weigh’ on such a scale if the victim is incompetent 
or dead) to the victim on a scale of suffering . . . .” CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT,
supra note 58, at 85 (emphasis omitted); see Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Giving Content 
to the Principle of Proportionality: Happiness and Pain as the Universal Currency for 
Matching Offence Seriousness and Penalty Severity, 69 J. CRIM. L. 50, 50 (2005).
If the pain and suffering from the invader’s requital is somehow to be gauged by the pain and 
suffering caused the invadee, the following discussed problems with identifying the appropriate 
sources and forms of suffering would be further exacerbated, for now the discomfort of two (or 
more) persons must be independently evaluated. We might decide, say, that the invadee’s 
psychic and dignitary harms are to be requited with the invader’s suffering from physical and 
economic harms. Furthermore, the invasion may not induce any real suffering by the invadee, 
as where she is beneficently paternalized. For formulas to compare the invader’s and invadee’s 
discomforts, see Kuklin, Punishment, supra note 112, at 23–85.
429 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Alternatives to Punishment—or Alternative Punishments, in
RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 142, at 43 (“Punishment must involve the 
imposition of some kind of suffering, pain, restriction, or burden: but that imposition can take a 
variety of material forms.”). “[I]t is not entirely clear whether the desert principle calls for 
wrongdoers to experience punishment or suffering. . . . [I]t has been noted recently that the 
desert-as-suffering claim seems to generate some troubling or dubious results.” Michael T. 
Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM, supra note 127, at 15, 28–29 (footnotes 
omitted).
430 See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 474–76, 498.
431 “The essence of punishments, as Aquinas clearly and often explains, is that they subject 
offenders to something contrary to their wills—something contra voluntatem. This, not pain, is 
of the essence.” Finnis, Retribution, supra note 405, at 98 (footnote omitted). One of the 
elements in Rawls’s definition of the institution of punishment is: “a person is said to suffer 
punishment whenever he is legally deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen on the 
ground that he has violated a rule of law . . . .” Rawls, Two Concepts, supra note 127, at 111; 
see, e.g., BOONIN, supra note 133, at 6–7 (“making her worse off in some way”); BRUDNER,
supra note 63, at 53 (“interferences with liberty”); KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT, supra
note 70, at 22–25 (“restriction of his freedom”); Richard L. Lippke, Retribution and 
Incarceration, 17 PUB. AFF. Q. 29, 34–35 (2003) (“interfere commensurately with the 
capabilities of offenders to live decent lives of their own choosing”); C.W.K. Mundle, 
Punishment and Desert, 4 PHIL. Q. 216, 218–19 (1954) (“frustration of a person’s desires”). 
That violation of another’s rights requires forfeiture of the same or similar rights, see MICHAEL 
D. BAYLES, PRINCIPLES OF LAW 287 (1987); Alan H. Goldman, The Paradox of Punishment, 9 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 42 (1979); see generally Wellman, supra note 133.
432 “Kant’s theory . . . accounts only for the imposition of some kind of deprivation on the 
offender to offset the ‘advantage’ he obtained in violating others’ rights. It does not explain why 
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leap. Furthermore, Kant does not discuss how to measure criminal violations against 
penal pain, suffering, or deprivations.433
A. Physical, Psychic, and Economic Harms
Cashing out retributive punishment in terms of the imposition of physical, psychic, 
and economic harms may seem rather straightforward. One simply gauges the extent 
of these harms that an invader would suffer from various forms or degrees of 
punishment and imposes an apt punishment accordingly. Even in principle, however, 
certain issues loom. Are all three of these types of harms to be summed, or only some 
of them, totally or partially? Should the particularities of the invasion or the requital 
maxim affect the answer to this last question? Even more troubling are issues relating 
to whether the harms are to be gauged against a hypothetical or reasonable invader or 
the actual invader. Before addressing these issues, let us first look at some principles 
relating to the possibility of cashing out punishment in terms of the fourth type of 
harm, dignitary harm.
B. Dignitary Harms
Since dignity is central to deontic principles, exacting punishment by the 
imposition of dignitary harms on an invader in proportion to the dignitary or other 
harms the invader imposed on the invadee may seem appropriate. Even in principle, 
however, this retributive coin raises considerably more complex issues than do those 
of physical, psychic, and economic harms. To begin with, Kant cautions that even 
criminals have a dignity that is entitled to respect.434 At first blush, this principle would 
seem to push the possibility of dignitary harm requitals off the table. Yet we must 
remember that this Kantian concern for dignity and respect refers to egalitarian 
underpinnings. All persons by virtue of their capacity for rationality are ethical beings 
with a dignityE that entitles them to respectE. This leaves on the table the liberty 
conceptions of these and related concepts. While everyone’s dignityE is entitled to 
equal respectE, we also respectL individuals to the extent that they have developed their 
talents, contributed to society, etc. They have earned and deserve their dignityL.
Hence, we treat them with commensurate respectL. As for those who have wrongfully 
                                                          
that deprivation should take the peculiar form of punishment.” VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE,
supra note 51, at 48.
433 Id.
434 See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 473, 580. According to Kant 
“moral virtue is not a prerequisite of dignity; even the grossly immoral have it.” THOMAS E.
HILL JR., Social Snobbery and Human Dignity, in AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 155, 169 
(1991). Hence, “punishments degrading to humanity are prohibited.” Hill, Jr., Punishment,
supra note 130, at 236 (citing MS6:328–370). “In punishing a criminal, we must always respect 
humanity in the criminal’s person, and this makes it wrong to inflict forms of punishment that 
humiliate or degrade.” ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT 134 (1999) [hereinafter 
WOOD, KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT] (citation omitted). “[H]ow can we punish people without 
humiliating them? . . . What is more, the humiliating message expressed by punishment is not 
an unwanted side effect. It is part of the punishment itself.” MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY 74 
(2012).
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harmed others by blameworthy conduct, they have earned our disrespectL for their lack 
of dignityL, or alternatively, their indignityL.435
It is useful to distinguish one’s earning of respectL for one’s dignityL from our 
recognition of that increased dignityL. For instructive purposes, let us first look at the 
positive side of the dignityL ledger at those who have earned increased respectL.
Courageous, socially beneficial conduct, for instance, entitles one to respectL, even 
before society recognizes this conduct as such.436 How might society recognize, 
requite, this heightened dignityL? Setting aside the complexities of posthumous 
recognition,437 we may turn to the opposites of physical, psychic, and economic harms, 
that is, rewards or benefits.438 As for physical benefits, the possibilities seem limited. 
We may grant medical care, as we do for military veterans.439 This care may extend to 
physical trainers and facilities as well as therapies and other services that increase 
                                                          
435 Hampton emphasizes the need to be respectful of the person being punished. “Hence the 
construction of retributive punishment is an art, which involves the satisfaction of two demands: 
first, that the wrongdoer be diminished; and second, that the diminishment not represent him as 
lower in value than the victim.” Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, supra note 142, 
at 14.
436 See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107 (2011) 
(suggesting the difference between dignity and the recognition thereof). “Dignity in this sense 
[of Waldron’s] is not something one simply has, but rather is earned through hard work on the 
self, and is fully settled only once it has been recognized by another.” Katherine Franke, 
Dignifying Rights: A Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1177, 1178 (2011).
437 Because I explore the recognition of increased dignityL for insights on how to deal with 
the decreased dignityL of a criminal, posthumous acknowledgments become uninstructive. 
Deceased invaders are not punished. Most commentators argue that persons cannot be harmed 
posthumously. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations 
of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2003); Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra
note 1, at 440 n.222.
438 Kant takes a counterintuitive position on rewards. “The rightful effect . . . of a meritorious 
deed is reward (praemium) (assuming that the reward, promised in the law, was the motive to 
it) . . . .” KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 382. Goodin contends “that 
notions of positive desert ought not play any important role in social policymaking.” Robert 
Goodin, Negating Positive Desert Claims, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 58, at 234, 
235. For questions about the symmetries between benefits and harms, see Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL 
THEORY 117, 120–25 (1999). Fletcher calls for caution in looking at one side of the ledger for 
help on the other. He argues for “an asymmetry between positive and negative desert.” GEORGE 
P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 98 (1996); see id. at 96–99. On the other 
hand, Kagan writes: “At a minimum, it is not at all obvious what there is about the difference 
between virtue and vice that might justify asymmetrical treatment.” KAGAN, supra note 70, at 
224.
439 For a description of the extensive benefits granted veterans, see U.S. DEP’T OF VETERAN 
AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS, DEPENDENTS, AND SURVIVORS (2016), 
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book/2016_Federal_Benefits_for_Veterans.pdf; 
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, ExploreVA, VA.GOV, http://explore.va.gov (last visited Feb. 
15, 2017). These benefits are, of course, partially a matter of contract, not unbargained-for 
reward.
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physical wellbeing.440 For psychic benefits, we have hero parades, medals, award 
ceremonies, and positive publicity. Therapies, such as massages, may be granted for 
their hedonistic pleasures even when not medically beneficial. Turning to economic 
benefits, these loom large. Financial rewards are common. Education benefits, such 
as under the GI bill, and mortgage subsidies fall into this category.441 Free passes and 
reduced rates for events and institutions do too. Economic rewards come in many 
possible forms.
The fourth category, dignitary harm or, on the credit side of the ledger, dignitary 
benefits, poses interesting prospects. This category draws our attention to the liberty-
security balance that, pursuant to the recognition of everyone’s equal dignityE, is 
struck by the adoption of deontic maxims designed to grant all persons the fullest 
freedom consistent with the equal freedom of others.442 The wrongful invasion of a 
person’s autonomy space that has been delineated by adopted maxims is a dignitary 
harm to the invadee irrespective of whether the invasion produces any of the other 
three types of harms.443 The invasion denies the invadee her full autonomy, her 
freedom to choose and act within the adopted limits of her equal liberty, and her equal 
security from wrongful impacts by others.444 While typically an invasion produces one 
or more of the other three types of harms, it may not, as where an invadee is 
beneficently paternalized or is unknowingly battered (e.g., kissed), such as during 
sleep.445 The dignitary harm remains in place.
Using invasions of the adopted liberty-security balance as the focus for 
determining pure dignitary harms offers aids in looking at the other side of the 
ledger—pure dignitary benefits. How might liberty-security benefits be granted to 
reward earned respectL and heightened dignityL? Looking first at liberty, is expanding
a deserving person’s liberty without, at the same time, unfairly truncating another 
person’s security plausible? As a reward, we certainly cannot allow our heroes to 
batter others.446 On the other hand, we might consider allowing them priority seating 
at events or public transportation and the right to move to the fronts of lines. We could
grant them priorities or weighted advantages for government employment or contracts,
or admission to public institutions such as schools. When attending next to honorees’ 
security interests, the possibilities seem few or questionable. Might we allow them 
greater fire and police protection? Free or reduced insurance, as is the case for 
veterans? Advantageous standards when bringing defamation claims or, for that 
matter, other tort or contract claims?
A difficulty with at least some of these considered tacks is that the expanded liberty 
or security freedoms of the rewarded beneficiaries can be seen as curtailments of the 
correlative liberty or security interests of those persons who experience setbacks from 
                                                          
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 See Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, supra note 1, at 380.
443 See id.
444 See id.
445 See id. at 387–89.
446 More accurately, we would not redefine a wrongful battery in such a way as to truncate 
the security interests of others with respect to the heroes.
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the granted dignitaryL benefits to others. Some of the controversies over affirmative 
action reflect this.447 Consider how easy moving to the front of a line in your hometown
would be unless, perhaps, you are a well-recognized hero. Mine is New York City 
where strangers predominate. Forgettaboutit. When we turn to the other side of the 
ledger to the dignitaryL harms that may be imposed on blameworthy wrongdoers in 
recognition of their just deserts, the objections of third parties are more muted, though 
not silenced.448 Yes, an invader’s dependents, kin, kith, associates, and supporters may 
suffer harms from her punishment, but these indirect harms likely would not be 
protected by adopted maxims when balancing overall liberty and security interests. 
They probably did not deserve to have a criminal in their lives, but their claims seem 
outweighed by the invadee’s claims, her affiliates’ claims, and the retributive aim of 
punishing the invader according to her just deserts. The invader’s affiliates may be 
harmed, but we would assert they are not wrongfully harmed. The deterrent effects of 
the punishment, moreover, generally protects or even expands the liberty and security 
interests of third parties, including the invadee and her affiliates and, perhaps, partially 
even the invader’s own affiliates, depending on the circumstances and whether they 
have also been the targets of the invader’s hostilities.
To avoid many of these complexities, an apt means of recognizing an invader’s 
indignityL, of meting out her just deserts, is restricting her liberty, as by imprisonment, 
house arrest, probation, and protection orders. These constrain her liberty interest 
irrespective of whether they cause her any physical, psychic, or economic harms. Even 
the measure of an economic harm, such as a fine, may be determined by its effects on 
the invader’s liberty and not directly on any sort of economic suffering. An invader’s 
security interest may also be constrained. She may be subject to searches and 
surveillance and other actions that are normally treated as invasions of privacy or 
otherwise proscribed. Although these types of security constraints have been 
consequentially justified by the needs of penal institutions, they have a desert 
grounding as well. Punishment entails the curtailment of the punishee’s liberty and 
security.449
C. Requitals in Principle, Requitals in Practice
There are various means to punish a criminal invader by imposing physical, 
psychic, or economic harms on her. Similarly, regarding dignitary harms, there are 
various ways to truncate an invader’s freedom, to dock her liberty and security 
                                                          
447 See, e.g., SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE, supra note 56, at 213–20 (“‘Victims’ of 
Preferential Treatment”).
448 I take these up below. See infra text accompanying notes 483–86.
449 An offender “arrogates to himself or herself excess liberties; the scheme of equal rights 
is upset. In order to restore it, the person’s basic rights must be restricted in an equal but opposite 
way. This restriction is the punishment.” ADLER, URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 406, at 
121. Under Adler’s “rectification principle,” “[w]hen a person has arrogated excess basic 
liberties by committing an offense, that person must then forgo an equivalent body of basic 
liberties by way of punishment.” Id. at 124. By “liberties,” Adler refers to what I have been 
calling liberty and security. See id. at 125–26. I would find a place for proportion in his principle. 
In gauging “an equivalent body of basic liberties” while avoiding the preferences of the 
punishee, one can ask, “‘[w]hat quantity of rights would a reasonable person willingly forgo in 
order to gain the right to do what the offender did?’” Id. at 137.
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interests. Even in principle, however, aptly gauging the freedom curtailments is 
problematic.450 For one, we should consider whether a restriction is measured by the 
invader’s hypothetical, formal, or material autonomy space. As we move from the first 
to the last, the curtailments tend to pinch harder.451 Additionally, we should decide 
whether to consider the functionality of the invader’s liberty and security constraints. 
The effects of curbs may vary from invader to invader depending on how they impact 
on her operative, preferred, or felt freedoms.452 More problems still exist in practice, 
such as the sensitivities of the punished invader. These variables also play out when 
directly gauging the physical, psychic, and economic harms produced by punishment, 
which I address first.
In practice, similar physical and psychic harms as requitals certainly vary 
effectively from invader to invader. Irrespective of this, any pains or pleasure put on 
the scales must survive the deontic filter. As examples stemming from unacceptable 
disrespectfulness, an invader’s additional suffering from being imprisoned by agents 
from a disfavored religion or sharing close quarters with such persons are kept out of 
the balancing pans. Past this preliminary, we must consider whether to account for the 
special sensitivities or insensitivities of the invader,453 as where the invader is happy-
                                                          
450 “[T]o measure opportunity in a real-world situation . . . requires us to locate options in 
some conceptual space in which relations of similarity and difference can be defined. But there 
are many such spaces, none of which is uniquely privileged.” Sugden, supra note 379, at 803. 
Kolber objects to a “liberty-deprivation calibration” gauge of punishment. Adam J. Kolber, The 
Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1598 (2009) [hereinafter Kolber, 
Comparative Nature of Punishment]. “First, it is not at all clear how we measure amounts of 
liberty.” Id. (footnote omitted). “I doubt we can compare the value of liberties without 
surreptitiously examining experiential facts.” Id. at 1598–99 (footnote omitted).
451 In discussing the gauge of punishment, Kolber directs attention to the invader’s “liberty-
in-fact,” “liberties-under-law,” and her “idealized liberties,” which track my material, formal, 
and hypothetical autonomy space. Kolber, Comparative Nature of Punishment, supra note 450, 
at 1585–94. Though doubting these conceptions of liberty profitably “identify[] the underlying 
disvalue of punishment, even if they did a good job, punishment severity would still have to be 
determined comparatively, because people differ in their baseline levels of all three notions of 
liberty.” Id. at 1594 (footnote omitted). As I analyze the differences, hypothetical and formal 
liberties do not differ from person to person, while material liberty does. For further elaboration 
of his “limited subjectivist position,” see id. at 1595–600. For much more, see Adam Kolber, 
The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009). This subjectivist 
complaint would also apply to dignitary benefits (i.e., rewards).
452 See Kolber, Comparative Nature of Punishment, supra note 450, at 1585–94.
453 Commentators have noted the variations in the sensitivities of prisoners. Bentham lists 
thirty-two “circumstances influencing sensibility.” BENTHAM, supra note 219, at 52. Ryberg 
refers to this as “the sensibility challenge.” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 102–09. “A morally 
plausible account of punishment severity cannot avoid counting in features the strength of which 
to some extent will be conditioned by the sensibility of the individual perpetrator.” Id. at 108. 
“[T]he sensibility is obviously determined by various factors to which there is no simple access 
for the punisher and, even if some knowledge is available, the risk of calibrating punishment 
severity in a way which observes proportionality will indeed be a complicated task.” Id. at 108–
09. Complicated or not, “[w]hen we know about prisoners’ sensitivities to punishment, we 
should try to take them into account at sentencing.” Adam Kolber, Unintentional Punishment,
18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 29 (2012) [hereinafter Kolber, Unintentional Punishment]. On the other 
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go-lucky or hardened,454 or imprisonment triggers her claustrophobia or claustrophilia. 
The invader may be a masochist who likes punishment or prefers imprisonment 
because her friends are there, because it provides for necessities otherwise 
unobtainable,455 or because she sees punishment as a means to expiate her sins.456
Some of these factors relate to the functionality of the invader’s autonomy space that 
her punishment curtails. The suffering one feels from confinement relates to whether 
it impacts on her operative, preferred, or felt freedoms.457 The couch potato, for 
instance, suffers less from being kept from the wild than does an outdoorsperson.458
The invader’s feelings of guilt or shame affect the psychic costs of her punishment.459
Her resilience may soon or eventually diminish the discomfort of her punishment.460
                                                          
hand, the relevance of the invader’s sensitivities has been challenged. See, e.g., David Gray, 
Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619 (2010) (“objectivism”). 
454 There may be a “‘hardening to punishment’ effect observed in animals, in which an 
escalating series of punishment, if it begins at a level that is ineffective in controlling the initial 
transgression, simply conditions the person to tolerate the increasing punishments, without 
reducing the rate of transgressions.” ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, at 38.
The invader may be “the happy-go-lucky person who tends to make his peace with his 
surroundings . . . [rather than] the melancholic person who is miserable no matter where he is.” 
KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, supra note 116, at 155–56. Hence, Katz argues, “certain kinds of 
[penal] harms are to be objectively rather than subjectively judged.” Id. at 156.
455 “[C]ounty jails often serve as places of refuge for vagrants during the winter months in 
cities in cold climates.” Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A 
Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 193 (2004) [hereinafter 
Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?] (footnote omitted); see Clarence S. Darrow, 
Crime and Criminals, 3 HUMANE REV. 209, 213 (1903). O’Henry humorously portrayed this 
tendency in a short story. O’Henry, The Cop and the Anthem (1904).
456 See supra note 407.
457 See NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 140, at 41.
458 These variations in the felt benefits of freedom are suggestive of the utility monster 
problem for utilitarians whereby people greatly vary in the satisfaction they obtain from 
consuming a unit of a particular resource. See id.
459 Kant took note of the additional suffering of a high-status prisoner owing to his sense of 
honor, vanity, and shame, as well as the impetus of the sense of honor in dueling and infanticide 
of illegitimate children. KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 473–74, 476–
77. Kant’s views of honor, however, are curious. See MURPHY, Does Kant Have a Theory of 
Punishment?, supra note 131, at 56–57. Because of feelings of guilt and anxiety, “[t]here are . 
. . several ways in which a criminal may suffer severely after his crime is committed but before 
conviction . . . .” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 17. Sociopaths and other egoists may have no 
feelings of guilt or shame.
“Although shaming penalties can be imposed by the government, shaming is essentially a 
nonlegal sanction. Shaming occurs when people draw attention to the undesirable traits or 
behaviors of another person, with the result that the target is seen as a less desirable cooperative 
partner.” ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 89 (2000). “History reveals two problems 
with shaming punishments. First, these punishments are messy. . . . Second, these punishments 
created deviant subcommunities.” Id. at 106; see generally id. at 88–111.
460 Studies of those suffering egregious injuries (e.g., paraplegia) or gaining great benefits 
(e.g., lottery winners) have shown that a person’s level of well-being typically returns to or near 
84https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss2/5
2018] PUBLIC REQUITALS 329
She may suffer from her reactive response to the harms her punishment causes her 
supporters.461 Sources of suffering other than the state may impact the invader, such 
as a threatening vigilante committee, bad publicity before, during, or after the trial,462
or self-triggered injuries during the course of the crime and its ensuing events.463 The 
                                                          
its ex ante level as time passes. See Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident 
Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978). As Bagaric and 
McConvill note, in the context of crime, this cuts two ways. With respect to the harmed victim, 
“[p]eople are extremely resilient and adaptable. It follows that most criminal offences are 
unlikely to have a lasting significant negative impact on well-being. This suggests that so far as 
the principle of proportionality is concerned, it is inappropriate to impose sanctions that have 
long-term effects.” Bagaric & McConvill, supra note 428, at 73. With respect to the punished 
criminal, this resilience cuts the other way. Since, as research has shown, prisoners adapt to 
their conditions (see what follows), “a long period of detention may be necessary to inflict [] 
even a moderate level of pain.” Id. Studies have revealed a “hedonic treadmill.” “The essence 
of the notion is that over time, people who move to a markedly better, or markedly worse, 
situation that initially produces great pleasure or discomfort, will adapt to that new set of 
circumstances and return to seeing it as a neutral state.” ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES,
supra note 51, at 39; see Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 455, at 
187–89 (describing two kinds of prisoner adaptations). Does the hedonic adaption of the invader 
during imprisonment correspond to the invadee’s hedonic adaption to her harm from the crime? 
Kant mentions the impossibility of predicting future pleasure. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL 
REASON, supra note 235, at 186. Hence, he discounts pleasure as the goal of duties. See id. at 
186–93. Does this argue for a similar discount for a suffering standard for punishment?
Several studies supporting this human adaptability to conditions “suggest that our society’s 
major means of modulating the punitive bite of punishment felt by a convicted individual, which 
is by manipulating the duration of the prison sentence, is not going to be as effective as what 
one might call the ‘naïve calculation system’ assumes.” ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES,
supra note 51, at 40. Referring to the “peak and end” rule in the context of deterrence, Robinson 
finds that recent work “suggest[s] that duration does not play anything like the major role that
intuition gives it in determining punishment amount. Instead in these experiments, the amount 
contributed by duration to the remembered experience of pain was small.” Id. at 41 (footnotes 
omitted). “New approaches to punishment are necessary to achieve proportionality in light of 
the challenges posed by adaptation.” John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (2009).
461 Should the suffering of the invader’s supporters or sympathizers be considered? For some 
of these harms, see Ryan, supra note 152, at 1085. Contrariwise, should we weigh in the 
satisfactions of third parties from the invader’s punishment? “The social welfare evaluation also 
includes the satisfaction of any tastes that individuals might have for correct punishment: For 
example, the gratification they experience when guilty parties are appropriately punished . . . .” 
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 58, at 292.
462 Adverse publicity may be a state vehicle for punishment, particularly for corporations. 
“[A] program of adverse publicity, sometimes to be coupled with fines, . . . would take the form 
of a court-ordered, institutionalized form of adverse publicity of the guilty corporation the cost 
of which is paid by the guilty corporate-collective by order of the state.” CORLETT,
RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 58, at 140.
463 Alexander poses a hypothetical in which, as a criminal “leaves the scene [of the crime], 
he is struck by lightning and suffers X amount of pain as a consequence. Should the lightning 
strike affect and perhaps reduce to zero the amount of punishment imposed for the crime?” 
Alexander, Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra note 127, at 819 (citing Douglas N. Husak, 
Already Punishment Enough, supra note 224, at 79). Most commentators argue that non-state 
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state itself may be an additional source of variable impacts on prisoners, as where 
incarceration conditions differ within a particular prison or its wider system.464 The 
stigma of punishment may have negative physical and psychic repercussions on the 
invader and her supporters long after the imprisonment has ended,465 these varying 
from person to person. In sum, the same formal punishment may have widely variable, 
physical and psychic impacts on affected parties.466
                                                          
sources of suffering should not count as punishment. See, e.g., Husak, Already Punishment 
Enough, supra note 224, at 83 (referring to a “school of thought”); but see SADURSKI, GIVING 
DESERT ITS DUE, supra note 56, at 230–31; Shawn J. Bayern, The Significance of Private 
Burdens and Lost Benefits for a Fair-Play Analysis of Punishment, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 23 
(2009); Husak, Already Punishment Enough, supra note 165, at 231 (making out “inconclusive” 
support for the proposition). “Interestingly enough, judges and juries, as the case may be, do
tend to take the wrongdoer’s suffering into account in sentencing.” Id. at 231. “This idea, 
referred to as ‘poena naturalis’, or ‘natural punishment’, seems to reflect something deeply 
embedded in our moral sense.” Id. Defense lawyers, unsurprisingly, have argued that adverse 
publicity causing great humiliation to a previously respected member of the community should 
constitute “punishment enough.” See RYBERG, supra note 136, at 17.
464 Kolber argues that we need to “justify those aspects of punishment that are neither 
intended nor foreseen” as well as “aspects of punishment that are augmented by offenders’ 
baseline characteristics.” Kolber, Comparative Nature of Punishment, supra note 450, at 1602. 
“When we harm people knowingly, we need to have a justification for doing so. Retributivists 
who claim that they can ignore the full, comparative range of harms to inmates simply because 
those harms are unintended have failed to fully justify those punishments.” Id.; see Kolber, 
Unintentional Punishment, supra note 453. “Similarly, focusing on retribution, judges could 
factor in likely sexual victimization in determining ‘just deserts.’ . . . If a likely collateral 
consequence of imprisonment is rape, or even fear of rape, some lesser sentence may be 
retributively appropriate.” Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1302 (2011) 
(footnotes omitted). This is a major problem. One observer “describes prison conditions in the 
United States as ‘unspeakably barbaric.’” Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L.
REV. 87, 95 (2010) (footnote omitted). “Our prisons in particular are theaters of appalling human 
degradation. Outside prisons, too, American criminal justice humiliates offenders in ways 
unique in the Western world . . . .” James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2698, 2699 (2005) (reviewing NUSSBAUM, supra note 160) (footnote omitted).
465 Ryberg mentions the negative long-term effects of job loss and the difficulty of obtaining 
a new job after release, losing one’s spouse and other social ties, and psychological after-effects. 
“Moreover, a punishment may have an impact on the lives of other persons, most obviously on 
the close relatives of the punished.” RYBERG, supra note 136, at 109–10. “Prisoners are often 
abandoned by their spouses and friends, face difficulty finding and keeping employment, and 
may suffer from incurable diseases contracted during their incarceration.” Bronsteen et al., 
supra note 460, at 1038.
466 “When we recognize the comparative nature of punishment, we see that, by putting two 
equally blameworthy offenders in prison for equal durations, the offender with the better 
baseline condition is likely punished more severely than the offender with the worse baseline 
condition.” Kolber, Comparative Nature of Punishment, supra note 450, at 1566 (emphasis 
omitted). “If we insist on giving both of these offenders equal prison terms, we cannot justify 
doing so on the grounds of proportional punishment.” Id. (emphasis omitted). “We would argue 
that fairness requires a recognition that the same sentence may have a disproportionately severe 
impact on certain offenders, and that only if one adopts a principle of equal impact can this 
problem be minimized.” Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal Treatment, and 
the Impact of Sanctions, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY, supra note 165, at 251, 
255. “Equality of impact is widely accepted as a strong principle of fairness in the calculation 
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As for economic harms, fines are one imposition that produce them. They provide 
a common means to punish business enterprises.467 Under the notion of the declining 
marginal utility of wealth,468 equal fines may have disparate impacts that hinge on the 
wealth of the fined invaders.469 Wealth effects aside, the preference for wealth is a 
variable matter of taste, as evident from the attitude manifested by religious ascetics.470
Imprisonment in itself also produces economic harms, as it precludes most gainful 
employment. The preclusion of gainful employment during imprisonment, or 
afterwards from the stigma of a criminal record, has differing economic impacts owing 
to the variations in the market value of the invader’s skill set, experience, and other 
factors. In other words, her opportunity costs may differ. We can even imagine 
eventual economic gains from imprisonment, as where a prisoner turns away from a 
life of crime, obtains a valuable education in prison, or hones her commercially 
valuable creative talents.471
Psychic harms especially, but also physical harms associated with economic 
harms, may vary from invader to invader. The invader’s temperament and preferences 
affect her reactions to economic harms. Again, a crucial factor is the functionality of 
the invader’s reduced autonomy space, that is, the amount that her economic loss 
impacts her operative, preferred, or felt freedoms.
                                                          
of financial penalties.” Id. at 256. “The same principle has, however, been less rigorously 
applied when calculating the length of custodial sentences.” Id. Furthermore, “insofar as the 
conditions in prison establishments vary, over and above the minimum, there is the question of 
whether, and, if so, how, to take account of those variations when calculating sentence length.” 
Id. at 262.
Perhaps these problems can be avoided by adjusting the purpose or meaning of retributive 
punishment. “It would be foolish to deny that persons experience punishment differently. 
However, what we deny, in the main, is that this variance in the experience of punishment is 
critically relevant to the shape and justification of retributive punishment within a liberal 
democracy.” Markel & Flanders, Bentham on Stilts, supra note 148, at 909. “A key point of our 
disagreement is the common and, for the most part, apparently unreflective conflation of 
punishment with suffering.” Id. at 911 (footnote omitted). “If retributive punishment is not about 
matching pain for pain but rather serves as an attempt to communicate to the offender society’s 
condemnation by means of a deprivation of an objective good such as liberty, then the 
idiosyncratic experience of the offender will hardly matter—if at all.” Id. This last point turns
on what is meant by “liberty.”
467 “Although it has escaped almost everyone’s attention, fines have long operated as the 
principal technique of governing crimes through risk. In most jurisdictions outside the US, fines 
make up about [seventy percent] of court dispositions.” O’MALLEY, supra note 246, at 84 
(citation omitted).
468 See, e.g., KUKLIN & STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW, supra note 342, at 40; RICHARD 
A. POSNER ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 75–76 (2d ed. 1977); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN 
ACTION 119–27 (3d rev. ed. 1966).
469 “Subjective factors, [Kant] grants, are sometimes relevant in assessing the severity of 
punishment (e.g. the rich man’s indifference to a small fine).” Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing,
supra note 130, at 436 (footnote omitted).
470 See id.
471 See infra text accompanying note 477.
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The significance of all these variations among punished invaders may be finessed 
altogether if we objectify the impacts of punishment,472 as we might also consider 
doing with respect to the impacts of invasions on the invadees.473 But this calls for 
justification.474 Should society take into account the knowledge that equal forms and 
degrees of punishment have disparate impacts on invaders?
For edification, let us again turn to the positive side of the ledger—grants of 
benefits for those we wish to reward.475 Suppose a community has established a prize 
designed to reward persons in proportion to their just deserts for beneficial conduct 
that reflects the honorees’ extraordinary beneficence and respect for fellow citizens. 
Over the years, a designated group of civic leaders has granted such rewards by means 
of free passes and services at the municipal sports and cultural institutions. For a 
heroic, highly risky rescue of the community from an impending disastrous flood, the 
leaders granted the honoree and her immediate family lifetime passes and free services 
at every municipal facility. For a modest rehabilitation of a local ball field, the leaders 
granted the honoree a one-year pass to municipal swimming pools. Now, let us assume 
that the leaders believe an appropriate reward for an honoree’s exceptional conduct is 
a lifetime pass to either a municipal golf course or ice skating rink. They discover that 
this person is an avid golfer but indifferent to skating. It seems unimaginable that the 
leaders would grant her the pass to the skating rink instead of the golf course. What if 
the honoree is known to be indifferent to all sports and cultural activities or incapable 
of enjoying them? Is it incumbent on the community to come up with an alternative 
reward, if possible? If so, what are the standards of “if possible”? Does this turn on 
the size or wealth of the community? The effort and expense required to find and 
implement an alternative reward? Suppose the community wishes to reward two 
persons for the same beneficial conduct, the leaders considering as appropriate for 
each the grant of a lifetime pass to one of the municipal facilities. It turns out that one 
of the honorees is twenty years old and the other is sixty. Should the community 
supplement the award to the older honoree? Again, the “if possible” issue arises.476
                                                          
472 “The assessment of severity, as the assessment of the harmfulness of the offense, should 
be standardized: the focus should be on how unpleasant the punishment characteristically is. 
Such standardization is necessary as a limit on discretion . . . . It is also needed as a safeguard 
against class justice.” VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 89–90. It “assures that the 
severity of penalties is knowable in advance.” Id. at 80. “[T]he criminal law, with its general 
rules and its emphasis on foreseeable harms, is mainly equipped to deal with standard cases.” 
Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis, 11 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1991). Nonetheless, “the living-standard analysis would 
explicitly allow for cultural variation.” Id. at 14.
473 For example, we might base impacts, or the pain and suffering from impacts, on a 
reasonable person experiencing a like formal (hypothetical? material?) autonomy space 
reduction.
474 See supra note 464.
475 I use the reward side of desert as an “intuition pump,” as coined by Daniel Dennett. 
Intuition pumps, which are subject to misuse, are “not arguments, they’re stories. Instead of 
having a conclusion, they pump an intuition.” Daniel Dennett, Intuition Pumps, in THE THIRD 
CULTURE 181, 182 (John Brockman ed., 1995).
476 “Often it may happen that the social costs of legal enforcement of justice based on desert 
are too high and then the attempt should be abandoned without, however, changing the criteria 
of what is desert.” SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE, supra note 56, at 121.
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On another side of the coin, suppose the civic leaders believe a lifetime pass to a 
municipal golf course is an apt reward for a person’s conduct, but then learn that the 
honoree is an avid golfer who had to give up the activity because she could no longer 
afford the green fees. Hence, she will become ecstatic by such a reward. The honoree’s 
psychic and other benefits, therefore, would much surpass the gauge of her just deserts 
for her conduct. Should the leaders then cut back on the length of the golf course pass, 
offer merely a discount, give her a pass to a skating rink instead, etc.? What if the 
heroic honoree is so wealthy that even free lifetime access to all the municipal facilities 
will strike her as a mere token?
In discussing the quandaries these hypotheticals raise, let me set aside some
possible responses: first, that the award is meant to be merely symbolic, and hence its 
value to the honoree is not a controlling consideration; and second, that the award is 
akin to a contest in which the contestant who satisfies the rules earns a pre-established 
prize irrespective of its benefit. In discussing retributive just deserts, I have dismissed 
both of these standards and all other standards but this: the invader is to suffer 
punishment in proportion to her just deserts. If a proportional standard is to apply to 
the honorees, attention to the honorees’ known conditions and dispositions when 
determining an appropriate reward seems important—if this consideration is 
reasonably possible. This last clause is a significant hooker. When is the standard of 
reasonability met? Substantially past this point it would seem to be an insult, and 
disrespectful, to grant an honoree a reward that is foreseeably inferior in the honoree’s 
eyes to an easily granted alternative.
To return to the debit side of the just deserts ledger, let us look at some arguments 
that have been accepted as a means of discounting foreseeable, but unintended, 
harmful effects or factors. To focus this inquiry, let us assume the favored requital 
maxim centers on dignitary harm and is, say, to “reduce an invader’s freedom in 
proportion to her blameworthiness.” To end the conversation, we could simply declare 
that, under this adopted maxim, foreseeable harms beyond those that would be 
suffered by a reasonable person from the freedom restrictions in themselves are not 
wrongful. Harms, yes, wrongful harms, no. But this is too quick. First, limitations on 
freedom, dignitary harms, cannot be neatly separated from the other three types of 
harms. Imprisonment, for example, often inextricably intertwines with physical, 
psychic, and economic harms, and occasionally benefits,477 as well. Likewise, a 
requital focus on any one or more of these latter three types of harms often involves 
the other types of harms also. Economic or physical harm, and even psychic harm, 
typically restricts a person’s freedom.
Second, even if we grant that a requital focus on one or more types of harm to the 
exclusion of other foreseeable harms meets the mandates of the categorical imperative, 
we must also then acknowledge that a significant range of other requital maxims, or 
applications thereof, would also meet Kant’s standard. In adopting one or another of 
these acceptable maxims, we usually expect a deeper justification than, “we put all the 
possible maxims on a board and adopted the one hit by a thrown dart.” Yes, reason 
alone will not lead to a single, uniquely acceptable requital maxim, but it will go some 
of the way even when, as here, we are struggling with moral issues bristling with 
                                                          
477 The punishment, for example, “could ultimately benefit the wrongdoer by healing the 
sickness of soul or mending the defects of character that had propelled her toward, or found 
expression in, her criminal deeds.” David Dolinko, Morris on Paternalism and Punishment, 18 
LAW & PHIL. 345, 348 (1999).
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essentially contestable concepts. We found a comparable problem when searching for 
standards by which to judge an invader’s just deserts. For this difficulty, we brought 
in our reasonable person, suitably deontically disciplined, to judge an invader’s degree 
of blameworthiness. Similarly, we may ask our reasonable person, as a representative 
of the entire community, to pick an apt requital maxim for adoption or application. In 
doing so, we should ask her to justify her choice. As postmodernists have instructed, 
she cannot be expected to justify her choice beyond debate all the way down to 
bedrock principles,478 but our questioning should push her to consider as many 
relevancies as reasonably possible, including consequential and aretaic normative 
factors that are not inconsistent with deontic principles. At the end of the line of 
analysis there is a leap of faith, such as “I choose this deontic maxim simply because 
I think it properly balances the many divergent values I have deeply contemplated, 
weighted, and weighed.” But the shorter the leap, the less likely are slips.479 As much 
as reasonably possible, our representative of the community must clear out the 
underbrush. She must justify as well as one can the adopted balance of the liberty and 
security interests of the invader and others. After all, the punished invader can claim 
that punishment that does not aptly account for her foreseeable requital harms does 
not respect her autonomy and her dignityE, to say nothing of her dignityL.
How, then, might we justify ignoring foreseeable harms to an invader produced by 
her punishment? Let us first turn to the community’s penal agent and ask her to justify 
her conduct that foreseeably punishes the invader beyond her just deserts. The agent’s 
situation is suggestive of moral quandaries that invoke the doctrine of double effect. 
The doctrine, roughly, is “that we may do what will cause a bad outcome in order to 
cause a good outcome if and only if (1) the good is in appropriate proportion to the 
bad and (2) we do not intend the bad outcome as our means to the good outcome.”480
                                                          
478 See generally COSTAS DOUZINAS ET AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE 16 (1991); 
CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT’S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM 1–48 (1990); STEPHEN TOULMIN,
COSMOPOLIS 5–44 (1990); Scott Fruehwald, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Postmodern Legal 
Thought and Cognitive Science, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 375, 377–79 (2006).
479 See KUKLIN & STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW, supra note 342, at 23–24.
480 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 292 (1991) (emphasis 
omitted) (criticizing the doctrine under her “Irrelevance-of-Intention-to-Permissibility Thesis” 
at 292–96); see, e.g., BRUDNER, supra note 63, at 197–205; ALAN DONEGAN, THE THEORY OF 
MORALITY 157–64 (1977); R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 58–63, 
74–98 (1990); F.M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS 21–23, 91–189 (2007); J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS:
INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 160–68 (1977); MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 42–51 (2009); T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS 1–4, 8–36 (2008); John 
Finnis, Intention and Side-effects, in LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 148, at 32; 
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect, 90 ETHICS 527 
(1980) (specifying “[t]he classic modern formulation” at 528); Dolinko, Three Mistakes, supra
note 127, at 1634 (referring to critics of the doctrine who claim the doctrine is mistaken, 
superfluous, or incoherent); Alison McIntyre, Doing Away with Double Effect, 111 ETHICS 219 
(2001). Quinn “suggest[s] a rationale with clear Kantian echoes” that buoys “the intuitions that 
support [the doctrine]” within bounds. Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and 
Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 335 (1989). “[T]he 
doctrine reflects a Kantian ideal of human community and interaction. Each person is to be 
treated, so far as possible, as existing only for purposes that he can share.” Id. at 350 (footnote
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The classic example is the wartime bombing of a munitions factory located in a 
residential neighborhood.481 Harm to innocent bystanders because of the bombing is 
foreseeable. Under the doctrine, if the overall benefits toward ending the war and 
reducing casualties (substantially?) outweigh the harms to innocents, bombing the 
factory is not immoral.482
In scrutinizing the doctrine of double effect in the punishment context, first 
consider the invader’s innocent supporters. The invader’s punishment causing harm 
to the innocent supporters is foreseeable even though they did nothing to deserve it. 
Nevertheless, as a matter of deontic justice, we arguably do not fully recognize their 
claims. We are not foreseeably harming the supporters as a means to punish the 
invader. The invader’s blameworthiness is not any less because her supporters will 
suffer from her punishment, her just deserts. Indeed, the invader’s blameworthiness 
seems even worse insofar as she can foresee her supporters’ ensuing harms from her 
conduct. But we are not unsympathetic to the supporters’ pleas. In punishing the 
invader, we may consider their harms as a matter of mercy,483 or consequentialism,484
and accommodate them to some extent accordingly,485 though these are not deontic 
principles fundamentally. Yet a deontic consideration remains. The supporters’ 
foreseeable harms should at least be a consideration in implementing the invader’s 
punishment when a range of possible requitals is apt. Parallel to the reward side of the 
desert ledger, an adopted maxim should protect against easily avoidable, gratuitous 
harms. If, for example, the punisher has equal options to imprison the invader within 
convenient visiting reach of the supporters or at an inconvenient distance, the first 
option reduces the foreseeable harms to those supporters. Insisting upon the nearby 
prison is reasonable.486 As accounting for the supporters’ harms becomes more costly 
for the punisher, at what point does it become unreasonable to require the 
accommodation? Just as we queried the strength of the demands on a community when 
rewarding a person for her beneficial conduct to make reasonable efforts to 
accommodate the honoree’s preferences, so are we raising these demands in the 
context of punishment. The word “reasonable” does the easy work of denominating 
the standard. The difficult implementation of this standard involves a multitude of 
considerations. When balancing the various liberty and security interests, at some 
                                                          
omitted). “An . . . urgent basic task [for morality] is to define the forms of respect that we owe 
to one another, and the resulting limits that we may not presume to exceed.” Id. at 351.
481 See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 480, at 292–93.
482 See id.
483 For the legitimacy of mercy to an invader in a deontic realm, see supra note 317. Whether 
mercy to an invader’s supporters should reduce the invader’s punishment is an even more 
perplexing issue.
484 The consequences of plausible maxims are considered in a deontic regime. See supra
note 96.
485 In sentencing, the Model Penal Code would consider the “excessive hardship to [the 
defendant’s] dependents.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2)(k) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (quoted 
infra note 498).
486 The punisher should not choose the distant prison in order to reduce the number of visits 
from supporters, thus psychically harming the invader along with the supporters. This tactic 
uses the supporters as a means only.
91Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018
336 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:245
point the harms to others that might occur (for example, from onerous administrative 
burdens or the expensive need to build more convenient prisons) may outweigh the 
foreseeable harms to supporters.
As applied to invaders themselves, the underlying quandaries of the doctrine of 
double effect take us down a path like the one for supporters’ foreseeable harms. Is 
adopting a requital maxim that excludes consideration of one or more of the invader’s 
four types of harms when foreseeable the proper option? If, say, we adopt a requital 
maxim that focuses only on dignitaryL harms from an invader’s freedom restrictions, 
may we ignore the foreseeable, disparate physical, psychic, or economic harms to 
various invaders from application of the maxim? Let us begin this inquiry at the far 
end of the slope. While we began with easy cases when discussing the foreseeable 
disparities in effects from rewards, and the harms to an invader’s supporters (i.e., a 
more convenient prison is equally available), let us start here at the opposite extreme. 
That is, assume incarceration of an invader will foreseeably produce great physical, 
psychic, and economic harms to her vastly beyond the norm for prisoners and her just 
deserts, and these harms would be extremely difficult, even practically impossible, for 
the punisher to avoid. The invader rightfully says, “because of my heightened 
sensitivities, if you imprison or otherwise punish me for my battery, it will destroy 
me.”
Our first response to the punishee’s point that normal punishment will harm her 
much beyond her just deserts might be, “you should have thought of that before you 
battered that invadee while knowing of the risk of criminal sanctions. Under these 
circumstances, your criminal conduct constitutes consent to the legal consequences.” 
This rebuttal, based on the notion of hypothetical, implied, tacit, constructive, or 
formal consent, is often seen in moral, political, and legal argument.487 I mention this 
analysis above as the main way that political theorists have justified a deontic basis 
for the social contract underpinning a government’s claim to legitimacy.488 There are 
real teeth in this type of consent argument. But the argument is often used to bite off 
more than it can swallow. One can invoke this argument to justify an unjust 
government or law, for example, or to justify an egregious remedy for a minor breach 
of contract that is buried in a nonnegotiable, complicated document. On the other hand, 
an orderly, efficient legal system would seem practically impossible if every defendant 
could deny liability by proving that she did not truly understand or explicitly consent 
to particular norms, laws, or contract provisions. To strike a fair balance, I have 
proposed a Consent Principle.489
Under the Consent Principle, the richness or depth of a person’s required consent 
to limitations on her autonomy space is proportional to the extent to which such 
consent truncates her baseline freedom, that is, constitutes curtailments of her liberty 
and security interests.490 For instance, the consent required for a social hug is much 
shallower than is the consent required for sexual relations. Likewise, the consent 
needed to forgo a nominal legacy is weaker than that to decline a substantial estate. In 
                                                          
487 Mikko Wennberg, Modeling Hypothetical Consent, 17 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 17, 17 
(2003).
488 See supra text accompanying note 15.
489 See Kuklin, Private Requitals, supra note 2, at 977–78.
490 See id. at 976–77.
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line with Aristotle’s notion of responsibility blameworthiness, full consent must be 
free of avoidable ignorance and coercion, but the imperfections of the human 
condition do not allow us to always demand full consent to hold someone responsible 
for their choices and conduct.491 In deciding where an apt line is drawn for sufficiently 
finding responsibility, the Consent Principle urges consideration of the likely impact 
of the finding on the purported consenter.492
Among the impacts on a person’s autonomy space, criminal punishment must 
surely rank among the most extensive. Hence, to counter the claim that the criminal 
invader “consents” to punishment that negatively impacts on her more than called for 
under the proportional standard of retributive just deserts, the invader’s agreement 
under the Consent Principle must be rich and deep. Some may doubt that this is often 
the case. Criminals generally have but a vague notion of the potential consequences 
of their sanctionable conduct.493
Even when criminals are completely aware of all the risks they assume by illegal 
conduct, their “consent” to the sanctions may not be enough to justify punishment 
beyond their just deserts. As Kant points out, even full consent has limits.494 One 
cannot consent, he claims, to actions that are disrespectful to oneself, such as self-
slavery, mutilation, or suicide.495 Because persons, by virtue of their rational capacity, 
are moral beings entitled to be treated with respect, one cannot disrespectfully treat 
even oneself under the categorical imperative.496 It seems that “consent” to punishment 
significantly beyond that which is mandated by one’s just deserts is disrespectful of 
oneself. While this line drawing is difficult, clearly that limit is often violated in our 
current penal system.497 A principled deontic regime would not tolerate this.
Our second, somewhat more sympathetic, response to the sensitive punishee who 
claims she will be “destroyed” by imprisonment might be, “because we don’t want 
you to suffer beyond your just deserts, we would like to avoid (most) of your harms 
from your special sensitivities, but doing this would require shifting substantial 
resources to your case which we simply cannot afford in light of the community’s 
other pressing needs. Our only plausible accommodation would be to set you free. But 
we must do our duty to you by punishing you.498 We also have a duty to your invadees 
                                                          
491 See id. at 977.
492 See id.
493 See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 455, at 175–78; id.
at 174 (“Potential offenders commonly do not know the legal rules, either directly or indirectly, 
even those rules that have been explicitly formulated to produce a behavioural effect.”).
494 See IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE COMMON SAYING: THAT MAY BE CORRECT IN THEORY, BUT 
IT IS OF NO USE IN PRACTICE (1793), reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 5, at 273, 
293–94 [hereinafter KANT, ON THE COMMON SAYING].
495 See id.; KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 431, 471–72.
496 See KANT, ON THE COMMON SAYING, supra note 494.
497 See generally SUSAN KUKLIN, NO CHOIRBOY: MURDER, VIOLENCE, AND TEENAGERS ON 
DEATH ROW (2008); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY (2014).
498 Kant notoriously claimed that the state has the duty to punish all criminals, just short of 
the heavens falling, in order to show respect for the criminal and her autonomous choices 
(otherwise, she is being treated as an incompetent). KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra
note 13, at 474–75. “Retributivism in other words, is truly a theory of justice such that, if it is 
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and those who are put at risk of your future wrongful risks to punish you.”499 Again, 
at the opposite extreme where, say, a prisoner’s severe temperature sensitivity could 
                                                          
true, we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is achieved.” Moore, Moral 
Worth of Retribution, supra note 127, at 96; see MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 170, at 
91, 154. Moore “defend[s] the purely moral claim that the obtaining of retribution is an intrinsic 
good.” Id. at 160; see Michael S. Moore, Responsible Choices, Desert-Based Legal Institutions, 
and the Challenges of Contemporary Neuroscience, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 233, 235 (2012) 
(“[A] freestanding, intrinsic good”). Brudner distinguishes legal retributivism from moral 
retributivism. Unlike legal retributivists, “all moral retributivists believe that the state should 
punish for the sake of the good inherent in punishing the morally guilty.” BRUDNER, supra note 
63, at 20. But, “[t]o say that punishment has intrinsic value would imply that the committing of 
an offence has instrumental value, but surely no-one would embrace this paradox!” Mundle, 
supra note 431, at 223. The Model Penal Code is not so strict. Among the considerations to “be 
accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of imprisonment” is that “the imprisonment 
of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents.” MODEL PENAL
CODE § 7.01(2)(k) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). In the private law context, however, we often do not 
think that we are disrespecting obligors or tortfeasors by allowing them to escape their 
obligations. Contract obligees and tort invadees have no duty to sue their obligors. Indeed, we 
often think we are honoring obligors by waiving their obligations.
From the other side of the Hohfeldian correlative—that is, the invader’s rights rather than the 
state’s duties—Morris argues that the fundamental, natural, inalienable, and absolute human 
right to be treated as a person entails the right to punishment. Herbert Morris, Persons and 
Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 127, at 74, 74–75. “[T]he denial 
of this right implies the denial of all moral rights and duties.” Id. at 75. Duff agrees that “[a] 
sane criminal has a right to be punished,” otherwise she is disrespected. DUFF, TRIALS AND 
PUNISHMENTS, supra note 82, at 263. Feinberg questions whether a criminal has a right or 
entitlement to be punished. FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 71, at 72 (“Of 
all those modes of official treatment for which a person might qualify under some institutional 
rules, only punishment seems resistant to the language of rights . . . .”). Why shouldn’t the 
criminal’s right or the state’s duty be waivable by the right-holder, as are most other rights and 
duties? See, e.g., ADLER, URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 406, at 19; SADURSKI, GIVING 
DESERT ITS DUE, supra note 56, at 245–47. The exceptions to waivable duties are those based 
on self-disrespect (e.g., mutilation), which, arguably, is not the case here. “[A] renounced right 
ceases, sooner or later, to be a right, and the criminal’s ‘right’ to be punished is well-nigh certain 
to be renounced.” FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 71, at 73 (footnote 
omitted). Kant denies that a criminal has a duty to accept punishment. KANT, THE METAPHYSICS 
OF MORALS, supra note 13, at 476 (“the social contract contains no promise to let oneself be 
punished . . . .”). While Morris and Duff argue that a person is disrespected if the state denies 
her the right to be punished, this does not seem to be the normal reaction in the private law 
context where, say, an obligee declines to accept her obligor’s contract or tort obligations.
499 If the state declines to punish, does this show disrespect of the invadees and the public 
put at risk of future wrongful risks? “Of course Kant regards externally wrongful (illegal) 
conduct as deserving punishment, and the state not only may but must use such coercion to 
protect people’s rightful freedom.” WOOD, KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT, supra note 434, at 134 
(citation omitted). What if invadees consent to the invader’s nonpunishment? “[A] retributivist 
should urge punishment on all offenders who deserve it, even if no victims wanted it.” MOORE,
PLACING BLAME, supra note 170, at 89; Moore, Moral Worth of Retribution, supra note 127, at 
95. Moore objects to Fletcher’s “rights-based retributivism” whereby a victim can waive the 
right to demand the criminal be punished, seeing this approach as an engine of vengeance and 
neglectful of equal punishment concerns. Moore, Victims and Retribution, supra note 146, at 
75–79. Yet since an invadee can usually consent ex ante to what would otherwise be an 
autonomy invasion, why can she not consent, in effect, ex post? Is it partially because the 
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be rectified by providing her warmer clothing, we would expect the foreseeable harm 
to be avoided. At what point do we cross from the “ought” to the “can’t”?500
The deontic duties of respect may help us draw lines when resource trade-offs are 
necessitated. Three types of parties with interests in the trade-offs are identified above: 
the invader (punishee), whether or not she is particularly sensitive; the invadee and 
those put at future wrongful risk by the invader’s possible ensuing conduct; and, other 
members of the community who will be denied sufficiently respectful treatment by 
the government if resources are reallocated to meet the invader’s claim of unjust 
punishment. In this latter category, we can imagine the need to take money from 
schools, welfare, policing, and other public institutions to treat punishees fairly 
according to their just deserts. This may become a deontic problem. When schools, 
for example, are substantially substandard, the children denied a reasonable 
opportunity to hone their talents are not being treated with respectE, especially when 
other schools in the system are not substandard. The same can be said about some 
other public services. Indeed, we can imagine a sufficiently impoverished community 
such that virtually all its members are denied their entitlements to respectE and
dignityE, which is due them simply by virtue of their rational nature. On top of this, 
they may also be denied their just deserts for their conduct, thus denying them their 
rights to respectL and dignityL.
So what is a community to do when it cannot meet all of its deontic duties because 
of its lack of resources?501 Is it to disrespect some persons (e.g., invaders) to fully 
respect other persons (e.g., invadees)? Is it to (dis)respect all persons to an equal 
extent,502 thus requiring everyone to share in a denial of their rights? Is this denial to 
be proportional? On what would such proportion be gauged? These are among the 
myriad of issues that remain for a community that wishes to “do the right thing” 
according to Kant. Let the debate among reasonable, just people continue.
                                                          
invadee’s ex post consent largely leaves in place the risk of future wrongful risks by the invader 
to the public? For some invasions, this is highly attenuated (e.g., problematic theft of spouse’s 
assets). How does prosecutorial discretion relate to these concerns?
500 More generally, if conceptions of retribution stumble in principle or practice, at some 
point do they run afoul of the Kantian principle that “ought implies can”? See generally Robert 
Stern, Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?, 16 UTILITAS 42 (2004). If we 
cannot properly retributively punish an invader, ought we give up any attempt?
501 I speak here and elsewhere of a community’s deontic duties while, at the same time, I 
have denied that a community or a state is a moral being under the categorical imperative. Thus, 
a collective does not have independent deontic status. The reference to community rights and 
duties, then, must resolve back to the individual rights and duties of each member of the 
community. See supra note 88. This complicates the analysis. For example, impoverished or 
disabled members may have different duties from those not so disadvantaged. They may not be 
able to afford to give more for the penal system without depriving their children of a fair 
upbringing. Other characteristics of each community member may also go into the calculus of 
their duties. I leave these complications aside.
502 That “equal” is a loaded, controversial standard, see DOUGLAS RAE, EQUALITIES (1981).
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